

Britain
in the
World Front

By R. PALME DUTT



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FOREWORD

At the moment when this book goes to press, a grave and responsible decision stands before the British people.

The launching of the Soviet offensive on May 12 has placed in the hands of Britain and the United States the most favourable opportunity to deliver a parallel offensive in Western Europe in order that the combined strength of the United Nations shall complete the defeat of Hitler this year.

Will Britain act in time? Will Britain, with the support of the United States, establish the Second Front in Western Europe this summer? The opportunity of last autumn was lost. We cannot assume that the opportunity of this summer will be repeated. This is now the crucial question of Britain's role in the World Front. This question is the pivot of the present international situation.

Up to the time of writing, this issue is still undecided. The nation-wide demand for the Second Front in the West is growing. There is a certain change of tone in the recent references of Government leaders to the question, from the previous disparagement, to approval in principle of the aim of the establishment of the Second Front in Western Europe at an unspecified date. It is manifest that a decision for action cannot be announced before action. But an examination of recent Government declarations as a whole (especially the Deputy Prime Minister's declaration in the House of Commons on May 19 describing the present moment as "a pause before the full summer campaign breaks upon us") affords no basis for judging that any fundamental change of strategy has yet taken place or any decision for speedy action. There is still no sign of a united allied strategy to combine the entire strength

FOREWORD

of the alliance in the maximum immediate common offensive action for the aim of victory this year.

We cannot afford to delay. The strategic time is now—when the Soviet forces are already in full action, when the issue is in the balance, when the opportunity is highest, when the European peoples are looking for our action, when our intervention can play a crucial part in the joint victory. There is still time to act, though late. But the sands are running out.

Only the most overwhelming united national will and determination can compel the necessary measures for immediate action, overcome all reactionary opposition, and sustain with the full strength of mass support and readiness for sacrifice the necessary action, once initiated. The working class and democratic movement, all who have stood in the forefront of the struggle against fascist barbarism during its decade of terror over Europe and the world, hold now the greatest responsibility in securing this united national mobilisation and action, in order that Britain may play its full part in the World Front for the final destruction of the fascist aims of world domination.


This book is directed entirely to the pressing needs of the present hour—to the manifold tasks which must be fulfilled if the full strength of Britain is to be exerted in the common struggle for the aim of speediest victory. There are a host of controversial issues of the past and of the future which at the appropriate time will repay careful review in order that the full political lessons of the period may be drawn. But the present is no time for recriminations over the past or philosophising over the future. The present hour requires unity in action of all who stand for victory over the fascist enemy in the supreme battle which is now being fought for the future of mankind.

R.P.D.

May 25, 1942.

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CHAPTER I.

OUR TASK

THE crisis of our times, which has advanced through so many storms and strains since the opening of the war of 1914, has finally interlocked the fate of all human beings in a single conflict, a war between the world forces of progress and the most bestial and bloodthirsty barbarism which is expressed in Fascism. The defeat of Fascism is the imperative task for the future advance of humanity.

To-day this world conflict governs the outlook for every state and nation, for every party and organisation, for every man and woman. It dominates every political question, every question of the working class movement, every practical question for action. The future for Britain depends on the response we are capable of making to its demands.

In the tenth year since Hitler came to power, at long last, through harsh experience, after many obstacles and difficulties, after an arduous and zig-zag path, the common front against fascist war aggression, for which the democratic anti-fascist fighters so long strove in vain, is to-day being built up. It is still incomplete, still full of imperfections. But it exists.

On January 1st, 1942, the representatives of twenty-six States and nations, led by Britain and the Dominions, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Chinese Republic, signed the Pact of Alliance "for victory over Hitlerism." This pact gave formal expression to the World Front, to which further adherence is open to all "nations which are or may be rendering assistance and contributions to the struggle for victory over Hitlerism."

Against Hitler's much vaunted "Grand Alliance," which consists only of satellite States and puppet Governments ruling over enslaved and terrorised nations, there has come into existence a -voluntary partnership of independent States and peoples, reaching to nations and peoples all over the world engaged in a common struggle for the freedom and independence of nations against fascist enslavement.

In its broadest character, this World Front is a common front drawing together, not only the States and Governments which constitute the formal alliance, and the organised

national endeavour behind these Governments, but the widest range of national liberation, anti-fascist and popular democratic movements in all countries, including in the enemy and enemy-controlled countries, the international working class movement, international cultural movements, corresponding forms of the national front within each country, parties and organisations of varied type, men and women of varied social and political outlook, Conservatives, Liberals, Labour, Communists and non-party, who are all united, from whatever standpoint, in the common liberation struggle in the cause of national independence and human culture against fascist barbarism.

Britain in unity with the Soviet Union holds the key position in the vanguard of this battle. The central pillar around which has been built the alliance of the nations for freedom has been and remains the British-Soviet Pact of July 12, 1941. When Britain signed this Pact, it meant the closing of a chapter of many years of hostility to the Soviet Union and support of reaction, which had brought disastrous consequences for Britain and the world, and the opening of a new chapter in which Britain stands ranged with all the most progressive forces of the world.

To the British people falls the proud obligation, working and fighting side by side with the Soviet, American and Chinese peoples, and with all the nations struggling for freedom against the world menace of Axis Fascism, to play an active and responsible rôle in the vanguard of the battle through all the regions of the world reached by their strength.

Fascism, which is the enemy of all human progress, is above all the greatest enemy of the working class movement, in the battle against which it grew and rose to power, and for the destruction of which it was originally brought into existence by the most corrupt and degenerate champions of reactionary privilege. It is the deadliest menace in the path of all those who seek to build a new and better society based on equality and true freedom. Therefore, in all the common tasks for the organisation of victory, it is above all the working class and democratic movement which will need to play the leading part to give inspiration to the people, to arouse their highest efforts, to organise their struggle and to be the driving force in every sphere of policy for pressing forward the urgent measures required in the struggle and overcoming every obstacle in the path. The future of the working-class movement, and the attainment of all the great positive aims for which it stands,

depends on the fulfilment of this responsibility in the present conflict.

Fascism in its hatred of all humanity has declared war on every man, woman and child. The bombing of Guernica, Shanghai, Warsaw, Belgrade, Rotterdam, London and Moscow; the firing squad and the Gestapo in the conquered countries; the limitless atrocities in the war against the Soviet peoples and the explicit orders of the High Command for methods of extermination against whole populations: all these have shown the character of fascist "total war." The "total war" of Fascism combines the most elaborate technique; the utilisation of all the weapons of modern science and invention, and the intensive organisation of whole populations mercilessly regimented for its purposes, with the most systematic and organised brutality and terrorism, the brutalisation of its fighting forces, the inculcation of contempt, on the basis of its racial theories, for all the peoples against whom it fights as "sub-human," and the direction of the utmost savagery of war against the civilian populations, men, women and children.

This "total war" of Fascism cannot be met by the old methods of easy-going partial effort, dilatory routinism, "Business as usual" or protecting profits and privileges in front of 100 per cent. mobilisation. It must be met by the rising of the whole people in holy anger, uniting all their energies, their passion, their heroism and their determination in a single crusade and a single aim—the destruction of this foul enemy.

Clearness of aim, unity, organisation, discipline and self-sacrifice of the entire people are the elements of victory over Fascism. There is no room for ambiguities, complacency, compromises, "appeasement," waverings or vacillation or half-heartedness in the fight.

To achieve victory over Fascism, this most cunning and desperate enemy, and to carry out our responsibilities in the great alliance of the peoples for this aim, we must

- (1) ensure the maximum participation of the full strength of this country in the joint effort, military, economic and political;
- (2) organise production for victory and elicit the democratic initiative of the masses of the people;
- (3) build up the closest unity in spirit and effort of the civilian population and of those serving in the armed forces;
- (4) overcome every reactionary obstruction and defeat all manoeuvres of the pro-fascist enemies of the nation;

- (5) ensure a leadership in the Government and in all commanding positions representative of the unity of the nation for these aims;
- (6) draw close the co-operation of the peoples all over the world, including in the countries of the Empire, and also in the enemy-occupied and in the enemy countries, for the speediest destruction of Fascism;
- (7) maintain and strengthen British-Soviet unity and co-operation in every field, and carry it forward, through the present struggle and through victory, in the future tasks of international co-operation.
- (8) make secure the victory, when won, by the establishment of a peace which shall be based on the freedom of the peoples and on the organisation of common action for the maintenance of peace against all aggression; and to lead the way to the further advance which then becomes possible.

The fulfilment of these tasks is the condition of victory over Fascism.

The conditions under which we have to organise our struggle are not easy. In a society built on social inequality, rent with divisions, and with deep unsolved economic and political problems, we have now to achieve that unity of will and action which can alone defeat the common enemy, whose defeat is the condition of all further advance. But it must be done. The obstacles must be overcome. National unity in the struggle must be achieved.

A heavy price has to be paid for past reactionary policies and long continued weaknesses in leadership, policy and organisation. The paying of this price is not yet completed; and we must be prepared in consequence for still further reverses and disappointments until the lesson is learned. The war demands the overcoming of a host of legacies of disorganisation, inefficiency, the stranglehold of vested interests, and anti-democratic prejudices and reaction from the past. The more speedily we learn the lessons and act on them, carrying through the changes that are necessary, the more speedy will be the victory on which all further advance in finally overcoming the roots of these evils depends.

The present book has been prepared, at this fateful turning-point in the history of the British people, to assist in the fulfilment of these tasks.

CHAPTER II.

WHAT STANDS IN THE WAY?

THE greater part of a year has passed since the summer of 1941 brought the British-Soviet Pact and the world coalition against Fascism.

Where do we stand? Have the essential conditions for victory been carried out? Are we playing our full part in the Alliance?

It is evident that the war is advancing to its highest intensity in these critical months of 1942. Are we prepared to play our part in these coming decisive conflicts?

In broad outline, on a large canvas, on a long term view, it might seem that all the conditions were present for victory, and that the road lies straight before us. The world coalition of the democratic Powers and of all the democratic anti-fascist forces exists, with overwhelmingly superior potential strength in resources and population to the fascist enemy. The headlong Nazi advance into the heart of the Soviet Union during the last six months of 1941 has been held and turned by the magnificent Soviet resistance. The Soviet counter-offensive has opened the possibility, given combined action, of the decisive defeat of Hitler this year, and the Soviet aim has been repeatedly and with increasing emphasis proclaimed for victory in 1942. United States production is being mobilised for war. In Britain there is more complete national unity than ever before in the history of this country for the common cause of victory over Fascism. There is the fullest support behind the Government for all the measures that are necessary for the achievement of this victory.

And yet—this is not the whole picture. Every one knows that we are still faced with a serious and critical situation, that the long chapter of grave reverses in a whole series of spheres of the war has up to the present continuously extended, and that we are still far from having reached that maximum effort and achievement which is indispensable for victory.

The potential superiority of the world coalition has not yet been translated into practical superiority in action. The unity of the alliance established in 1941 has not yet been accompanied by corresponding unity and co-ordination of strategy. During all these months the united strategy of the two-front war against

Hitler has not yet been achieved; the Second Front in Europe does not yet exist; and the Nazi regime has been using these months to work all the arsenals of Europe overtime in preparation for the gigantic conflicts now opening. The only positive military action on our part during the first half-year since the Pact, alongside the terrific battles in Eastern Europe, the Libyan offensive, which opened in November, met with the set-back of Rommel's counter-thrust. Japan with lightning speed has swept over Eastern Asia, directly menacing India and Australia. The divergence between the strategic conception of victory in 1942, proclaimed as the aim by Soviet spokesmen, and the conception of a waiting policy till 1943 or later, proclaimed by Anglo-American spokesmen, has so far remained unresolved.

On the home front the problems of production still clamour for effective solution. There is still confusion and wasted effort. While every theatre of war has revealed the same record of desperate shortage of material, there are still by common admission un-utilised reserves of productive power, and even restrictive influences hamper full production. There is not yet full mobilisation of the man-power and woman-power of the country. Passivity, half-heartedness and limited effort among wide sections have not yet been overcome. We have not yet achieved the self-sacrificing drive by every man and woman that is necessary to defeat Fascism.

It is only necessary to sense the opinion of every section of the nation to be conscious of the most widespread disquiet, anxiety, questioning; doubts of existing policies and strategy; doubts of the competence of ruling authorities or methods of organisation.

What is wrong? The answer is often given that "democracy works slowly," that we cannot expect the same efficiency and speed of mobilisation as in the fascist regimes, that we will "muddle through," that "time is on our side," that the superiority of forces on our side will tell in the long run, that we must trust to a waiting policy, etc. The inadequacy of these answers is manifest, and has by now been abundantly proved by experience. It is not true that Fascism is efficient and that democracy is necessarily inefficient. On the contrary, one of the most significant facts of the recent period has been that in contrast to the collapse of France in a few weeks and the Anglo-American reverses, it has been precisely the most advanced democratic forms of organisation, the People's Armies of the Soviet Union and China, which have won successes against Nazi Germany and against Japan. We need more democracy, not less. We need the fullest scope for the initiative and creative energy of the

people overcoming all barriers. The ruthless "total war" of Fascism cannot be met by bureaucratic methods or by waiting defensive policies which expect automatic victories or mistake potential resources for actual resources. The defeat of the fascist onslaught requires full and conscious participation of the mass of the people, ready for the maximum effort and sacrifice, just as it requires the full mobilisation, organisation, leadership and action in strategy which can alone wrest the initiative from Fascism and ensure speediest victory.

Nor is it true, as is sometimes said, that the expressions of criticism represent only an unreasoning dissatisfaction or searching for scapegoats in the face of temporary reverses, when such reverses need to be counted on in the ups and downs of the severe ordeal of war to be met with strengthened determination. The readiness and ability of the British people to meet the heaviest reverses and difficulties without weakening, and with only reinforced resolution, is unquestionable. The dissatisfaction is specific, and expresses the sense of definite and avoidable inadequacies of preparedness, organisation, policy or leadership.

The millions of soldiers "browned off," as they find themselves condemned to prolonged inactivity, with no prospect of facing the enemy or to soul-destroying "spit-and-polish" routine, while our allies are carrying forward the decisive battles of history against Fascism on the Eastern European front and calling in vain for our participation. Or the soldiers overseas who find themselves again and again compelled to meet the enemy without adequate equipment or aircraft protection. The millions of workers in war industry, chafing against enforced idle time and unused or half-used machines or waste of their skill, or told by the foreman "to look as if they were doing something" when a royal inspection takes place. The women eager to offer their services, and met with vague dilatory answers from harassed administrative officials and assurances that there is "no work." The small manufacturers vainly seeking for orders for their plant, and finding themselves up against the entrenchments of the ring of monopolists in possession who snugly dominate the war controls and even openly restrict production. The younger officers, eager to respond to the new requirements of technique and strategy of a war of ceaseless innovation, and finding themselves powerless to storm the fortifications of the no less firmly entrenched, old-fashioned military caste which similarly choked off the De Gaulles in France and led France to ruin. A whole generation awakening to political life and awareness in this titanic conflict and finding themselves paralysed and thwarted

by the reactionary forces entrenched in the governing party machinery and parliament. Restrictions of democratic expression, and the prohibition of the only newspaper not owned by the millionaires. The millions of colonial peoples frozen off from participation in a struggle which determines their fate, and which is regarded as only the affair of their masters, with their role to be the pawns and spoils of the victor. The placid settlements of rentier parasites (with their families prudently evacuated to the United States or Canada) in the spas or "safe" resorts, living on the fat of the land, and complaining that the war in the Far East has been brought home to them because it has restricted their supply of golf balls, while the soldiers' dependents are struggling to exist or selling their household furniture, and the railwayman toils through the black-out for his three pounds a week. All this is the other side of the medal of England at war to-day.

And all this, alongside the desperate admitted urgency of the war situation.

Is it surprising that emulous comparisons with the war effort of the Soviet Union begin to be made, not merely by representatives of the left, who have long recognised the distinctive strength of the social and political system of the Soviet Union, but by representatives of the right, who have previously disparaged that system as supposedly inefficient and not based on the will of the people. It is a Churchill who, in the hour of crisis after the fall of Singapore, holds up the example of the unbreakable national unity of the Soviet people in the face of reverses as a model for the British people. It is the organs of the millionaire press which, with rueful references to previous laughter at the Five Year Plans, hold up Soviet war production as a model of efficiency from which British business men should learn.

It took only a few weeks for the two hundred millions of the Soviet Union, thrust from the midst of peace into the midst of war by Hitler's treacherous aggression, to mobilise all the resources of their country, and to mobilise every man, woman and child against the barbarous total war of Fascism. The entire people have risen as one to meet the enemy. They have stood up to an onslaught the like of which has never before been known in war, and within six months moved to their counter-offensive. All the representatives of every shade of opinion in the democratic countries have paid tribute to the epic example of this people who know no quislings; to their unbreakable national unity of will and action; their creative energy and

miracle of achievement equally in the factories and at the front; to the way in which they have gone through an ordeal without equal, with the long retreat, the devastation of their territories and the infinite barbarism of the invader, and emerged, at the very moment when the experts on both sides were proclaiming their annihilation, to thrust back at the enemy with unquenchably renewed and ever rising confidence, vigour and resolution.

Yet here in Britain in the third year of the war, in a country with great initial advantages and resources and with a long tradition of leadership in the world, we are still struggling with heavy obstacles which cripple our effort.

Undoubtedly, it is true that there can be no close analogy between the Soviet Union and this country. Our conditions and problems are in many respects different. The Soviet people are strong, not merely because of what they are achieving to-day, but because of what they have achieved for a quarter of a century. They were able to establish from the outset a planned and unified war production, free from conflicting interests, and comparatively without difficulty and without delay, despite the heavy technical obstacles through the enemy occupation and the devastation of key industrial regions, because they had already built up a planned economy through twenty-three years of arduous reconstruction of the whole basis of ownership and organisation in industry and agriculture and through the laborious experience of three Five Year Plans. They are able to display a unity greater than any other people can immediately reach, because they have already in peace-time built up a society free from the division of classes and realising the equality of all the races and nations within it and the complete equality of men and women. They entered the war with those advantages. We have to wage the war without those advantages. We cannot undo in the twinkling of an eye the neglect of twenty years or make good what we should have achieved in the years of peace. With our existing forces and resources, with the nation at the stage of development it has to-day reached, we have to organise our war effort in the present urgent immediate conflict. Inheriting all the obstacles of a society based on the division of classes, and of the anarchy and monopoly interests of privately owned industry, we have to find the way to organise the united endeavour of the nation, and of all sections of the nation, in the war effort, and the most efficient organisation of the war effort, in such a way as to overcome and break down the crippling influence of sectional interests. The task is not easy, but it can be accomplished, and

its accomplishment is the condition of victory. The difficulty only means that our effort must be the greater.

The British-Soviet Pact brought Britain out of the dangerous isolation in Europe which the previous policy of hostility to the Soviet Union, refusal of the Pact when it was offered before the war, and neglect of collective security had caused. It brought a profound change in the situation and the character of the war, and the birth of new hope and confidence and energy throughout the nation.

These hopes have received their measure of fulfilment with the establishment of the world coalition against Hitler and the consequent shifting of the balance of world forces to the disadvantage of Fascism.

Yet the hopes and enthusiasm which greeted the great changes of the summer of 1941 have been in part sapped and weakened by the policies of passivity, and have given place to renewed disquiet and questioning.

This was further intensified by the serious reverses in the Far East. Indeed, never was questioning more acute than in the early months of 1942 over the whole position and prospect of Britain in the war, over all the questions of strategy and organisation. The reconstruction of the Government in February, 1942, was a measure of reflection of this demand for a new and strengthened approach.

This deep concern, this sense of a crisis of the British people, is by no means confined to popular opinion. It finds its reflection equally in ruling class opinion. Consciousness of a deep inner bankruptcy, the fear of the looming possibility of the collapse and loss of the Empire, haunts ruling class expression.

Thus on February 21, 1942, the *Times* published an editorial which bears already something of the character of an obituary notice of the old Britain. It wrote:

"For a hundred years before 1914, Great Britain occupied a position of unparalleled greatness and prosperity. In the war of 1914-18 she enjoyed the powerful support of allies and associates; yet when the armistice sounded she could feel with justification that she had been the leader of the coalition and that hers had been the major share in the victory. Not only did this rightful consciousness of a glorious tradition in the past create an undue sense of security and ascendancy in the present: it also bred a blind and deep-seated belief, all the stronger for being rooted in instinct and rarely explicit in words, that the same methods which had hitherto produced these satisfactory results could be relied on to produce the same results in the future. Hence the unreasoned and almost unconscious resistance to innovation which has dominated national policy, domestic and international, military and economic, in an era of world-wide change."

Similarly the *Economist*, February 21, 1942, on the same theme wrote:

"The British people have been wonderfully patient under the long string of disasters and disappointments. But they are getting very tired of always losing—and usually losing so badly. In the whole history of the war, the British Army has not a single success of any importance to its credit—unless it be the very Pyrrhic triumphs of Dunkirk or the very temporary gains in Libya. True, it has had a great deal of bad luck—but the good general does not have bad luck. True, it has been short of equipment, but production is now very large. True, shipping is scarce, but it could have been less scarce if the imports of food had been reduced as drastically as the situation has demanded for several months past. And in any case, all of these excuses in combination do not explain what happened at Singapore. The dispatch from Batavia in Tuesday's *Times* was the most terrifying document that has appeared in print for many years. 'Soft' troops, unenterprising commanders, outwitted strategists, and incompetent administration, an apathetic native population—these are not the signs of a gallant army betrayed only by bad luck; they sound uncomfortably like the dissolution of an Empire."

And further:

"It is not the armed forces alone that require the reformer's zeal. Nowhere in the world is a scorched earth policy more necessary than in Whitehall. With rare exceptions, the present process of government is one of interminable delays, resulting in ridiculous compromises. The faculty of decision has been lost. . . ."

"It is a base libel to represent Britain as a tired but dogged sexagenarian with no prospect after successful defence save an honourable retirement."

These expressions are symptomatic of the severe self-questioning which has arisen, the sense of the dying days and bankruptcy of a whole régime.

This is not the place to pursue the deeper issues raised by these critics. The decisive question at this moment is not the question of the basic weakness of the old traditional society in Britain, and the basic reconstruction which will have undoubtedly to take place. The decisive question now is how, in spite of the obstacles arising from this inherited structure of the old society, to organise our forces, to-day and not to-morrow, for the defeat of Nazism. In proportion as we fulfil this task, we shall be the stronger to deal with the deeper evils.

What stands in the way? What holds back the full mobilisation of the people, in order to overcome the present weaknesses and disorganisation and exert our full strength?

Many of the obstacles arise from the legacy of the past, the deadweight of past reactionary policies and inherited institu-

tions and forms of organisation which still exercise a paralysing influence and hamper the war effort.

It would fall outside the scope of this book to go into the causes which have led us into the present mess. The inter-war years, under the rule of the Baldwins, MacDonaldis, Chamberlains and Montagu Normans, were not happy years in the history of the British people. They were years of lost opportunities: of a profound social and economic decline, reflected in chronic mass unemployment, derelict areas and the decay of the basic industries, alongside tightening monopoly and growing parasitism; of reaction at home, expressed in the domination of Conservatism for eighteen out of the twenty-one inter-war years; of a reactionary colonial policy, most sharply expressed in the worsening relations with India; and of a reactionary foreign policy, destroying the weak attempts at a collective peace system, pursuing hostility to the Soviet Union, rebuilding the military power of German reaction, and supporting the enemies of the people and opposing popular advance in all countries: all culminating in the present war. Nor was the labour movement ready to take over leadership and carry through the changes that were necessary: the hostility of the ruling class to the Soviet Union was paralleled by the vendetta against Communism within the labour movement; and the divided labour movement proved unable to check the course of reaction.

To-day we are having to pay a heavy price for the legacy of these lost years. We are not only having to pay it in the difficulties of the international situation whose outcome has been the present war and the reverses in the war. We are having to pay for it in economic life, with the stranglehold of the monopolies on production, the dismantled shipyards, the restricted productive machinery, the neglected acres of the countryside, the loss of skilled labour. We are having to pay for it in the political field, with the still powerful role in parliament and in political life of those who were responsible for the old pro-fascist policies, as they were responsible for the policies of economic restriction, and whose continued influence has been seen in the pouring out of millions of pounds to a Franco, the privileges of a Mosley, the protracted unwillingness to declare war on Hitler's satellites in Europe, and the tenacious opposition to an active anti-Hitler strategy and combined offensive with the Soviet Union in Europe. We are having to pay for it, in the colonial sphere,

where the results have made themselves sharply felt by all in the Far East, and where even the urgent need, with the enemy at the gates, to reach a basis of cooperation with the Indian people to enable them to mobilise their defence as a co-partner of the United Nations has been resisted and has so far met with an alarming breakdown. We are having to pay for it in the whole sphere of administration, with a bureaucracy still dominated by the old Munichite chiefs paralysing initiative and speedy action. We are having to pay for it in the military field, with the unpreparedness in armaments, the effects of the resistance to mechanisation, the dominance of reaction in the High Command and opposition to innovation and new strategic conceptions.

The past cannot be changed. But we can change the present. We can and must ruthlessly clear away every obstacle from reactionary past policies which stands in the way of present needs. We must be prepared to make far-reaching changes without hesitation in accordance with war needs. There can be no room in politics or in any commanding positions for those who hold responsibility for the old pro-fascist policies: to play with this question is to ask for trouble. In the economic sphere we must establish effective control and a united plan of war production which will override the resistance of monopolies and vested interests. In the colonial policy we need a new approach, the first step in which must be partnership with a free India. We must establish working class unity as the essential basis of democratic strength: in the labour movement there is neither room for the outlook of the bourgeois of the right, who, on the basis of old antagonisms, oppose such unity to-day; nor for the bourgeois of the former left, who fail to understand the urgency of the present struggle and the necessity of national unity for victory. In every sphere, in administration, in government and in the military command we need to make room for the advance of new forces and new methods, capable of overcoming the old routine and responding to the new needs, close to the people, resolutely anti-fascist in outlook and able to carry forward the struggle against Fascism to victory.

Alongside the legacies of the past, there is a second factor which exercises a hampering effect on all sections of the nation—the fear of the future. In a society which has been built up on the basis of every individual looking after his own interests, on trade competition, sectional antagonism and class division, the call to sacrifice individual interests to national need inevitably gives rise to hesitations, doubts, divided loyalties and

incomplete response, not merely through the continuance of old outlooks and direct selfish resistance, but also through genuine and serious concern and anxiety for the future. Employers and managers in industry, compelled to consider the interests of their firm or their shareholders, respond to the national call with a divided loyalty, when they are simultaneously judging every new proposal and development with one eye on how it will affect the future interests of their firm, its hold on the market, its future trading position, or, with the memory of the sequel to the last war, fear the extension of production because they are haunted by the spectre of excess capacity after the war. Similarly the workers and trade unions, eager to respond to the appeal for maximum production, but with bitter memories of the sequel of the last war, are held back in agreeing to necessary changes in practices, sacrifice of old safeguards and hard-won positions, extension of training or the use of semi-skilled workers and the introduction of women in industry, because they fear the effects in the consequent weakening of their bargaining position in the economic struggle after the war. The women who are called on to give their services in the war effort, break home ties and enter production, view with anxiety their prospect after the war, in view of the experience which followed the last war, when the women who had responded to the call for war service were unceremoniously thrust aside from the jobs they had been temporarily called on to fulfil, and there was no further use for their training and capacity. In the same way the farmers, with no less bitter memories of the promises to agriculture at the end of the last war, hesitate to give full co-operation in the urgently needed maximum extension of production on the land, because they fear the situation which they foresee with the withdrawal of government support and the collapse of agricultural prices after the war.

Thus the fear of the post-war position becomes a factor paralysing the maximum effort in the war. Preoccupation with post-war prospects becomes the enemy of victory in the war, and could thus finally lead, if given free play, to the very outcome most feared, that is, the worst possible post-war position—defeat by Fascism.

We must overcome these paralysing doubts and fears; first by firmly recognising that the paramount necessity at the present moment, overriding every sectional interest, is the defeat of Fascism, on which depends the future prospect of every section of the nation; second, by recognising that the measure of strength of democratic response, initiative and organisation in tackling

the present needs of the war is the best guarantee and the only finally effective guarantee for effectively tackling the problems of the post-war world in such a way that the experiences which followed the last war shall not be repeated; and, finally by such provisional guarantees (as with regard to the restoration of Trade Union rights or with regard to future agricultural development) as can assist in mitigating the anxieties felt.

A third factor hampering the national effort and will to victory consists in the hindrances to national unity consequent on the existing social and political structure—the glaring inequality of sacrifice, the war profiteering (which the mockery of the 100 per cent. excess profits tax does not camouflage—for the right to declare dividends of 50 per cent. or 100 per cent. on the grounds that similar dividends were already being made at the height of the pre-war arms racket can hardly be dismissed as the abolition of war profiteering, while the public are awake to the trickery of financial reserves, undistributed profits, and similar devices), the class discrimination in the services and in the call-up, the injustices in the practical working of partial food rationing with the continuance of the luxury hotels and restaurants, the hardships of many soldiers' dependants, etc. Here it is necessary to face brutal facts frankly. We have to fight Fascism with the existing society of a class-divided nation; we threw away the chance to make a basic social reconstruction during the past twenty years, such as the Russians have carried out, and cannot now carry through this gigantic task overnight in the midst of the fight against Fascism, when it is necessary to rally all sections for the common struggle. But this only makes it the more necessary that we can and must carry through the most radical democratic measures for diminishing the inequalities, for really curbing profiteering and luxury expenditure, for all-round rationing, for protecting the health and standards of the people, for democratic changes in the armed services, and for working towards the aims of equality of sacrifice.

A fourth factor paralysing the national will is unclearness of aim. The question "What are we fighting for?" is still often heard. Neither the record of the ruling class during the past ten years since Hitler came to power, nor the extremely contradictory declarations of Government spokesmen and official propaganda, are calculated to inspire the confidence of the people in the present struggle as a democratic struggle against Fascism and for the victory of the freedom of the peoples. Every sign of weakness or hesitancy in effective collaboration with the Soviet

Union, of a conciliatory attitude to fascist régimes abroad or hostility to anti-fascist refugees, or opposition to recognising the claims to freedom of the colonial peoples, strengthens the doubts and suspicions.

The Soviet people have no difficulty in knowing what they are fighting for. The statements of Stalin lack nothing in concreteness. But it would be possible to compile a long list of statements of Government Ministers in Britain showing the most extreme contradictions on vital issues, e.g., the question of whether the war is against German Fascism or against the German people as a whole. Yet clearness of aim is the indispensable condition for the united mobilisation of the people and the will to victory.

The aims of the fight against Fascism, the ruthless exposure of what Fascism means and why its defeat is a life-and-death necessity for humanity, the aims of the victory of the freedom of the peoples and of the establishment of world peace as indicated in broad principle in the Atlantic Charter, need to be proclaimed in plain and concrete terms which can win the confidence and enthusiasm of the masses of the people. The aims of a conflict can only correspond to the forces waging it and directing its policy; and the clearness of aim of a democratic anti-fascist struggle can only be ensured by strengthening the representation in the Government and in all commanding positions of the most determined anti-fascist fighters who are capable of expressing the view-point of the millions in the war factories and the armed services.

All these factors underlie the tendencies to passivity, or lack of conviction, drive, 100 per cent effort or fighting spirit, of which complaint is often made. This passivity, running through many spheres of the war effort, both above and below, finds expression in a whole series of fields: in strategy; in production; in administration; in the political mobilisation of the people.

Representatives returning from the Soviet Union, whether statesmen, diplomatists, generals, or journalists have all borne witness to the difference of atmosphere of which they are conscious on their return: the absence of the same sense of urgency and all-out effort of the people. Petty preoccupations which reflect the absence of this sense of urgency and responsibility; sectional considerations, the tendency to regard the conflict as some natural cataclysm which has impinged on daily life, but is the concern and responsibility of those in control rather than our concern; negative criticism of those in authority, without the determination and activity to make the necessary changes; idle speculation on the post-war future; the old

complacent calculations that "we are bound to win," that "it will all come right in the end," without special effort on our part, that someone else somewhere will do the job for us, that "Fascism will collapse," that "Russia will win the war for us," that "America's vast resources makes victory certain"—all these tendencies which are the expression of passivity are still strong.

The task of overcoming this passivity is not an easy one, for it has deep roots in the past. It is bound up with the whole tradition and social-political structure of this country. For generations the unchallenged world monopoly and world leadership of Britain bred the assumption, instilled into the people by the ruling class, of a natural ordained and automatic superiority and privileged position without special effort; that no world events or catastrophes of other nations could really touch the stability and favoured immunity of this country; the lion might sometimes slumber, but he had only to stir anew to shake the world and re-assert his kingship. Only slowly does the awakening consciousness begin to break through that the old world situation is changed for ever; that Britain is no longer the foremost or strongest Power in the world; that the old sheltered immunity is gone; and that the issue of a struggle for national existence can seriously arise.

Similarly for generations the wars of British policy were conducted with skillfully constructed coalitions of allies, who bore the brunt of the fighting, while the hostilities were conducted on the soil of other nations. Only the war of 1914-18 brought the first shock, compelling heavy sacrifice of blood and life from the people of this country on a continental scale (though not proportionately as heavily as France or Germany or Russia); but even then there was not really a comparably serious threat to the island immunity; the French army remained intact; the enemy never held Paris or Calais; nor had air-power begun to balance sea-power; and the final victorious outcome strengthened the assumption of automatic victory.

The privileged economic position on the basis of the tribute of Empire and the export of capital all over the world bred parasitism in the life of the nation. This was reflected in the decline of the basic industries, the growth of the rentier class, and the growth of every form of non-productive service, salesmanship, the luxury service of the rentiers, etc. Characteristic of the modern period was the rapid multiplication of the so-called "new middle class," divorced from the traditions and habits of common action of either the ruling class or the working class; living standardised lives in the no less rapidly multiply-

ing standardised suburbs of the great towns; taught and trained by their whole conditions of life to seek "safety first"; and constituting the vast reservoir of passivity and apathy, the natural basis of Baldwinism and Chamberlainism.

For generations the people have been taught to look to a narrow and compact governing class—in which the names of a few families, or of the products of a handful of schools recur for generations in the leading offices of State, and into which the ambitious and successful newcomers in politics in each generation have been rapidly and effectively drawn—to direct the mysteries of State and control the conduct of administration. The one great popular assault on the entrenchments of privilege, Chartism, was beaten down and broken so completely that even its memory became dim and almost unknown to the sons and grandsons of the Chartists. There followed the long period of economic prosperity, in which liberalism was able to hold the workers under the sway of the ideas and politics of their masters, so that it was for long deemed impossible for a political party of the working class to arise in England. With the traditions of "public service" of the leisured ruling class, every sphere of national life, religion, culture, education, sports, youth organisation, has been directed and organised for the people by the representatives of the gentlemen, who set the tone, established the standards and philanthropically supervised the practice, so that the very forms of activity, ideas, and entertainments of the people were conducted along lines prescribed for them by their masters. There was another side to this picture, which found expression in the self-made organisations of the people, the trade unions and co-operatives; but these in nineteenth century England were still limited in scope, reaching only to a minority, and did not venture to challenge the ascendancy of the ruling class in the great issues of public affairs. The gradual advance of democratic reforms and extension of the franchise did not basically change this traditional aristocratic or oligarchic character of English politics and English society. The alternation of the "ins" and the "outs" of the two ruling parties left the same narrow ruling circle in control, while the people were privileged as spectators to cheer their favourites and at lengthy intervals of years appeared for a day as nominal sovereigns to determine such issues as it was agreed to place before them.

The growth of the political labour movement in the twentieth century represented the first advance of the movement

of the people to take the initiative into their own hands in public affairs. But during the past quarter of a century the same gulf between leadership and rank-and-file has appeared, with a vast mass membership, formal democracy within certain limitations, but active participation of only a small minority, so that the politically active have remained a handful, while the bulk of the membership have remained passive, voting faithfully at elections, but seldom attending meetings of their organisations to take part in the formation of policy and control of decisions. The official system of bans and division during the recent period, with the exclusion and partial disfranchisement of the militant left wing, has intensified this tendency to passivity and stagnation, so that the advance towards greater unity and political activity of the workers has had to proceed against heavy obstacles.

In the critical years before the war the overwhelming majority of public opinion in this country was strongly anti-fascist, opposed to Hitler and Mussolini, hated the Chamberlain policies of conciliation to Fascism, supported collective security and approved the idea of an Anglo-Soviet Pact. Every testing of the evidence showed this again and again. The Peace Ballot in 1935, with its eleven million vote for collective security, disturbed ruling class circles. The 1935 elections had to be carried out on a basis of plain deception, with the proclamation of an anti-fascist League programme to win a majority, in order to carry out a Chamberlain programme of appeasement to Fascism and sabotage of the League. In the spring of 1939 a Gallup poll showed an 87 per cent. majority for an Anglo-Soviet military pact, at the same time as the Government was declaring that the adoption of such a Pact would fatally divide Europe into two ideological camps and was preparing to propose a thousand million pound loan to Hitler as the better way. Yet this overwhelming public majority opinion for the plain policy which would have been capable of preventing the present war was never able to make itself effective against the narrow unpopular Chamberlain Cliveden clique. The campaign for a union of the popular forces to defeat Chamberlain and ensure the alternative policy in time was able to organise great and enthusiastic demonstrations, but was not able to mobilise a decisive political majority. The mighty labour movement remained unmoved. The giant forces of passivity, strengthened by the inaction of the labour movement, won the battle for the hated and unpopular Chamberlain.

To-day the crisis is serious in the final degree. There is no

room for passivity. There are no more last chances. A new approach is necessary, a break with old forms and paralysing limitations, a drastic change in the whole outlook and way of life in this country, a rousing of the energies and initiative of the masses of the people in a way that has never been done before. The many-million-strong working class movement has a prime responsibility in this to play the part that it can play, in every factory, in every locality, in every decision of national policy. The people must act or perish. This war is like no other war. The existence of the working class movement, the existence of democracy in any part of the world, the existence and future of socialism, of human progress and the freedom of peoples is at stake before the universal night of darkness with which Fascism threatens to engulf the world. The methods of this war are like no other war. The entire strength of organised populations, military, economic, industrial, moral and political, are thrown into the field. We cannot conduct this war on the principle of limited liability. Victory or extinction—these are the alternatives equally for Fascism and for the cause of popular freedom. The same superhuman energy, creative initiative and universal mobilisation which the Soviet people have been able to demonstrate, we must achieve in this country also. We must and can overcome every obstacle that stands in the way of this. We dare not fail.

CHAPTER III.

THE FACE OF THE ENEMY

1—WHAT IS HITLERISM ?

At this time of day, when Fascism is so branded in the sight of all thinking people; when its barbarities and outrages, its pogroms and tortures, its racial megalomania and crucifixion of nations, its frauds and double-dealing, its glorification of war and cruelty and exploitation, its contempt for the people, denial of reason, holocaust of culture and insult to every decent human feeling, have become the common experience of the world; it might seem unnecessary to waste time in discussing its character.

Yet in fact the necessity remains. There is still very great confusion as to the character of Hitlerism or Fascism. There is the very vocal school of thought which sees no distinction between the Hitler regime and the German people, and draws from this a series of conclusions for strategy and war aims. Then there are those who separate the fascist régime from the war, declare that they have nothing against the fascist régime, in which they even see good points, and regret the war as a mistaken policy of Fascism, which has placed them under the reluctant necessity of fighting in opposition to it. Others seek to find similarities between Fascism and Communism, that is, between Fascism and its opposite, its most consistent antagonist. Others again seek to draw distinctions between "good" and "bad" Fascists, "extreme" and "moderate" Fascists, German and Italian Fascism, etc. All these various approaches have their practical consequences in the method of the conduct of the war. Every confusion weakens the fight against Fascism.

To know well the enemy against whom we are fighting is an indispensable condition for success in the fight.

At the outset it is necessary to be clear that our enemies are not the German, Italian or Japanese peoples, but the fascist rulers of these nations, who for their own ends have involved the masses of their peoples in war and whose rule imposes heavy sufferings upon them.

The masses of the German, Italian and Japanese peoples are our potential allies. Fascist rule has only been imposed on them by violence, terror and deception, not by free choice.

There is a corrupt, degenerate section, a minority of the population, who are the willing accomplices of the criminal fascist rulers: these are the hangmen, gangsters, storm-troopers, petty officials etc., who carry out the work of the fascist rulers and enjoy a share in the spoils. A section of the youth, who have been subjected from their earliest years to fascist training and known no other conditions, have grown up young fascist hooligans. But the masses of the people, held under an unexampled régime of daily terror and lies, are unthinking accomplices of their rulers rather than actively responsible. A heroic minority of the bravest fighters of the people and of the best representatives of the culture of these countries has conducted a consistent struggle against Fascism. This opposition will grow as the blows of the anti-fascist armies shatter the military prestige of Fascism and the deepening misery of the life of the peoples under the fascist rule is stripped of all lying pretensions to hide it. So long as the masses of the peoples obey the orders of their masters and work and fight for them, we must necessarily conduct war against the entire forces led by Fascism without distinction, for the will they represent is the will of the fascist rulers; they are fascist armies. But in conducting war, we look always to the masses of the people controlled by Fascism as our future allies and seek to win them to our side as speedily as possible in the common struggle.

The British-Soviet Pact of July 12, 1941, described the present war as a war "against Hitlerite Germany"—thus for the first time in an official document defining the aim of the fight to be a fight against Hitlerism, and not against the German people. This corresponded with the declaration of Molotov on June 22, 1941, when Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union:

"This war has been forced upon us, not by the German people, not by the German workers, peasants, and intellectuals, whose sufferings we well understand, but by the clique of bloodthirsty Fascist rulers of Germany, who have enslaved Frenchmen, Czechs, Poles, Serbians, as well as Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other nations."

Similarly the Atlantic Charter of August, 1941, after describing "the policy of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite Government of Germany and other Governments associated therewith have embarked," defined the military objective of the struggle to be "the final destruction of Nazi tyranny" as the indispensable condition for achieving the further aims of greater freedom and secure peace for mankind.

The Soviet-Polish declaration of Friendship, signed by Stalin

and Sikorski on December 4, 1941, laid down in its opening clause:

"German Hitlerite Imperialism is the most evil enemy of mankind. It is impossible to make any compromise with it."

The World Pact of twenty-six States and nations signed on January 1, 1942, summed up the struggle against the members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents as "the struggle for victory over Hitlerism."

Reporting this Pact to the House of Commons on January 27, 1942, Winston Churchill declared:

"This union is based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter. It aims at the destruction of Hitlerism in all its forms and manifestations in every corner of the globe."

What is this Hitlerism which has thus united the overwhelming majority of mankind against it?

Hitlerism is German Fascism. A fascist régime is inseparable from war. Fascism is a criminal régime imposed upon people by the most powerful reactionary forces in a country, the big trusts, landowners, military caste, etc., for the purpose, first, of holding down the people in absolute and terrorised subjection to their rule, when all other means of checking the advance of the people to freedom have failed; and second of conquering other countries and advancing to the domination of the world.

Hitlerism is the spearhead of World Fascism. Hitlerism, Nazism ("National Socialism") or Fascism are different terms for the same general type of régime or system, representing the most extreme, violent, brutal type of reaction in the modern era, the enemy of all democracy or progress. Fascism was the name invented by its original exponents in Italy, where it first won power under Mussolini; and Fascism has since become the most general term to describe it in all countries. Nazism or "National Socialism" was the term adopted by its exponents in Germany under Hitler. Hitlerism is the descriptive term which has come into general use in the countries outside Germany to denote Nazism or German Fascism, with special reference to its aims of world domination. When Fascism won control in such a powerful modern State as Germany, German Fascism became the most important, the strongest and most aggressive representative of Fascism all over the world, with its tentacles extending to all countries. The fight against Hitlerism is thus the fight against the spearhead of Fascism all over the world, an enemy representing the most reactionary social-political

forces and tendencies in modern society, with secret or open adherents in all countries.

The attempt to associate the whole German people with the Hitlerite rulers and their aims of world domination means to weaken our fight against Hitler. This view considers the militarist aggression and expansionist drive of Hitlerism towards the aim of world domination to be a peculiar racial characteristic of the German people, supposedly traceable for centuries and even for thousands of years. The exponents of this view accordingly condemn any attempt to appeal to the German people against their rulers, and demand a policy which will threaten the German people with an onerous peace imposing penal conditions and a military occupation for many years.

It is obvious that this policy is calculated to strengthen the resistance of the German people even around their Hitlerite rulers in order to prevent such a Carthaginian peace. This policy in fact emanates from reactionary circles who fear a real people's revolution in Germany, and who would consequently seek to use victory and the anger of the world against Hitler's crimes in order to penalise a future People's Germany and maintain in power the old reactionary elements, the basis equally of Pan-Germanism and Hitlerism. This policy is a reactionary policy opposed to the interests of a real victory over Hitlerism. Its principal exponent, Lord Vansittart, was a guest of Hitler before the war, and permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office in the initial years of the policy which helped to build up the armed strength of Hitler and tear down the restrictions of Versailles.*

* In his book "I Know These Dictators," Mr. Ward Price, of the *Daily Mail*, describes a dinner party given by Hitler in Berlin at the time of the Olympic Games.

"On the Chancellor's right sat Lady Vansittart, the wife of the British Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs who was then visiting Berlin. . . .

As Sir Robert Vansittart stood in the middle of the room after dinner, laughing and joking with Herr Hess, the Chancellor's deputy, there was a noticeable contrast between the glittering splendour of the star and cordon of the Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George worn by the one and the field-service-like simplicity of the khaki uniform of the other."

Lord Vansittart was Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1937. During this time British armament firms were engaged in exporting arms to Germany, including artillery and planes, contrary to the Versailles Treaty and with the sanction of the British government; the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty were finally repudiated by the German Military law of 1935, and

As for the pseudo-history with which it is attempted to buttress this view-point it is sufficient to note that if the German people are to be supposed to have been the principal exponents of the arts of world expansion throughout the bourgeois era ("For generations Germany has been trying to annex the earth"—Lord Vansittart), they have been singularly less successful hitherto than other Powers in the accomplishment of their designs. The racial diagnosis of Hitlerism is as great nonsense as the racial theories of the Hitlerites themselves, who proclaim the "Nordic German race" to be the natural rulers of the world. Indeed, the racial explanation of Hitlerism favoured by the Vansittart school, is only the servile echo, in reverse, of the racial theory of the Hitlerite philosophy.

Pan-Germanism is only one part of Hitler's Programme. Hitlerism arose as a weapon against popular revolution in Germany. It is perfectly true that Hitler was originally trained for political work by the Army under the control of the same Great General Staff which in fact continued unbroken from Kaiserism into the Weimar Republic; that he was sent into the tiny "German Workers' Party," which became the Nazi Party, under military orders as part of this political work; that the first Storm Troops were organised by a paid Reichswehr soldier; and that the money for establishing the first Nazi party organ, the "Völkische Beobachter," was supplied by the officer commanding the Munich Reichswehr, General von Epp. It is perfectly true that Hitler and the Nazi Party were built up, financed and protected, stage by stage, to power by the army and police authorities, the big industrialists, sections of the Junkers and the most reactionary elements of the old bureaucracy—all enemies of the Weimar Republic and apostles of Pan-Germanism, that is, of German imperialist expansion. When Hitler was finally placed in power, against the majority vote of the German people, by the dictatorial act of a Hindenburg, the true line of succession received symbolical expression. It is perfectly true

French protests over-ruled by Britain; the aerial disarmament clauses were repudiated by the proclamation and rapid building-up of the German air force; the Naval disarmament clauses were cancelled by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, which gave Germany the right to a navy and included a special clause permitting Germany to build submarines up to 100 per cent of the British level, whilst the German military reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 finally ended the military clauses of Versailles. Thus all the safeguards imposed by the Versailles Treaty against the rebuilding of German militarism were torn down with British connivance while Lord Vansittart was Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office.

that Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels, Daluege, Ley and the other Nazi leaders, and the elaborate apparatus they have built up, represent the political instrument, the scientifically organised last-word political machine, far more effective for its purpose than the old Kaiserism, of the most reactionary sections of German imperialism, of German monopoly capital.

But it is also true that Fascism is a phenomenon which has appeared in all capitalist countries, in greater or less degree, at a certain stage of development. Fascism has won power in Italy (before Germany), in France, Spain, in Japan (a special type of military Fascism, on the basis of Japanese feudal imperialism), in Vichy France (after the German conquest, but the fascist movement was strong for years before, and its supporters organised the capitulation in order to impose their reactionary régime), in Salazar Portugal, and in other countries. Fascist movements have appeared in Britain (Mosley) and in the United States (Dennis, Father Coughlin, the Silver Shirts). It is true that, with the establishment of the power of German Fascism, the strongest, most completely organised and aggressive fascist régime in the world, all other fascist movements in all other countries (Franco, Pétain, Mussolini, Mannerheim, Mosley, etc.) have become more or less tributary to it and vehicles of the influence of German Fascism. But this does not mean that these movements have not arisen directly out of similar conditions, from similar decaying reactionary elements, within these countries. When Lord Rothermere announced his support for Mosley some years ago he was not acting consciously as a Pan-Germanist.

The true character of Fascism thus needs to be recognised as a social-political phenomén with its roots deep in the existing outworn social order, and not as a peculiar racial outcome which can only arise in one country.

There are historical reasons why Fascism first won power in any front-rank industrial country in Germany. Prior to 1933 the theory was widely expressed that Fascism could only conquer in a backward semi-agrarian country, and not in a modern highly industrial country with a powerful organised working class movement. Hence the "It Can't Happen Here" illusion, which was widely prevalent in Germany and neighbouring countries up to 1933. The victory of Nazism in Germany dealt a crushing blow to these illusions (not the final blow, unfortunately; as late as May, 1940, on the very eve of the Pétain-Weygand coup in France, Blum at the head of French Socialism, in his speech to the Bournemouth Labour Party Confer-

ence, saw only the danger from the Communists and the Left, and saw no danger from the Right). With its victory in Germany Nazism became the dominant type of all Fascism, the heart of the hydra-headed monster which the whole world has now to fight.

The issue of the future of Germany, recognised on all sides as decisive for the future of European and world development, has run like a red thread through all the complications of world politics since the last war. Not only local and national factors, but also international factors have played their decisive role in the temporary victory of Fascism in Germany.

German imperialism was defeated in the war of 1914-18, after four and a quarter years of intense conflict, by the superior coalition of its enemies. The defeat led to a popular revolution which temporarily overthrew the ruling Junker and imperialist forces, represented by the Kaiser régime, but failed to consolidate its gains; and to the Versailles Treaty, by which the victorious Allied Powers sought to shatter and hold in chains the German imperialist rival.

Neither the partial revolution of 1918 nor the Versailles Treaty could solve the problem of Germany. On the contrary, all the contradictions were intensified. Only a genuine popular revolution in Germany, which destroys the military and bureaucratic caste, which strikes down the power and possessions of the Junker large landowners and of the big industrialists, and thus establishes the basis for a real democracy, could finally end the menace of German militarism and imperialism for the peoples of Europe. But the reaction in Germany and the reactionaries among the victorious Allied Powers were equally opposed to this.

Nazism throve on the crisis of defeated Germany and the counter-revolutionary complicity of Anglo-French reaction. The disorganisation of economy, the ruin and impoverishment of the middle class elements through inflation, helped to provide it with a recruiting ground. The world economic crisis, which hit German economy hardest, helped to sweep it forward to a leading position. Nazism made demagogic use of the genuine grievances of Versailles in order to attribute all the social and economic evils consequent on a society in dissolution to the Versailles Treaty, and thus harness the German people anew to the chariot of German militarism and imperialism. The reactionary ruling forces in Germany, bankrupt of any constructive policy, recklessly seeking a solution for their internal and external problems, and greedily grasping after any means for

their aims of world expansion, found in Nazism their chosen instrument.

So it came about that in 1933 power over the German people passed into the hands of a band of bloodthirsty adventurers, drug-maniacs and perverts, who let hell loose in Germany as a preliminary to letting hell loose over the world, and dragged down in shame the good name of Germany and every tradition of culture and civilisation of the German nation.

Hitlerism is a monstrous product. But the responsibility for that product rests not only with German reaction, and with those sections of the German people who assisted or permitted its rise to power. It rests also with the reactionaries of all countries who assisted to build up its power, and with the peoples who failed to prevent those policies; just as the responsibility now rests with the peoples of all countries in union with the German people to destroy the monster.

2—THE SYSTEM OF FASCISM

Fascism means war. The fascist system cannot be separated from the war aims of Fascism. From the outset the Nazi revolution in Germany was not merely a violent attempt to solve the internal social and political crisis of the old régime in Germany. It was at the same time, from the first hour of Hitler's coming to power, a conscious and systematic step in the preparation of war for the aims of world expansion. All the measures of the Nazi régime, not only in the direct military sphere, but in industry and production, civil administration, education or the regimenting of the population, have been directed and are directed to the supreme aim of war.

In 1936 Major Jost, the head of the Press Department of the German War Ministry, issued a pamphlet on "The Military Significance of the National Socialist Revolution." This pamphlet was published with a preface by the War Minister, General von Blomberg, who declared that "the contents may be regarded as having official approval." In this officially authorised pamphlet it was explained that Nazism represents the necessary form of State organisation for modern "total war."

"The writer goes on to show that the form of the National-Socialist State corresponds with the requirements of modern war which demands all the moral, physical, and material resources of the State. He recalls the divorce between strategy and politics in the pre-war period which caused the totalitarian nature of war to be forgotten. As chief of the State, Leader of the Party, and supreme Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Adolf Hitler

is the master of Germany, with power in his hands for which there is scarcely any precedent in history. All opposition between soldier and citizen, between civilian and military thinking, has been resolved in his person."

(Berlin correspondent of *The Times*, February 27, 1936.)

Similarly in 1936 Mussolini declared:

"The regulating plan of Italian economy is dominated by one premise—the inevitability that the nation must be welded into one concrete warlike bloc. When and how war will break out no one can say, but the wheel of destiny runs fast. Industry which works directly or indirectly for the defence of the nation and has formed its capital from public subscriptions, and the industry which has developed to such an extent as to be capitalistic or supercapitalistic, will be formed into great units corresponding to what are called key industries. . . . We are moving towards a period in which these industries will have neither the time nor the power to work for the private consumer. They must work exclusively, or almost exclusively, for the armed forces of the nation."

(Mussolini, Speech to the Second National Assembly of Corporations, March 23, 1936.)

The internal and external aims of Fascism are inseparable. Fascism, the system of violent rule of the most reactionary big monopolist interests, is inevitably at the same time the system of organisation of the State and economy for aggressive war.

For many years Fascism succeeded in deceiving, or at any rate in winning the support of large numbers of respectable, influential and educated people in all countries. Blinded by its claim to represent their bulwark against Communism or democratic advance, they became its apologists and sycophants; they palliated its crimes and extolled its supposed virtues. Statesmen, financiers and arms merchants vied with one another in supplying the armaments to Fascism which were subsequently to be used against their own peoples. The worst infamies of Fascism were kept out of the official press; the consular reports on the concentration camps, which were available in the official pigeon-holes through all these years, were not made public property until after the outbreak of war; anti-Nazi films like "Professor Mamlock" were suppressed. Aristocrats and millionaires, press magnates and politicians, professors and publicists paraded in a long series at the Nazi public rallies or intimate gatherings as guests and friends of this crew of bloodstained gangsters, whose touts were received in turn in this country as the darlings of Mayfair and the country house parties. Religion also was drawn into the racket, with Buchmanism and "moral rearmament"; and high

placed pacifism had its part. The majority of these gentry have not yet disappeared from public life. Some of them have since had their eyes opened; others are prudent enough to keep their mouths shut, or endeavour for the moment to sing in a different key in public. But they remain influential; their basic sentiments and outlook on life have not changed; and the danger remains that at an appropriate moment they will seek to return to their vomit and by one tortuous means or another work anew for their old sinister aims. This is one of the reasons why the basic exposure of the whole system of Fascism remains important, even though it is nowadays universally denounced in public expression in this country.

In addition, some sections of workers in all countries and of middle-class democratic opinion have been taken in by the apparent efficiency of the economic and social organisation of Fascism. They have confused Socialism with Hitler's "National Socialism." In this way they have failed to distinguish between propaganda lies and reality.

Socialism, the aim to which the organised working class movement and large sections of opinion in all countries look as the solution of their problems, the solution of the problems of war and poverty and of all the evils of the old class society, has nothing in common with "National Socialism" or Fascism.

Socialism is characterised by the abolition of classes, through the common ownership of the means of production which are socially operated for the general benefit. This abolition of the monopoly of the narrow propertied ruling class establishes for the first time the conditions for complete democracy, by removing those barriers which limit the effectiveness of the democratic rights already won by the people in the capitalist democratic countries as the first step to their further advance. The social ownership of the means of production, by establishing the equal participation of all in the labour of society, and enabling all to share in its fruits on the basis of their labour (finally, in communist society, on the basis of needs alone), ends the exploitation of one section of society by another and provides the indispensable foundation for universal free and equal citizenship, for real freedom.

Fascism, on the other hand, is characterised by the violent maintenance of the class system, of the division between the great monopolist trusts and the mass of the population, who are completely deprived of all rights, even of the rights they have won in the capitalist democratic countries. The power of the monopolies, fused with the State, is established as a statutory

power over a serf population (the Labour Code), maintained by every device of ideological domination and bloody terror. This is the essence of Fascism, from which all else follows; the destruction of democracy; the war on culture and freedom of thought; the systematic barbarism; the drive to expansion and world conquest.

Hitler laid bare the true character of "National Socialism" or Fascism when he declared:

"We want a selection of the new ruling stratum which realises that, by virtue of its racial superiority, it has the right to rule and ruthlessly to maintain and secure with all means its rule over the broad masses."

(Quoted in Konrad Heiden "History of National Socialism").

Goebbels put the point no less explicitly in his brochure "Prussia Must Become Prussia Again":

"Socialism is Prussianism (Preussentum). The conception 'Prussianism' is identical with what we mean by Socialism."

And again in a speech in East Prussia:

"Our Socialism is that which animated the Kings of Prussia, and which reflected itself in the march-step of the Prussian Grenadier regiments: a socialism of duty."

Similarly, from the side of the big industrialists, the organ of German heavy industry, the "Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung" wrote in August, 1933:

"It was the word 'Socialism' which had long made considerable sections of the capitalist class hesitate before rallying to the Hitler movement. . . . To-day it is long clear that this was a great misunderstanding. Better than any National-Socialist propaganda, the acts of the new Government have shown that the 'socialism' of the Third Reich is the exact opposite of what Marxism means by 'socialism.'"

(Deutsche Bergwerkszeitung, August 13, 1933).

No wonder the big industrialists and Junker landlords, the bankers and steel barons and Hohenzollern princes rallied with enthusiasm to this kind of "socialist" programme so soon as they understood its real purpose. The financial backing of Hitler by big industry was already laid bare in the Hitler-Ludendorff trial of 1924 and in the Bavarian Diet Investigation Committee. Foreign supporters were stated to include Deterding, Kreuger, and Ford. Paul Faure stated in the French Chamber of Deputies on February 11, 1932, that the foreign financial backers of the Nazis included the directors of the Skoda armaments firm, controlled by Schneider-Creusot. In 1927 Kirdoff, the founder of the Coalowners' Association and the Honorary President of the Steel Trust, joined the Nazi

Party. In 1931 the Coalowners' Association adopted a resolution to pay a levy of 6d. on every ton of coal to the Nazi funds; and for this purpose the price of coal was raised. These subsidies reached fantastic heights in 1932, when for the Presidential elections in August, 1932, alone the Steel Trust provided over three million marks within a few days for the Nazi funds.

The power of the great trusts was given statutory recognition in the "New Germany." The Supreme Economic Council appointed under the Nazi Government included for its leading figures:

Herr Krüpp von Bohlen, armaments king; private fortune £6,000,000, capital represented, £15,000,000.

Herr Fritz Thyssen, steel king; private fortune £6,000,000, capital interests German Steel Trust, £140,000,000.

Herr F. C. Von Siemens, electrical king; private fortune £6,500,000, capital represented, £12,500,000.

Prof. Karl Bosch, Dye Trust millionaire; private fortune £2,000,000, capital represented, £55,000,000.

Dr. A. Vögler, German Steel Trust; private fortune £6,000,000, capital represented, £140,000,000.

Herr A. Diehn, director Potash Syndicate; capital represented £10,000,000.

Herr Boehinger, director Maximilian Steel Works, capital £1,000,000.

Herr F. Von Schröder, banker.

Herr A. Von Finck, banker.

Herr F. Reinhart, banker.

"The list of German millionaires," wrote the *New York Times* Berlin correspondent in May, 1938, "reduced by the economic crisis, is lengthening again." The number of millionaires in Germany increased between 1932 and the end of 1937 by 1266, and of multi-millionaires by 180. "Hitler has done nothing to break the power of the industrial combines," wrote Professor Stephen H. Roberts, of Sydney University, in his documented study of the Nazi régime; "indeed, one of the striking features of his four years of power has been the rise of super-trusts in the heavy industries." (S. H. Roberts, "The House That Hitler Built," 1937).

The solid results for the big financial backers of Fascism were shown in the figures of profits and security values. Even if we take only the first four years of the Hitler régime, before the final frenzied armaments boom and plunge to war, the profits of 50 leading German companies, with a share capital of 2,100 million marks, rose from 124 million marks in 1934 to 188 million marks in 1937. Dividends rose from 85 million marks to 132 million marks.

The official index of German industrial share values rose from a low point of 40.3 (monthly average) for 1932 to 84.8 in 1938, and with the war soared to 98 in 1940 and 119 in November, 1941.

In Italy the industrial share index rose from 44.6 in 1932 to 84.6 in 1938. Profits of the largest Italian armaments trust, the Montecatini, rose from 67.4 million lire in 1935 to 148.6 million in 1938.

In Japan the industrial share index rose from 62.2 in 1931, when the Manchurian adventure was started, to 132.9 in 1938, and 137 in 1940.

The war swept forward this advance. Between April, 1940, and April, 1941, German industrial share values rose 20 per cent (League of Nations World Economic Survey, 1939-41). The profits of Krupps rose from 395 million marks in 1939 to 421 million marks in 1940, or over £31 million. The profits of the German Steel Trust rose from 222 million marks in 1939 to 260 million marks in 1940, or over £19 million.

This is what Hitler calls his miraculous "New Order," a "national socialist working community." With monumental effrontery the Fascists describe their conception of the State as above all sordid economic considerations:

"The State has nothing to do with any definite economic conception. It is not an assembly of economic negotiators during a period with defined limits for the purpose of carrying out economic objects, but the organisation of a community, homogeneous in nature and feeling, for the better furtherance, and maintenance of their type and the fulfilment of the destiny marked out for them by providence. This and nothing else is the significance and object of a State."

(Hitler, "Mein Kampf," English edition, p. 69).

"The foundation of Fascism is the conception of the State, its character, its duty and its aim. Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State . . . The Fascist State is itself conscious, and has itself a will and a personality."

"The State as conceived by Fascism is a spiritual and moral fact in itself."

(Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," 1932).

This "spiritual" claptrap is used to cover up the rule of the robber barons, the militarists, the big industrialists and Junker landowners, who have chosen as their patrons and protectors the fascist gangsters.

But what of the position of the workers, of the mass of the people, in this "New Order"? To win the support of the

workers, there was no limit to the lies and deceptions which Fascism put across before the winning of power. Thus the Italian Fascists called for: Abolition of the Monarchy; abolition of conscription; confiscation of church property; abolition of the Stock Exchange and dissolution of limited liability companies and banks; transfer of the control of industry to technicians and workers. The Twenty-Five Points Programme of the Nazi Party, adopted in 1920, and proclaimed by the 1926 Congress to be "unalterable," included the following aims among its miscellaneous medley of items (which may be usefully set out with the practice alongside for comparison):

PROGRAMME

PRACTICE

Point 1. "Union of all Germans to form a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination of nations."	Violent conquest of Europe.
Point 11. "Abolition of Unearned Income. Breaking of Interest-Slavery."	Increase of multi-millionaires in Germany by 180 between 1932 and 1937.
Point 12. "Confiscation of all War Profits."	Krupps' profits in 1940: 421 million marks.
Point 13. "Nationalisation of all Trusts."	"One of the striking features of Hitler's first four years of power has been the rise of super-trusts in the heavy industries." (Professor S. H. Roberts).
Point 17. "Death Penalty for Usurers and Profiteers."	Wholesale execution of Communists, Socialists and Trade Unionists.

As soon as Fascism came to power, the workers soon learned that the "New Order" meant a paradise for the militarists, profiteers, and fascist hooligans, and a hell for the masses of the people, with limitless exploitation and complete deprivation of rights.

The place of the worker in the fascist régime was statutorily laid down in the German Labour Code:

ARTICLE 1. "In a business undertaking the employer as leader, and the employees as followers, shall work together to further the purposes of the undertaking, and for the common good of the community and the State."

ARTICLE 2. "As between the leader of an undertaking and his followers, the leader shall make all decisions concerning the undertaking."

(Law for the Organisation of National Labour, January, 1934).

All trade unions and working-class organisations were abolished after Hitler's coming to power, and their funds confiscated. In their place was established the "Labour Front," which combines employers and workers in a single organisation under Nazi control. Its officials are appointed by the Nazi Party, not elected. The Labour Front is forbidden to occupy itself with questions of wages, hours and working conditions. With twenty-five million members, the Labour Front takes all the contributions which workers formerly paid to their unions, and has also taken over all the accumulated funds of the old trade unions; thus its financial resources are enormous, its revenues in 1937, amounting to 360 million marks. These finances pass over to the Nazi Party apparatus, under the system established of a joint treasurer for the Nazi Party and Labour Front; only a small proportion is used for the "Strength through Joy" and similar "cultural" purposes. The Labour Front offers its members, in place of material benefits, "ideal values." As its leader, Ley, explained in March, 1935, in presenting the report of the "Strength through Joy" organisation:

"We could not offer the working masses any material benefits, for Germany was poor and in a state of confusion and misery. New rates of wages or similar things were out of the question."

Hence it was necessary to "suppress the materialism" which led to demands for improved standards of living, and "instead divert the gaze of the workers to the ideal values of the nation".

Similarly the elected Factory Councils, which were the principal gain from the revolution that the industrial workers had succeeded in maintaining throughout the Weimar Republic, were abolished by Hitler, and replaced by "Confidential Committees" nominated by the employer from workers of "unimpeachable political outlook". In form, the list chosen by the employer had to be adopted by the workers in the enterprise; but even this form was dropped after 1935. The functions of the Confidential Committees are purely advisory.

"As in every community so also in the business there can be only one Leader; only he can make decisions and he alone is responsible for economic and social affairs . . . The Leader of the enterprise alone makes the decisions. Only for advice on his decisions does he call to his aid the Confidential Committees; but these cannot take away from him the sole responsibility for his decisions. . . . The interests of the followers must be placed behind the interests of the business community, and be brought into conformity with the economic requirements of the business."

(Official Announcement of the Labour Trustee for the economic district of Brandenburg).

Final decision on all questions of wages and labour conditions is placed in the hands of "Labour Trustees" or district dictators appointed by the Nazi Government. The character of these "Labour Trustees" can be judged from the fact that the big industrialist, Krupp, was appointed "Labour Trustee" for the Ruhr area.

From the outset the principle of uniform wages rates, embodied in the old collective agreements, was set on one side in favour of the principle of determining wages individually in each enterprise according to its ability to pay, i.e. according to the employer's opinion of its ability to pay:

"The substitution of a works tariff for a district tariff will be more likely to lead to an improvement in the competitive conditions of the small and medium undertakings. . . . In terms of wage policy this means that the ability of the undertaking to pay wages will be brought as a determining factor into the wage movement. The start in competitive power which the undertaking working under favourable conditions of production has can in this way be compensated."

(*Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, February 16, 1933).

The absolute power of the employer to determine all questions of wages, hours and labour conditions in his enterprise (the Labour Trustees being only called upon in the event of labour trouble, and being required not to interfere in the normal conduct of business) is laid down in the Labour Code. By this enactment the employer is given full authority to lay down "establishment rules" which determine

1. The beginning and ending of the normal daily hours of work and of the breaks;
2. The times for the payment of remuneration and the nature thereof;
3. The principles for the calculation of jobbing or bargain work;
4. Regulations for the nature, amount and collection of fines;
5. The grounds on which an employment can be terminated without notice, in cases where this does not rest upon statutory grounds;
6. The utilisation of remuneration forfeited by the unlawful termination of an employment, in cases where the said forfeiture is prescribed in the establishment rules or contract of employment or statutory provisions.

Not without reason the American commentator, Professor R. A. Brady, observes on this:

"Never in all the bitter annals of labour conflict—including that period of hitherto unparalleled and ruthless brutality known

as the beginning of the English factory system—never could the most cynical and inhuman employer have asked more from the State than this."

(R. A. Brady, "The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism," 1937).

With rare truthfulness the Italian fascist organ, *Lavoro Fascista* wrote of the Nazi Labour Code when it was first introduced in 1934—when Italian and German Fascism were still at loggerheads, and it suited the Italian fascist pot to describe the Nazi kettle:

"German National Socialism has handed over the German worker bound hand and foot to capitalism . . . smacking of the Middle Ages . . . bringing to naught everything achieved by the workers through the struggles of the last hundred years."

How has it been possible to carry through the fascist programme of robbery, lies, terror and war? The programme has only been carried through by methods of blackguardism, demagoguery, corruption, intimidation and plain thuggery without equal in political annals. The technique of mass-deception; incitement to racial hatred and anti-semitism; unrestrained promises and lavish publicity campaigns to bewilder and hypnotise the unthinking; corruption of the youth; bribes for all willing rowdies, hooligans and spies; menaces for the timid; beating up, torture and death for resolute opponents—these are the methods of Fascism.

It is not true that Hitler was placed in power by the will of the German people. The myth that Hitler came to power by the support of the majority of the German people is a typical Nazi legend. The facts prove the opposite. Just as Mussolini in Italy (whose fabled "March on Rome" took place in a luxurious sleeping-car), so Hitler in Germany was placed in power by the act of the ruling authorities against the people. In the last free elections before Hitler came to power, in November, 1932, the Nazi Party only obtained 196 out of 584 seats, as against 221 for the Social Democrats and Communists. Even in March, 1933, after Hitler had been placed in power, after the Communist Party had been suppressed, with the Communist and Socialist Press suppressed, with terror raging, the Nazi Party was still only able to obtain 288 out of 647 seats. In the Presidential elections in June, 1932, Hitler was defeated with 13.4 million votes, against 23 million anti-Hitler votes. Hindenburg was elected President on the cry of keeping Hitler out. Hindenburg then used his Presidential powers to suspend the democratic working of the Constitution and placed Hitler in power to

govern by decree without a parliamentary majority. Germany was handed over to Fascism by a conspiracy of the reactionary upper class Junkers, big industrialists and military authorities, in defiance of every expression of the democratic outlook of the people.

The Nazis endeavoured to maintain their hold on the German people after they had come into power by claiming that they had "solved the economic crisis" and "conquered unemployment." In fact the partial recovery from the depths of the world economic crisis in 1932 took place in all the countries of the capitalist world between 1932 and 1937, and Germany showed no peculiar feature in this respect. But the so-called "conquest of unemployment" in Germany concealed the turning of the entire forces of the German nation, and its vast technical equipment to the gigantic war programme of armament-building and military preparation, the construction of strategic roads and the conversion of industry for war, with the extension of conscription, forced labour service for a pittance, and a colossal financial expenditure for war purposes reaching to one thousand million pounds a year already by 1937.

GERMAN RE-ARMAMENT, 1933-37

Year	Total State Expenditure (million Reichmarks)	Armaments Expenditure	Armaments Expenditure (£ million)
1933-4	9,700	3,000	250
1934-5	12,200	5,500	460
1935-6	16,700	10,000	830
1936-7	18,800	12,600	1,000

(*"The Banker,"* February, 1937)

The State Debt was trebled between 1933 and 1939.

This colossal armaments expenditure was no solution of the economic contradictions, as the Nazis pretended. On the contrary, it could only prepare a more intense crisis, for which they could seek no other solution than war. "As the rearmament programme draws to its close," wrote *"The Banker,"* in February, 1937, "unemployment and under-nourishment must be the lot of the German people . . . Germany, it is said, will find relief in War."

The advance to war went forward with the military re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, Spain in 1936-7, Austria in the spring of 1938, the Sudetenland in the autumn of 1938, and Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939.

By the spring of 1939 the signs of new economic crisis were appearing. The Nazi leaders proclaimed that the only solution was war for the conquest of new territories. The leader of the Labour Front, Ley, declared in a mass meeting at Munich on March 12, 1939:

"If you go on living in this cramped area, fellow workers, you will start fighting each other again, and Marxism will once more raise its head. . . . The time is ripe."

The aggression of Nazism for the conquest of Europe and the world was thus seen as the alternative to social reorganisation within Germany.

3. THE PHILOSOPHY OF FASCISM

Fascism is the deadly enemy of all mankind. Underlying all the elaborate organisation of the fascist state system, its terror troops and bandit armies, its sterilisation centres and concentration camps, its cold cruelties and frenzied schemes of world domination, lies a deep hatred and contempt of all humanity.

We must know Fascism for what it is, for what it stands for, for all that it has done and is doing and is yet planning to do; we must know and understand this on pain of death; for Fascism is the death-threat to humanity. Once the true character of Fascism is understood, it cannot fail to arouse a deep and holy anger of all human beings which will unite them in one indomitable resolve—to destroy this foul monster.

All the methods of Fascism, its attitude to the people, to culture, to women, to children and the young, to old people or to the sick, breathes this hatred and contempt.

The American educationist, Dr. Ziemer, describes in his book "Education for Death," a dramatic poem which he observed being taught in a Nazi school for boys under ten years of age to learn by heart. The poem relates how a lowly fly pounced on a smaller victim and refused to grant it mercy in spite of all its pleas. The stanza ended with the lines:

"Please," begged the victim, "let me go,
For I am such a little foe."
"No," said the victor, "not at all,
For I am big, and you are small."

The poem went on to describe how the spider killed the fly; the sparrow killed the spider; the hawk killed the sparrow; the fox killed the hawk; the dog killed the fox; the wolf killed the dog; the hunter killed the wolf; and in every case the victor refused to grant mercy because he was bigger and stronger. The lesson was driven home by the teacher:

"This struggle is a natural struggle. That is why the Fuehrer wants his boys to be strong, so they can be the aggressors and the victors, not the victims. Life and nature respect only the strong and the big. Germany will be strong. The Fuehrer will make it so strong that it can go out and attack any foe the wide world over."

Herein is expressed the diseased Nazi philosophy, the perversion of science and education to wipe out every instinct of human solidarity and co-operation, and to inculcate the lust for aggression, murder and conquest. The philosophy of Fascism is the philosophy of cruelty, of destruction, of the tyranny of the strong over the weak.

"Our State," boasted Hitler in his speech of October 3, 1941, when he gloated over the imagined prospect of the annihilation of the Soviet Union, "is not ruled by the principle of equal right for all like the Soviet Union". That sneer revealed the gulf between two conceptions of life. It revealed not only that Fascism repudiates the principles of the social order of human co-operation on which the Soviet Union is built. Fascism repudiates equally and at the same time all the principles for which every movement of human progress and advance in the modern era, the great democratic revolutions of three centuries, the greatest thinkers and leaders of humanity, have fought. Fascism repudiates the liberty and equality of men. Fascism repudiates the brotherhood of man.

The glorification of inequality is the ceaseless theme of Fascism, as it must be the theme of all defenders and apologists of tyranny. Walther Darré, the Nazi Minister of Agriculture, wrote in his book, "The New Aristocracy of Blood and Soil," published in 1930:

"The order of society rests upon an inequality which cannot be abolished, but which is inseparable from man like birth and death. Inequality is as unchangeable as mathematical truths, and as eternal as the laws which govern the movements of our planetary system."

So, too, Mussolini declared in his encyclopaedia article on Fascism, that "Fascism affirms the immutable, beneficial and fruitful inequality of mankind." In the name of the sacred principle of inequality it is proclaimed that all rights and privileges must rest in the hands of the *élite*, the elect, the ruling few—that is, of the fascist gangsters and their patrons, the élite of reactionary militarists, large landowners and millionaires.

Except for the chosen of their own kind, the people for the fascist rulers are a herd—speaking animals, to be cared for as

such in just sufficient physical condition to fulfil their tasks, toiling and laying down their lives for the benefit of the elect who really constitute the nation. The principle of Fascism is the principle of the *Herrenvolk*, the ruling stratum, conscious of its right to govern, and ready without mercy, without moral compunction, to win, maintain and exercise this right over the common herd. This is the significance of Hitler's statement already quoted that "we want a selection of the new ruling stratum which realises that by virtue of its racial superiority it has the right to rule and ruthlessly to maintain and secure with all means its rule over the broad masses."

"With all means." Since all sections of the people cannot be fully conquered, terror and all devices of violent coercion are necessary and justifiable weapons against those who resist, like the whip for animals. Hence the elaborate tortures and concentration camps, the rubber truncheons and castor oil, the beatings up and assassinations are no excrescence on the face of Fascism ("regrettable excesses," as its gentlemanly apologists here and in other countries used to say), but of its essence, the expression of its inmost soul, its highest conception of pleasure, on which the Fascist leaders have written gloating books to celebrate their exploits.*

For the common people the contempt of Fascism is boundless. The people want bread and circuses. They cannot understand ideals. The mass of the people are not rational beings; they are semi-idiots, who can be taught anything and led anywhere.

"The masses can never replace the individual. They are not only the representatives of stupidity, but also of cowardice. And just as a hundred hollow heads will not produce a wise man, so a courageous decision cannot come from a hundred cowards."

(Hitler, quoted by Dr. Sigfrid Mette in "Adolf Hitler als Staatsmann und Volksfuehrer," p. 14).

"The great mass of the labouring classes wants nothing but bread and games. They have no understanding for ideals, and so we shall never be able to count on winning over the working men in any quantity."

(Hitler, quoted in "Die Grosse Trommel," p. 123).

* See, for example, the "Ernstes und Heiteres aus dem Putschleben" of Von Killinger, in which he relates, among other incidents, how the campaign against the Soviet Government in Munich he had a soldier whip a young "wench" with a horsewhip "until there was not a white spot left on her backside"; or how, after a Communist street agitator had made an impudent reply to a threat, he had a soldier toss a hand grenade at the man, and goes on to recount with gusto the gory details of the man's death. Von Killinger was appointed by Hitler Minister-President of Saxony. Such are the "heroes" of Fascism, like their patron saint, the pimp, Horst Wessel.

From this contempt for the people follows the fascist theory of propaganda as the repetition of lies often enough till people believe them. Hitler has explained that the greater the lie, the more likely it is to be successful. The stupidity of the masses is in his view the foundation of all propaganda:

"The capacity of the great masses of the people to take in anything is very limited; their understanding is small; their forgetfulness is very great."

(Hitler, "Mein Kampf," p. 198).

"The mass of the people are feminine in temperament and disposition; not reason and conviction, but feeling and emotion govern their thought and action."

(Hitler, "Mein Kampf," p. 200).

Fascism fears nothing more than conscious thinking human beings. The fascists fear culture and education as the devil fears holy water. "When I hear the word 'culture' I feel for my revolver" (Goering). Fascism as the embodiment of war demands obedient blind masses as its tools.

The fascist boast of having no programme is only the expression of this fear of thought. "What we need is not a programme, but action" (Mussolini). "Let us first begin to rule, then the programme will come by itself" (Hitler in 1923). "The people want no programmes; they want some one to rule them" (Hitler in 1927). "If I had founded the Party I should not have put out any programme at all. . . . We are reproached with having no programme, or that the one we have is full of contradictions. But just because of this we shall gain the victory." (Goebbels).

Fascism has declared war on culture, science and reason. Its appeal is to the lowest instincts. The highly advanced educational system which was once the pride of Germany, and on the foundations of which the Nazis have been able to build their technical strength for war, has been laid in ruins by Hitler. Between 1933 and 1939 the number of students in universities and high colleges in Germany was brought down from 150,000 to 60,000 (report of Dr. Mentzel of the Reich Ministry of Education, issued in 1941, calling attention to the alarming shortage of trained scientists). In the same period the number of students in the Soviet Union increased from 295,000 in 1930 to 700,000 in 1940. Can it be doubted which system will conquer? The ablest scientists in Germany have been dismissed or driven into exile, either because they were Jews or because they would not submit to Nazism and its degradation of science and refusal to permit honest scientific research and

teaching. Up to 1938—the total number of scientific men of first-class reputation exiled from Germany and Austria was 1,888, including more than twenty-five per cent of Germany's Nobel prizewinners.

Even more significant than the wholesale cutting down of education is the character of what is taught. An analysis by the American statistician, E. Y. Hartshorne, of the number of students in the different subjects in 1937 as a proportion of 1932, showed an average drop to 57.8 per cent of 1932: but a specially heavy drop in mathematics and natural science to 35.6 per cent, or one third; while the only increase was registered by Journalism, 169 per cent., and "Education," 142 per cent, i.e. the subjects of Nazi propaganda in place of the exact services. (E. Y. Hartshorne, "German Universities and National Socialism," Harvard University Press, 1937).

The degradation of the schools to the inculcation of militarism, contempt for intellectual interests ("the development of mental capacity is only of secondary importance," Hitler, "Mein Kampf"), racial hatred and aggressive aims against other nations, glorification of war and violence, blind obedience to leaders, and training in physical cruelty of the strong against the weak, follows from the basic conceptions and aims of Fascism and has been systematically carried out. "The school is the preparation for the Army" is the governing rule laid down by the Nazi Minister of Education, Rust.

"Teaching in school can give the young bearer of Race (Rassenträger) something that will later be useful to him as Bearer of Arms. Tables can be learnt with horseshoe nails. Logarithms find their most beautiful application in the science of ballistics (artillery). In geography the world war can come into its own limitless rights. History is full of overflowing with instances of war politics. Chemistry has as much application in the military struggle with poison gas as in the fight for daily bread. Physics problems can best be explained by aid of a motor or a tank."

("Wehrerziehung," educational periodical, "Education for Arms," November, 1935).

Science, or the study of objective truth, is condemned and rejected:

"The new science is entirely different from the idea of knowledge that found its value in an unchecked effort to reach the truth."

(B. Rust, Nazi Minister of Education, speech at the 550th anniversary of Heidelberg University, 1936).

"We renounce international science. We renounce the inter-

national republic of learning. We renounce research for its own sake. . . . We teach and learn history, not to say how things actually happened, but to instruct the German people from the past. We teach and learn the sciences, not to discover abstract laws, but to sharpen the implements of the German people in competition with other peoples."

(Dr. Kahrstedt, Professor of History at Göttingen University, address on German Empire Day, "Nature," April 24, 1937).

"Science must be regarded by the racial State as a means of promoting national pride."

(Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, p. 473).

In place of Science, Fascism has developed its pseudo-science or "racial theory"—which is simply the expression of its hatred and contempt for all subject people, for all mankind apart from the *Herrenvolk* or ruling few, as "sub-human" and therefore without rights. This frenzied egoism is dressed up in mystical balderdash about the "myth of the blood," etc. "We think with the blood," says the Nazi, meaning that he dispenses with the burden of thought and wishes to justify all uncontrolled violence and brutality.

"To-day a new faith is awakening: the Myth of the Blood: the belief that it is by the Blood that the divine mission of man is to be defended; the belief, combined with the clearest knowledge, that Nordic Blood represents that Mystery which has overcome and replaced the old Sacraments."

(Alfred Rosenberg, "The Myth of the Twentieth Century," Munich, 1935, p. 114).

"Blood and soil, as fundamental forces of life, are the symbols of the national-political point of view, and the heroic style of life. By them the ground is prepared for a new form of education. What does Blood mean to us? We cannot rest satisfied with the teachings of physics, chemistry or medicine. From the earliest dawn of the race this Blood, this shadowy stream of life, has had a symbolic significance, and leads us into the realms of metaphysics. Blood is the builder of the body and the source of the spirit of the race. In Blood lurks our ancestral inheritance, in Blood is embodied the race, from Blood arises the character and destiny of man; Blood is to man the hidden undercurrent, the symbol of the stream of life."

(Address of the Rector of Frankfurt University, Krieck, in 1935).*

* The language and thought of Fascists is, in the most literal sense, bloody. In this connection it is tempting to quote Dickens (who incidentally shows that the "Myth of the Twentieth Century" was sufficiently familiar in the Victorian era):

"We might have been a party of Ogres, the conversation assumed such a sanguine complexion."

"I confess I am of Mrs. Waterbrook's opinion," said Mr. Waterbrook with his wine-glass at his eye. "Other things are all very well in their way, but give me Blood!"

"Oh! There is nothing," observed Hamlet's aunt, "so satisfactory to one! There is nothing that is so much one's *beau-ideal* of—of all

The racial theory is no new discovery of Fascism. The myth of the superior ruling race, with the right to conquer and oppress all "lesser breeds without the law," is the familiar myth of all empires and tyrannies. It was dressed up anew as a theory in its modern form by the reactionary French Royalist, the Comte de Gobineau, who sought to buttress the interests of the decaying relics of French feudal aristocracy against the bourgeoisie by his book on "The Inequality of Human Races" (1853), in which he contended that the different races of mankind are innately unequal in talent, worth and ability to absorb and create culture, and that therefore it is absurd to maintain that all men are capable of an equal degree of perfection. Since then, the racial theory has been the happy hunting ground of all opponents of human progress. Its completely unscientific character has been demonstrated by all serious scientists.

"One of the greatest enemies of science is pseudo-science. . . . Nowhere is this lamentable state of affairs more pronounced than in regard to 'race.' A vast pseudo-science of 'racial biology' has been erected which serves to justify political ambitions, economic ends, social grudges, class prejudices. . . ."

"One fact which emerges from a survey of this kind is the relative unimportance, from the immediate point of view, of purely biological factors as opposed to social problems in the broadest sense. . . ."

"Racialism is a myth, and a dangerous myth at that. It is a cloak for selfish economic aims, which in their uncloaked nakedness would look ugly enough. And it is not scientifically grounded."

(Julian S. Huxley and A. C. Haddon, "We Europeans: A Survey of Racial Problems," 1935).

that sort of thing, speaking generally: There are some low minds (not many, I am happy to believe, but there are *some*) that would prefer to do, what I should call bow down before idols. Positively idols! Before service, intellect, and so on. But these are intangible points. Blood is not so. We see Blood in a nose and we know it. We meet with it in a chin, and we say, 'There it is! That's Blood!' It is an actual matter of fact. We point it out. It admits of no doubt.'

"The simpering fellow with the weak legs stated the question more decisively yet.

"'Oh, you know, deuce take it,' said this gentleman, looking round the board with an imbecile smile, 'we can't forego Blood, you know. We must have Blood, you know. Some young fellows, you know, may be a little behind their station, perhaps, in point of education and behaviour, and may go a little wrong, you know, and get themselves and other people into a variety of fixes—and all that—but deuce take it, it's delightful to reflect that they've got Blood in 'em. Myself, I'd rather be knocked down by a man who had got Blood in him, than I'd be picked up by a man who hadn't.'"

(Dickens, "David Copperfield").

The racial theory is a weapon to cover up the real aims of the Hitlerites, the aims of the exploitation of their own people, of imperialist aggression, of enslavement of other nations, and of the destruction of culture and civilisation.

The racial theory serves to confirm the division of society into classes as a "natural biological necessity". The employers are a superior biological type, born to command; the workers an inferior species, "born to obey. In the National-Socialist State, declares Hitler,

"The German Labourer will be the mainstay, because he is susceptible to that feeling of faith and confidence which does not always think that it should use the probe of personal opinion, but which consecrates itself to an idea in blind faith and obedience."

(Hitler, speech to the Second German Labour Congress).

And again Hitler:

"There does not exist a capitalist system. The employers have worked their way up to the top by their industry and efficiency. And by virtue of this selection, which shows that they belong to a higher type, they have the right to lead."

The racial theory serves to justify the right of aggression and conquest against all other nations.

"The Nordic Race has a right to rule the world. We must make this right the guiding star of our foreign policy."

(Hitler to Otto Strasser, May 21, 1930).

"Anyone who really and sincerely desires the victory of the pacifist idea must strive by every means after the conquest of the world by the Germans . . . The pacifist-humanitarian idea may perhaps be very good after the world has been conquered and subjugated by the highest type of man, so that he becomes supreme lord of the earth."

(Hitler, "Mein Kampf," p. 315.

"The White Race is destined to rule. It has the unconscious urge to rule. This urge arises from its heroic conception of wealth, which is entirely non-pacifist. . . . When the White Race abandons the foundations of its rule over the world it will lose that rule. It is a rule which is the basis of the European structure."

(Hitler, speech at Munich, January 26, 1936).

That by the world domination of the White Race, Hitler means the world domination of German imperialism is made sufficiently clear. All rivals are rejected as racially impure. Frenchmen are "negroids" and sub-human; France must be annihilated; the French Empire represents "a vast territory for settlement from the Rhine to the Congo, occupied by a

bastardised lower race." The same applies to "worthless Poles, Czechs, etc."; Germany has the right of territorial expansion to the East at the expense of Russia. Britain is contaminated with Jews; America is a "melting-pot" of races. Only the Japanese are temporarily recognised as "honorary Aryans"—until such time as conflict may arise with them.

All people of low race multiply like rabbits and only litter the earth. They must be ruthlessly subjugated, made to labour as bondslaves, and, where necessary, exterminated in order that their land may be taken for German settlers.

The racial theory serves for the destruction of political opponents in the name of "racial hygiene," with the laws for sterilisation of "unsuitable types" and the justification of all measures against "lower biological types."

What I saw drove the blood from my face for a while, I admit. Hospital beds came and went with methodical precision. The doctors made quick, deft incisions on white abdomen walls, spread the slit and applied surgical clamps. They probed, delicately lifted a tube which they wrapped and cut. The wound was sewed, and the body was wheeled off to be replaced by another.

"What are they doing?" I asked.

He (my Nazi guide) informed me they were doing what the Third Reich had to do if Germany wanted to have a race of super-soldiers. "These doctors," he said, "are sterilising women."

For more than an hour I saw women come in with the cradle of life intact, and leave empty shells.

I asked what type of women were thus being disciplined, and was informed they were the mentally sick, women with low resistance, women who had proved through older births that their offspring were not strong. They were women suffering from defects.

Upon questioning, he admitted that some of the women were sterilised because they were enemies of the State. Many of them should be in concentration camps.

"It is not humane to keep women in concentration camps," he said. "But a sterilised woman loses her interest in politics, especially if her fellow-women know that she is sterilised. And we see to it that the others find out."

He could not tell me how many women were sterilised yearly; but he knew that in this particular clinic six doctors operated four days a week. The process had been going on in all larger German cities since 1933.

(Gregor Ziemer, "Education for Death," New York, 1941).

The destruction of the sick and old people is openly advocated in Nazi literature as a necessary measure to relieve the State of useless burdens. Thus the Nazi leader, Ernst Mann, in his book "Die Moral der Kraft" ("The Ethics of Strength"), published in Weimar, advocates suicide as the holy

duty of all chronic invalids and those disabled in war, and declares that the State should undertake "the annihilation of all weaklings and sickly people."

Since the outbreak of war, tens of thousands of sick and aged Germans have been murdered by the State authorities in accordance with this principle:

"But in no field of action has their 'logic' been invoked to justify such extreme measures as inside Germany itself toward those who, because of mental or physical disability, can no longer contribute to the efficiency of the German State. Nazi dogma decrees that the individual lives for the benefit of the State. Nazi logic concludes from this premise that any individual who is a burden on the State is undesirable. They have proceeded, under this dogma, to liquidate the aged, insane and infirm by the thousand. How many have actually been killed under the label of euthanasia or 'mercy killing', since the practice began sometime in the summer of 1940 no one knows outside of the Gestapo, who supervised the operation. Estimates by Germans with some personal knowledge of the affair who were in touch with American correspondents in Berlin have run as high as from eighty thousand to one hundred thousand. This seems a probable exaggeration. It may be nearer twenty thousand. But there can be no doubt of the fact that large numbers of persons have been taken from the sanatoriums of Germany and destroyed."

(Joseph C. Harsch, "Pattern of Conquest," Heinemann, 1942, pp. 227-8).

Most of the boasted social amenities exist only for the Nazi clique and their hangers-on, for the "politically reliable" and those approved by the Nazi authorities. The mass of the people must manage as best they can. When the women were driven out of jobs in the early years of the régime, in order to deal with unemployment, in the name of sending them "back to the home," they were left to fend for themselves. Later, when the extension of war industry required them again, they were forced back into industry, and the propaganda about the "sacredness of the home" was put into cold storage.

Nowhere is the whole fascist philosophy more sharply exposed in all its bestiality than in its relation to women and in its conception of the role of women in society. In the fascist philosophy women have only the twofold task, to produce soldiers and to perform household drudgery—or, when necessary, the lowest drudgery in war industry and on the fields. All education, culture, participation in politics or responsible work must be closed to them. Their training must be rigidly confined to preparation for this animal role in the militarist State.

"In the case of female education the main stress should be laid on bodily training, and after that, on development of character; and last of all, on intellect. But the one absolute aim of female education must be with a view to the future mother."

(Hitler, "Mein Kampf," pp. 459-60).

"The National-Socialist movement is in its nature a masculine movement. . . . While man must give to life the great lines and forms it is the task of woman out of her inner-fullness and inner eagerness to fill these lines and forms with colour. The realms of directing and shaping are not hard to find in public life. To such realms belong for one thing the tremendously great sphere of politics. This sphere without qualification must be claimed by men. When we eliminate women from public life, it is not because we want to dispense with them, but rather because we want to give them back their essential honour. . . . The outstanding and highest calling of woman is always that of wife and mother. . . . woman will find her personal happiness in family and child."

(Goebbels, February 11, 1934, quoted in "Der Nationalsozialistische Staat.")

"The mother should be able to devote herself entirely to her children and her family, the wife to the husband. The unmarried girl should be dependent only upon such occupations as correspond to the feminine type of being. As for the rest, employment should remain given over to the man."

(Dr. W. Frick, "Die Deutsche Frau im Nationalsozialistischen Staate.")

"You ask me what I have done for the women of Germany. Well, my answer is this—that in my new army I have provided you with the finest fathers of children in the whole world; that is what I have done for the women of Germany."

(Hitler, speech to an audience of women at the Nuremberg Congress of the Nazi Party, September, 1936).

The Nazi rulers urgently need more human cannon-fodder; reliable tools for the oppression of other peoples; for the ceaseless new wars and aggression; they need more of the German race to populate the newly conquered regions, after exterminating or driving out the original inhabitants.

In the Nazi State women represent the necessary machinery for the mass-production of soldiers. To this aim all else is subordinated. In relation to this aim all the claptrap about the sacredness of the family and the home is thrown overboard.

For this aim the Nazis have sullied and destroyed love, marriage and the family. They have prostituted family life. Again and again the principle is proclaimed: "The only moral obligation of German women is the production of children." Rosenberg writes:

"The Germanic tribal streams of former centuries would never have come into existence had it not been for polygamy, and this is as much as to say that all the preconditions of Western culture

would have been lacking. There were also later times when the number of women was far greater than that of men. To-day this is again the case. Shall these millions of women, pityingly smiled at as old maids, go through life robbed of their natural rights? . . . The future German Reich will consider just the childless woman, whether married or not, as a second-rate (nicht vollwertig) member of the community."

(Alfred Rosenberg, "The Myth of the Twentieth Century.")

The "Schwarze Korps," official organ of the storm troopers, points the lesson sharply during the war:

"It is not permissible that the birth of children of pure blood is diminished during the war below the pre-war level. A girl who shirks the fulfilment of her highest duty is as much a traitor as a soldier who deserts the front. Storm troopers! Show that you are not only ready to give your lives for the Fatherland, but make it a present of the largest possible quantity of living beings before you go to the battlefield."

Himmler has followed this up even more explicitly:

"On German girls lies now a military duty. The question now is not about marriage ties—marriage here does not come into question. Your duty is to become mothers of children of the soldiers who go to the front."

Again the "Schwarze Korps":

"If in a family where the mother is healthy there is no progeny, it is necessary to have recourse to artificial fecundation. If this method does not give the desired result, it is necessary to call in to assist the husband—if possible—the brother of the husband."

If the husband has no brother, the "Schwarze Korps" recommends recourse to any youth from the S.S.

Thus at one moment the Hitlerite propaganda clamours for "Lebensraum," for "living space," or the violent conquest of new territories as the indispensable necessity to provide room for the growing population of Germany to expand. At the next moment the Hitlerite propaganda clamours for the increase of the German population by every means in order to conquer and settle the new territories. This contradiction does not trouble the heads of the Nazis; for both demands are in reality only complementary aspects of the same policy, the policy of aggressive expansion of German militarism and imperialism.

The philosophy of Fascism is the doomed philosophy of all the forces of destruction, barbarism and decay of a dying society. Consciously fighting human progress and advance, hating the people, hating freedom and hating life, its outlook is one of black and open pessimism.

"We have no belief in programmes or plans, in saints or apostles. Above all, we have no belief in happiness, in salvation or in the promised land."

(Mussolini, "Popolo d'Italia," January 1, 1922).

"Fascism denies the materialist conception of happiness as a possibility."

(Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism.")

Similarly the original patron philosopher of Fascism, Oswald Spengler:

"Only dreamers believe that there is a way out. Optimism is cowardice. We are born into this time and must bravely follow the path to the desired end. There is no other way. Our duty is to hold on to the last position, without hope, without rescue."

The "new man" and the "new order" created by Hitler exists for war and only for war. "Man is a beast of prey," as Spengler wrote in 1933, when he was still approved by the Nazis as the prophet of the New Germany. "The measure of the strength of a people is always and exclusively its readiness for military conflict" (Rosenberg). "It is a sacrifice for us not to have a new war. . . . War is the most simple affirmation of life. Suppress war and it would be like trying to suppress the processes of nature. These are also terrible. Every living thing is terrible" (Goebbels in 1934). "Not a 'community of men of free will,' but victorious war is the true social ideal" (E. Kaufmann). The "new man" of the Nazi pattern is, according to the boast of his leaders, totally permeated with the ideas of war. He dare not and cannot think of anything else. War is his only passion, his only enjoyment, his vice and his sport. Everything is directed to the central task of the robbery and enslavement of other peoples.

For a decade the entire society in Germany has been moulded according to this pattern by the Nazi rulers. The greater part of a generation has been trained in the Nazi schools and in the network of Nazi institutions to fulfil this pattern. In this way has been built up the gigantic machine of aggression to let loose over Europe and the world.

4. THE NAZI "NEW ORDER" IN EUROPE

For two and a half years the hordes of Hitler and Mussolini have overrun Europe, robbing its towns and villages, destroying the independence and freedom of peoples, massacring and pillaging, deporting populations for forced labour, and turning Europe into a graveyard and a slave camp.

The expedition of pillage and massacre against Abyssinia seven years ago was the prelude, which was followed by the invasion of Spain and the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The "Brown Network" of Nazi terror gangs and murder spread over Europe to prepare the ground. The Hitler terror outside Germany, financed and directed from Berlin, organised the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss of Austria, of Prime Minister Duca of Rumania, of King Alexander of Yugoslavia, and the French Foreign Minister, Barthou. Tens of millions of pounds annually were spent on the foreign organisation and propaganda, employing thousands of provocative agents in every capital of Europe; bribing statesmen, diplomats, generals and the press; and making every Nazi embassy and consulate a centre of intrigue, conspiracy and crime. The book, "The Brown Network," published in 1936, described with voluminous evidence this organised system, and listed the number of German refugees murdered in the countries to which they had fled. The Soviet trials of 1936 to 1938 uncovered—and smashed—one corner of this conspiracy, when it attempted to penetrate the Soviet Union, where it met with short shrift in place of the free licence of other countries. All this preliminary work was only preparation for the march of the armies and direct conquest.

For the sake of gain and conquest the Hitlerite clique has turned millions of their own people into cannon fodder. Hitler promised the German people honour, bread and peace. Instead, the Nazi rule has brought endlessly extending wars of aggression; it has brought the hatred and contempt of Germany by all other European peoples; it has laid waste Germany's resources and brought impoverishment and suffering for the masses of the people. In place of the repeatedly renewed, and repeatedly postponed promises of speedy victory and peace, every campaign has been followed by a new marauding campaign in limitless perspective.

The Nazi rulers cannot proclaim their true aims to the people; for their true aims are not in the interests of the German people or the peoples of Europe, but are directed solely to increase the profits of the handful of the German trust magnates, Junkers, and militarists, whom the Hitlerite clique represents. In vain they seek to conceal their aims with a thin veil of phrases about a "New Order in Europe" and the "Crusade against Communism." Nothing can conceal the fact that their wars are wars of aggression, invading and despoiling country after country which has sought to live at peace, and enslaving

in turn Austrians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Danes, Norwegians, Dutchmen, Belgians, Frenchmen, Serbs, Greeks, Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians; etc.

Conscious of their wars as wars of aggression, they seek to involve their troops and people in a direct personal interest in booty and spoliation as the only incentive. The fascist armies are not people's armies fighting for a cause; they reproduce the old type of mercenary armies or bandit hordes fighting for gain. This was demonstrated already in Abyssinia and Spain; it is demonstrated on a gigantic scale in Europe to-day and in the character of the war on the Soviet Union. The letters from the civilian population found on the bodies of dead fascist soldiers are again and again letters demanding the dispatch of food, clothing, furs, valuables. This system is directly encouraged and organised by the High Command. The secret instruction of July 17, 1941, addressed to all propaganda units of the German army and found by the Red Army when they routed the 68th German Infantry Division, directly declared:

"Rooted in every officer and soldier of the German army is the consciousness of personal and material interest in the war."

Order No. 24220 of the Chief of Staff of the 14th Rumanian Division, Colonel Nikolaescu, laid down:

"Grain, large-horned cattle, small-horned cattle, poultry, all this must be taken away from the population for the army. In every home it is essential to make a careful search and to seize all clothing and whatever else is to be found. For the slightest resistance shoot down on the spot and burn the houses."

The Red Army General Rokossovsky, who fought the Germans in the war of 1914 and in the present war, has described the difference between the Kaiser's army and Hitler's army:

"Wilhelm's army was better than Hitler's. Hitler has ruined the German army. It's hard to explain, except to a professional soldier. Hitler's army can win many victories, but it will never win a war. Wars are won only by real armies, and Hitler's is not a real army.

"It looks very much like a real army, mind you. An inexperienced eye could easily be taken in. The German soldiers march perfectly; they salute deftly; they're well primed with rules and regulations. Many of them shoot well, many of them are brave. The commanders know tactics and topography perfectly, and many of them also are brave.

"Nevertheless, it is not a real army. It is an 'ersatz' army. It is obsessed with the desire for gain. Perhaps you will understand me better if I say that it is a commercial army, not a military one . . .

"By employing such tactics, the German regiment has lost a certain quality of military value. When that regiment meets one of our regiments it will be defeated. The Nazis will lose the war."

Not only have Hitler and his gang harnessed their own people to the Nazi war machine, but they are attempting to harness all the conquered peoples of Europe by every method of terror and deception. For the subjugated peoples of Europe the invasion of the Nazi armies and the establishment of Nazi domination has meant unexampled barbarity and spoliation. Requisitioning and pillage; wholesale violence against the civilian population; systematic extermination in whole regions in order to make room for German settlers; and wholesale deportations to supply forced labour for the Nazi conquerors, have been the order of the day.

The economic spoliation of the conquered peoples is conducted with an elaborate and systematic organisation which is able to combine simple robbery and seizure with all the armoury of the advanced technique of modern monopoly capital, exchange manipulation, compulsory cartels and amalgamation, share control, holding companies, banking monopoly, inflation of local currencies, etc. Production in the conquered countries is turned to the service of Nazi war requirements; industries producing consumption goods for the people are deprived of raw materials, closed down or converted to war purposes; and amid shortage of the necessities of life the people are compelled to labour for the Nazi war machine which holds their country enslaved and uses the products of their labour to attack other countries. The populations are compelled to work for the German rulers, either by the direct deportation of workers to Germany (now totalling over two million foreign workers in Germany, and intended to reach, according to official statements, four millions), or by German control of the industries employing them.

Direct requisitioning and commandeering has applied above all to foodstuffs, cattle and agricultural products, and in some cases to machinery.

"In every country which they have overrun they have commandeered outright nearly all the food reserves and have ordered the slaughtering of much of the livestock. During this week alone, September 16-22, Germany is taking over 17,000 sheep from Denmark, 15,000 for immediate slaughter, 2,000 for grazing. Over 11,000 head of cattle are similarly being taken from Denmark to the Western districts of the Reich. Holland lost nine-tenths of her butter reserves in a week. Out of 28,000,000 poultry in the Netherlands, 22,000,000 are being killed this autumn." (*Times*, September 20, 1940).

This requisitioning is commonly "paid for" by the "Illusion Mark," that is, by a special marks credit established in the country at an artificially high rate of exchange, thus serving to depreciate and eventually ruin the local currency and effectively tie the economy of the country to German economy. In return, the despoiled country must buy German industrial products at high monopoly prices. This was the system by which, in an initial form, the ingenuity of Dr. Schacht, the super-sharper at the head of Nazi finance, was already tying the Balkans and South Eastern Europe in a tightening network to Germany before the war, and which has now been extended all over Europe in a far more developed and still more predatory form with the aid of the war.

The occupied States have to pay for the armies of occupation to the extent of something like £900,000,000 a year, or about £12 a head of the population—a sum great enough to maintain eight million soldiers on the British level. Since this is far in excess of the actual occupying forces, these payments are in fact direct tribute. It is estimated that the Nazis are extracting in all some £1,000,000,000 to £1,100,000,000 a year from the conquered peoples, or an average of one-fifth of their pre-war national income. The value of confiscated property, factories, machinery, arms and equipment cannot be estimated; seizures of gold and State property (prior to the attack on the Soviet Union) have been estimated at £1,000,000,000.

In France alone between the armistice and the end of 1941, according to the estimates of the German press, two hundred thousand million francs had been squeezed out during one and a half years of occupation. Half of France's wheat crop, 80 per cent of the total wine yield, the bulk of the potato and sugar beet crops and several hundred thousand head of cattle had been seized by the Germans. In 1941, 90 per cent of the output of the French canneries was transported to Germany, as well as 85 per cent of the motor vehicles turned out in France. Six thousand French enterprises were compelled to produce consumer goods for Germany out of French materials. In occupied France, by the beginning of 1942, 80 per cent of the entire manufacturing industry was occupied on German orders. (*Economist*, February 21, 1942).

What this spoliation of food supplies has meant in starvation and worsened health conditions of the French population has been attested by French official figures. The Health Office of the Seine Department reported that mortality in January, 1942, was 49 per cent above January, 1939, and infant mortality had risen

by 50 per cent. The Vichy town health department reported in October, 1941, that 52 per cent of the kindergarten children were ill from privation, and that infant mortality had tripled during the first half of 1941.

To break the resistance of the conquered populations the most methodical terrorist system is organised in order to lead to moral and physical exhaustion of the masses of the people and acceptance of Nazi rule. The Polish Government, in "The German New Order in Poland," published in the beginning of 1942, has recorded the evidence of the massacres, individual shooting, imprisonment and starvation in Poland; the killing of over 80,000 Polish men, women and children in or near their homes since the fighting was over and the "New Order" established; the death of thousands more in the concentration camps; the organisation of communities in forced-labour gangs; the establishment of walled-in ghettos in the large towns; the closing of all universities and higher schools, and even of Polish elementary schools, for the destruction of Polish culture. The Yugoslav Government, in a report issued in March 1942, has recorded the massacres by the German punitive exhibitions in Serbia; how in a single month in the Macva region the Nazis killed more than 15,000 people, burning down nearly all the villages and driving off the cattle; in the Rudnik region they burned almost the whole town of Gornji Milanovac, leaving 72 houses standing out of 450; in the town of Kraljevo they officially declared that they had shot 6,000 people; in the town of Kragujevac, eighty miles south of Belgrade, the following notice was posted by Hitler's express orders:

"For each German soldier killed 100 Serbs will be shot. For each German soldier wounded 50 Serbs will be shot. Sniping from houses will be punished by shooting all people in the respective houses who are over 15 years old. The house itself must be destroyed and burnt."

The mass executions of hostages in France included such heroic popular leaders as the Communist Gabriel Peri, Raymond Guyot, Racamond and Semard. The execution of the leaders of the Norwegian trade unions was followed by the tortures of Norwegian citizens, some of the facts of which slipped out, through a handful who escaped, and were published in the Swedish press in March, 1942, with the result that the Swedish newspapers which carried the terrible record were suppressed by the Swedish Government. The well-known methods of the terror within Germany have been extended with ever greater ruthlessness over Europe.

Faced with the unbreakable resistance of the Soviet people in the invaded territories, and deprived of the hope of using them as their tools,* the Nazi authorities in their war against the Soviet Union and treatment of the population in the occupied Soviet territories have resorted to methods of barbarism which have exceeded even their own previous records. The Order of the Day of Field-Marshal von Reichenau in October, 1941, called for the extermination of the local Soviet population and the destruction of all historical buildings:

"The provision of food to the local population and to prisoners of war is unnecessary humanitarianism . . .

"The troops are interested in putting out fires only in such buildings as can be used as quarters for the troops. All the rest, which are symbols of the domination of the Bolsheviks, must be destroyed. No treasures of history and art in the East are of the slightest consequence."

The Molotov Note on German Atrocities, issued on January 6, 1942, has recorded the devastation and barbarism: the razing of towns and villages to the ground; the blowing up and burning of dwelling houses, public buildings, factories, workshops, schools, libraries, hospitals and churches; in one village, 960 out of 998 homes destroyed; in another 564 out of 602; in another 225 out of 233; the erection of gallows in occupied towns and villages; the seizure of all foodstuffs, grain, cattle, poultry, household linen, clothing, blankets, kitchen utensils; the stripping of men and women naked and leaving them to starve and freeze in the Russian winter; the raping of pregnant women; the shooting at children for targets; the public exhibition of rows

* "In all the territory that Hitler has overrun there is not one Russian quisling" (Eden broadcast on January 4, 1942). "Hitler had hoped to find Quislings, Fifth Columnists in the wide Soviet regions he overran and among the unhappy masses who fell into his power. He looked for them, he searched for them, but he found none" (Churchill broadcast on February 16, 1942). The most striking evidence of this is to be found in the Nazi official admissions. Thus the General Commissariat of White Russia was excluded from Rosenberg's Decree for the setting up of local governing authorities in conquered regions on the grounds that "after nearly twenty-five years under the Soviet régime the necessary organisations and individuals are lacking as a basis on which to build up self-administration." Similarly Dr. Schlotterer, Ministerial Director in the Reich Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories, complained that in the occupied Soviet territories "Bolshevisation has been pushed to such a point that men have lost all comprehension of such notions as possession, property and private enterprise" (National Zeitung, February 14, 1942); while Kube, General Commissar of White Russia complained at a conference of officials on February 20, 1942, that the youth of the territory were for the most part infected with Bolshevist ideas.

of mutilated bodies of women and children to terrorise the population. In Kiev within a few days of its capture 52,000 men, women, old men and children were killed and tortured; in Lvov 6,000 were shot; in Odessa 8,000; in Kamenetsk-Podolsk 8,500 were killed or hanged; in Dnepropetrovsk 10,500 were shot by machine guns. As for the treatment of prisoners of war:

"Red Army prisoners are tortured with red-hot irons, their eyes are poked out, their legs, hands, ears and noses cut off. Their stomachs are ripped open. They are tied to tanks and crushed to pieces."

The appeal of the Soviet women to the German women broadcast in March, 1942, declared:

"German women! Do you know what the Nazis are doing in occupied Soviet territory? They have inflicted indescribable suffering on Soviet people. They are cutting open the bodies of pregnant women, cutting off the breasts of young mothers, bombing hospitals, setting fire to kindergartens, throwing people into the fire, torturing hundreds of people to death, putting out the eyes of Red Army men, branding their faces with fascist signs."

The peoples of Europe will never forget and never forgive the crimes of the fascist brigands, on whom full vengeance will be taken when the hour comes, in order that the last vestiges of Fascism shall be wiped off the face of the earth and Fascism shall never again befoul the life of humanity.

The aim of Hitler in organising an economic network of control and spoliation in the conquered countries is directed, not merely for immediate gains and confiscation, but to establish a permanent hold by subordinating the whole economy of the conquered country to German economy and finance.

Firms and enterprises in the occupied countries are drawn into the German Cartel system, subordinated to German banks, or dominant share control by German holders established. Thus in Belgium the entire coal production has been drawn into the newly constituted Union des Sociétés Charbonnières which is controlled by the German Klöckner Konzern and the Hugo Stinnes Coal Association; the steel industry, through the Ougrée Marihay, now dependent on the Otto Wolff Konzern, through the Phœnix Works, acquired by the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, and the steel syndicate Sybelac, has been brought under the control of the German Steel Cartel; the chemical industry is controlled by the Solvay Trust, predominant influence in which is now held by the Hermann Goering Konzern; and subsidiaries of German banks (the Kontinentale Bank in Brussels founded by the Dresdener Bank, the Banque de

l'Ouest in Brussels and the Banque du Travail in Antwerp, founded by the Bank der Deutschen Arbeit) provide the means of extending German control over Belgian industry. Similarly in France:

"The German authorities use unspent money received from the French Government under the armistice agreement to cover occupation costs, in order to acquire share capital majorities in mines, iron and steel works, chemical, electro-technical and automobile works. By this and by other means virtually all French industry has passed under direct or indirect German control." (*Times*, November 18, 1941).

This predatory absorption and fusion of the economy of the conquered countries into the network of exploitation of German monopoly capital provides the economic basis of the Quislings* and Fifth Column who have operated on behalf of Nazi Germany in all the conquered countries, except the Soviet territories, where none could be found. The Quislings are not only individual traitors, adventurers, gangsters and mercenaries; they represent a corrupt section of employers, traders, financiers, officials, etc., who live as intermediaries of the Nazi system of exploitation. In the various conquered countries, notes the *Economist* of January 10, 1942, "attempts to introduce Labour Fronts after the German model were not very successful; but various employers' federations acquiesced more readily." They represent a weak and degenerate bourgeoisie, which has lost all confidence in its capacity to maintain its power and privileges against its own people, and therefore prefers to betray the nation to the Nazi conquerors in order to survive as vassals enjoying the crumbs of the spoils. These enemies of the nation, tied to the chariot of the Nazi executioners, seek to deck themselves with the cloak of the "New Order" in Europe and the "Crusade against Bolshevism." The muffled revelations of the Riom trial have shown how the leading French reactionaries and militarists disorganised French defences and opened the front to the enemy in order to defeat the hated popular forces of the French nation; just as it was Field-Marshal Lyautey who said already in 1931 that "I feel more hatred towards certain Frenchmen—the revolutionaries—than towards the Germans

* The original Quisling was a Commander of the British Empire (and a Buchmanite, according to Sydney Dark, late editor of the *Church Times*), decorated by a Labour Government for his services in representing British interests in Moscow in 1927-29. His book, "Russia and Ourselves," issued by a leading London publisher in 1933, opens with the typical Quislingite sentence: "An unspeakably dangerous enemy is threatening our civilisation and primarily the British Empire; this enemy is Bolshevism, the monster of Russia."

of my own class," and the Conservative Academician Louis Bertrand who declared: "I feel closer to Hitler and his men, infinitely closer than to the Communists." Here is the soil of counter-revolutionary treason and the Fifth Column (like the monarchists at Coblenz, or the Tsarist emigrés who took up arms against their country) who, if unchecked, can lead a nation to ruin and slavery, and on whom Nazism has skilfully played for its own purposes.

This is the corrupt, foul and bloodstained basis of mass executions, spoliation and enslavement of the masses of the people, with the collaboration of a small group of traitor intermediaries, on which Hitler seeks to build his "New Order" in Europe and eventually throughout the world. The "New Order" in Europe, like "National Socialism" in Germany, is a gigantic deception. Just as the necessity of collective organisation in Germany is exploited to conceal the brigandage of the Nazi gangsters, Junker landlords, militarists and millionaires, so the no less undoubted necessity of the economic and political unification of Europe is exploited to conceal the brigandage of the Nazi gangsters and German monopoly capital in the enslavement and exploitation of Europe.

The conception of the "New Order" in Europe (like Japan's "New Order" in Asia) is the conception of the *Herrenvolk*, the ruling stratum or "superior race" maintaining ruthlessly its domination over the masses, extended to Europe as a preliminary to its extension over the world. Between the Germans and the remaining inhabitants of Europe a sharp line is drawn. The whole of European economy must be reorganised to suit the requirements of German finance-capital. The remaining countries must be driven back to the rôle of agricultural colonies, providing raw materials and slave labour for German industry. Wherever necessary for the establishment of "Greater Germany," existing populations must be exterminated or deported to make room for the expansion of German settlers. To the German working population is assigned the role of a labour aristocracy within the slave system, enjoying a relatively privileged position, sharing in the plunder, and thus to be given a direct material interest in the maintenance of the slave system, and paying for it with their blood.

The gulf between the ruling and subject peoples in the European "New Order" is strikingly shown in the present allocation of food. The following table shows the rations in Germany and the German-controlled countries in the beginning of 1942:

NORMAL RATIONS (ounces per week)

	Meat	Total Fats
Germany—present ration ..	14.1	8.8
.. ration in 1916 ..	8.8	4.0
France	8.8	no fixed ration
Belgium	8.6	3.7
Holland	2.5	7.0
Poland	—	4.4
Finland	2.5	1.3

(*Economist*, January 17, 1942).

This differentiation extends to every sphere of life and social and political organisation. In every Nazi-controlled country the Germans are organised as a separate racial group under their own leadership and with special rights and privileges, protected by regulations and treaties which already begin to take on the character of the old system of "capitulations" and "extra-territoriality" in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

"In annexed territories of non-German population the Germans at once become a special class; in Warsaw a quarter, shut off by a green belt, is being built to house 10,000 of them. Where Germans in any numbers live in territory which is not directly annexed, the Reich obtains from the State where they reside a recognition of them as a Volksgruppe; treaties to this effect have been signed not only by Croatia and Slovakia, but by Rumania and even Hungary." (*Times*, February 9, 1942).

"The National-Socialist World Empire under Hitler's leadership is now arising," proclaimed Governor-General Frank of Poland in a speech at Berlin University on November 19, 1941. The same Governor-General Frank had most sharply proclaimed its principles in an address to a meeting of German officials in Warsaw in January, 1941:

"The administration of the 'Gouvernemente-Général' is a training-ground for the future tasks which the Reich must face. The 'Gouvernement-Général' is the first country annexed in Europe as a 'Nebenland'—an auxiliary territory for the Reich."

Similarly the Galleiter of Poznan, Greiser, had declared:

"Never again will even a centimetre of the soil that we have conquered belong to a Pole. The Poles can work for us, but no longer as rulers, for which they have proved themselves incapable, but only as serfs."

The "New Order" of Nazism is not new, but very old, as old as slavery and oppression in human history. Its essential character seeks to revive the characteristics of the slave empires of antiquity. The Nazis have no eye for the future, but seek to find their inspiration in the vanished glories of the past. In

a speech at Aix-la-Chapelle on May 1, 1939, after the seizure of Czechoslovakia, Rosenberg sought to proclaim that the prototype of Hitler's Empire must be Charlemagne's Empire:

"Under the roof of Adolph Hitler's Germany must be gathered everything that has ever belonged to Germany in her thousand years of history.

"A new epoch has opened for the German people. The Nazi slogan, "One People, One Country" is now over-ruled. Henceforth, as has been demonstrated by the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, the German Reich must embrace all the peoples of the old German Empire. Charlemagne is the new symbol of Nazi philosophy, and Adolph Hitler his first real successor."

This fanciful claim gave already, in the spring of 1939, a hint of the intended frontiers of the new "Greater Germany." The Empire of Charlemagne included the whole of France, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, half of Italy, and part of Yugoslavia and Hungary, in addition to Germany; during the past thousand years the frontiers of Germany also included half of Poland.

The frontiers of the new "Greater Germany" would include almost all the industrial regions of Europe (excluding the U.S.S.R.), while in the remaining regions the agricultural worker would outnumber the industrial worker by more than two to one. The consequent structure of economy was described by the Reich Minister of Economy, Dr. Funk, in a speech on July 25, 1940:

"The peace-time economy must guarantee to the Greater German Reich a maximum of security and to the German people a maximum of consumption goods in order to increase their welfare. European economics must be directed towards this end."

Dr. Funk made clear the status which the "New Order" would provide for the subject peoples of Europe and the world:

"It is necessary to think not only of a national State but of a World Empire. The position of the Poles or the Negroes in the colonies must be considered under criminal law from the standpoint of the supremacy of the German people."

In a more recent speech delivered at the general meeting of the Reichsbank on March 17, 1942, Dr. Funk, as President of the Reichsbank, dealt with the problem of the war debt, which he described as "utterly unthinkable according to present-day conditions"; but, he continued,

"the debt would no longer be a problem after victory, as cheap raw material and labour then at Germany's disposal will enable it to be wiped out."

"Cheap raw material and labour at Germany's disposal."

The speculation of the Nazi gamblers is here laid bare. Such is the bountiful prospect of the "New Order," as described by the Reich Minister of Economy, offered to the conquered peoples of the world "after the victory" of Fascism.

Thus the outlines of the real Nazi war aims, the true character of the "New Order" in Europe and the world begin to reveal themselves equally in present experience and in future prospect. Their real war aims are intended to consolidate their world hegemony and the fascist régime for ever, in an ossified hierarchic structure of domination and enslavement—a pyramid, with Hitler, the Nazi gangsters, the German war-lords and big industrialists at the top; then, the German "racial" population in Germany and the conquered countries, lording it over the subject peoples and sharing in the plunder; then, the subordinate "Germanic" (Flemish, Scandinavian, etc.) communities in other countries organised in imitation Nazi parties, the Quislings and agents, sharing in the role of slave-drivers; and at the bottom, all the non-German subject populations as serfs without rights.

In the name of this "New Order" Hitler calls on the peoples of Europe to join in the "Crusade" against Communism and the U.S.S.R. With this "Crusade for European culture against the Anglo-Saxon-Jewish-Bolshevist conspiracy" he hopes to rally the support of the reactionary propertied sections in all countries and thus to consolidate the chains of the "New Order" on the peoples of Europe and the world. The Hess Mission showed that he even hoped with this appeal to foment division within the ruling classes of Britain and the United States. The old battlecry of Fascism, temporarily placed in cold storage between 1939 and 1941, is thus brought to the forefront anew. With this slogan Fascism advanced to power in Germany. With this slogan German Fascism built up its armed strength by the connivance of the ruling classes in other countries. With this slogan German Fascism broke the Peace-Front which could have checked its aggression. But to-day the old magic no longer works as formerly. The true face of Fascism has been revealed in the experience of the peoples of Europe. Only a handful of Quislings, corrupt and degenerate elements, mercenaries and adventurers respond to Hitler's call. The peoples of Europe see instead in solidarity with the Soviet Union the path to liberation from fascist slavery. The resistance of the Soviet people has inspired with renewed courage and confidence the national resistance of the European peoples. The revolt of the European peoples is rising against the "New

Order"; the daily arrests and executions of the heroic pioneers to-day are the prelude of the mass revolt of to-morrow.

The adventurist plans of the Nazis will not win success, despite their temporary victories over many peoples who were unprepared. Fascism will never establish its "New Order." But the cost in human life and suffering is already heavy, and the account rises with every day that passes. We must hasten and intensify our efforts to speed the day of victory and liberation.

CHAPTER IV.

THE TWO CAMPS

I. THE CONDITIONS FOR VICTORY OVER FASCISM.

THERE are sure grounds for confidence in decisive and speedy victory over Fascism—*provided that we mobilise and bring into action the full strength of the forces opposed to Fascism with sufficient speed.*

For a series of years, until the second half of 1941, Fascism has advanced with seemingly irresistible superiority and won success after success. The same ruthless and unscrupulous methods which served in the winning of power within Germany were brought into play and extended in the conquest of Europe. Swift, carefully prepared and concentrated offensive tactics, combined with exploitation of every political and diplomatic weakness of the other side, launched against divided and unprepared opponents, brought down country after country in Europe. The terror of Nazi blitzkrieg and the myth of Nazi invincibility were spread far and wide, and skilfully magnified in propaganda, to capture and hypnotise popular imagination, and thus themselves became additional weapons in the Nazi armoury.

But to-day the situation has changed. A world alliance of free nations, represented by Britain, the Dominions, the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic, confronts the robber alliance of enslaved nations under the Fascist conquerors. The world alliance of free nations reaches out to the nations enslaved under Nazi rule, who are potential allies in the common struggle against the common enemy.

The strength of the Soviet Union within this alliance has transformed the military situation. For the first time the main Nazi armies have met with an enemy who has not only been able to stand up to their headlong assault, but driven them back. The Soviet resistance and counter-offensive has given new inspiration and hope to all the peoples fighting Fascism. The myth of Nazi invincibility has been broken.

For the first time the blitzkrieg strategy has been defeated. The defeat of the blitzkrieg strategy is of cardinal significance for the further development of the war.

The blitzkrieg strategy grew out of the doctrine of "total war."

Both the conception of "total war" and the blitzkrieg strategy corresponded closely to the special conditions of a war waged by Nazi Germany. "Total war," or war waged with the sum-total of the entire material, industrial, military and man-power resources of the whole population of a State for the utter annihilation of an enemy State, not only corresponded to the social-political structure of the Nazi system, but also represented Hitler's method to save himself from the perils of a protracted war against ultimately superior forces, by being able to throw immediately his entire forces into action from the first day of war, while other States were not yet prepared on a comparable basis. It also represented the method to prevent and throttle unrest in the rear, such as had finally brought down the structure of the Kaiser régime in 1918—a nightmare ever since haunting the military leaders of Germany.

Corresponding to the conception of "total war," the blitzkrieg strategy represents the most characteristic strategy to exploit its advantages to the full. The blitzkrieg strategy is essentially the strategy of the aggressor, the sudden overwhelming offensive, based on a formidable arms superiority, especially in mobile armoured units, tanks and planes, to achieve the rapid breakthrough, encirclement and pursuit leading up to the complete smashing of the enemy within a few weeks. The campaign against Poland was completed in eighteen days. The campaign against Belgium, Holland and France was completed in six weeks from the day of the invasion to the final French capitulation. It is obvious that this strategy also closely corresponded to the special requirements of Nazi Germany, in order to prevent a protracted war, to deal most rapidly with one enemy at a time, and to escape having to face an ultimate superiority of material resources ranged against it.

The collapse of the blitzkrieg strategy against the Soviet Union threw the Nazi plan out of gear. For with this failure of a sudden decision, the long-term factors which the Nazi rulers most feared could come into play: and the full strength of the world alliance, whose Western partners had proved unready for immediate action, could now be brought into combined operations for the final defeat of Nazism in 1942.

Despite the military reverses which the Powers opposed to the Axis have suffered, and which have increased the forces on the side of the Axis, by the Nazi control of Western and Central Europe, and by the Japanese conquests in the Far East, with corresponding losses to the resources of the Anti-Axis Powers, the anti-fascist world coalition has still decisive superiority in

available man-power, in natural resources, in almost all raw materials with the exception of rubber, in industrial productive power, in shipping, in the means of production of arms of every description.

This superiority, however, while giving just grounds for confidence in the final outcome, can only become effective in proportion as we use it. Wealth and productive resources in the hands of an idle miser are no guarantee of military victory. We cannot for one moment afford to under-estimate the magnitude of the struggle against the Nazi alliance. Overwhelming as are the potential resources on the side of the world anti-fascist coalition, there can be no minimising of the formidable immediate strength which the Axis powers are still able to bring into the field, even after the heavy Nazi losses against the Soviet Union.

A survey of the potential and mobilised resources of the anti-Axis Powers will emphasise the need for speed in action, if the war is not to be protracted in a long and costly struggle, with consequent heavy destruction and exhaustion. The superiority of potential forces on the side of the anti-Axis Powers is undoubted. But, in order that it may become effective, it requires: first, the speediest mobilising, organisation and consolidation of these forces; and second, their military use in action on the co-ordinated series of fronts necessary for a combined offensive for the speediest defeat of Fascism.

2. POTENTIAL STRENGTH

The potential strength of the two camps is represented by the population and available man-power, natural resources and raw materials, technical development and industrial productive power. The conditions of these vary with the military fortunes of war, and with the gains and losses of territories. Any estimate is therefore necessarily subject to variations, as recent events have emphasised; and is further limited by the black-out of most current statistical information, with the consequence that it must be mainly based on the latest pre-war returns as a rough, but by no means always accurate indication of present strength.

In respect of population, the Axis Powers directly represent 230 millions: Germany (Reich total, excluding Czechoslovakia and Poland) 80 millions; Italy, 45 millions; Japan (including Korea) 105 millions. In addition, the territories conquered or controlled by the Axis include, at the time of writing (May 1942), over 400 millions. Nazi Europe, directly or indirectly

controlled, extends in practice (if we include the nominally neutral States in this area which fall within its orbit) from the English Channel and the Atlantic to the borders of the U.S.S.R. and Turkey, and thus includes some 200 millions additional to Germany and Italy—irrespective of the temporarily occupied Soviet territories. To this must be added the Vichy French Colonies in Africa, representing about 20 millions. Japan at present controls Manchukuo, (40 millions); French Indo-China (23 millions); Thailand (15 millions); Malaya (5 millions); the East Indies (70 millions); the Philippines (16 millions); as well as the greater part of Burma (16 millions), and considerable partially occupied regions in China; making a total of some 185 millions, with a conjectural addition for the occupied regions of China. This gives a gross total of some six to seven hundred millions under Axis control. The majority of these, however, are not available man-power for the Axis in a military sense; and even their economic exploitation is limited by the degree of active resistance.

As against this, the four leading Powers of the anti-Axis alliance hold direct sovereignty over close on thirteen hundred millions: British Empire (excluding Burma and Malaya), 510 millions; U.S.S.R. 193 millions (prior to the Nazi invasion); U.S.A., 130 millions; China, 450 millions. Even if we take only the fully independent democratic States participating in the alliance (excluding all subject colonial territories), i.e. Britain, the Dominions, U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and China, and compare this with the Three Axis Powers, we reach a total of 840 millions against the 230 millions of the Axis. To the broader total of close on thirteen hundred millions, must be added the control of the remainder of colonial Africa, except for the Vichy French colonies; the association of Ethiopia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, etc.; and the association of the majority of the Central and South American States.⁴ This would give a gross total in the neighbourhood of fifteen hundred millions ranged against the Axis; and the proportion of willing association in the anti-fascist alliance, and therefore of fully available man-power for all purposes, including military, is very much higher than in the case of the six to seven hundred millions controlled by the Axis. The real superiority in potential man-power is thus considerably more than two to one.

In respect of natural resources and raw materials, foodstuffs, cotton, oil, metals, etc., the superiority of the anti-Axis alliance is marked, except in respect of the loss of the former dominant position in rubber consequent on the loss of Malaya and the

East Indies (the extent to which the "scorched earth" policy has been carried out will limit the immediate availability of the resources thus gained for the Axis).

The following estimate is based on a table issued by the United States Census bureau on December 11, 1941, modified for subsequent changes in territorial control, together with the League of Nations Report on "Raw Materials and Foodstuffs" (1939) and the League of Nations "World Economic Survey, 1939-41". It can of course have only limited accuracy as a rough guide on the basis of pre-war figures.

The Axis group, for the purpose of this estimate, is taken as represented by Nazi Europe (all Europe excluding the British Isles and the Soviet Union), and the Japanese Empire, including Manchukuo, French Indo-China and Thailand. The anti-Axis group is represented by the British Empire (excluding Burma, Malaya, Borneo), U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and China; Egypt, Iran, Iraq; Central and South America; and colonial Africa other than Vichy French colonies. The new conquests of Japan in the Far East are not included for the purpose of this calculation with either group; since their output, while very important in respect of rubber, tin and, to a certain extent, oil, is lost to the anti-Axis group, but cannot be regarded as immediately available for Japan.

The territory of the Axis group covers just over three million square miles (or, including the new conquests of Japan, some four million square miles). The territory of the four main Powers of the anti-Axis group covers twenty-nine million square miles.

The superiority of the anti-Axis group in the proportion of the world output of the leading foodstuffs and raw materials is illustrated in the following table:

PERCENTAGE OF WORLD OUTPUT

	Anti-Axis Group	Axis Group
Wheat	69	21
Sugar	65	25
Tea	67	11
Cotton	97	—
Jute	99	—
Copper	85	12
Coal	67	29
Lead	70	9
Iron Ore	65	27
Petroleum	86	3

The principal materials which do not at present reflect this superiority are rubber, tin and aluminium. In respect of rubber, 89 per cent of the world production in 1940 came from Malaya, Borneo, Sarawak and the East Indies; and the strengthening of the anti-Axis position in rubber now depends on conservation of stocks, and the development of rubber reclamation and the synthetic rubber industry. In respect of tin, some 55 per cent of the world production came from Malaya, the East Indies, Burma, Thailand, Indo-China and Japan; but Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Belgian Congo and Nigeria still represent some two fifths of the world production. In respect of aluminum, Germany held the premier position in world production until 1940, but was overtaken by the United States in 1941; and the 1941 figures showed a production of 530,000 metric tons for the anti-Axis group and 462,000 for the Axis group.

The position in respect of industrial productive power shows also a definite superiority of the anti-Axis group, even after allowing for the Nazi control of all the advanced technical productive equipment of Continental Europe. It has been estimated that the output of the industries of the anti-fascist coalition constitute 72 per cent of the world's industrial output. The production of steel, which represents the indispensable basis for all war production, whether of tanks, planes, guns or shells, provides the most useful index of advanced industrial development. The relative position in 1939 showed:

PRODUCTION OF STEEL IN 1939
(in million metric tons)

Anti-Axis Group		Axis Group	
United States	47.9	Nazi Europe	44.7
U.S.S.R.	19.0	Japan, Korea,	
British Empire	17.6	Manchukuo	6.8
Total			
	84.5		51.5

Since 1939 the output of the United States has enormously increased; the steelmaking capacity is now 90 million tons, and the planned output for 1942, 80 million tons.

A recent calculation of the potential industrial strength on both sides was made in an article on "The War Industries of the Belligerents" in the journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. This calculation compares (1) the numbers employed before the war in the key industries which can be most readily turned over to war production; (2) the value of output in these industries before the war; (3) the total steel-making capacity.

RELATIVE INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH OF THE TWO CAMPS

	Metal, Engineering, Chemical and Precision Instrument Industries, 1939	Steel-making Capacity 1939	
	Persons occupied (000s)	Net value of output (£ millions)	(million metric tons)
Germany (Old Reich)	4,980	1,750	24
All Enemy Territory (Europe)	8,852	2,740	50
Japan	1,000*	200	7
AXIS TOTAL	9,852	2,940	57
United Kingdom	2,750	900	14
Total British Empire	3,935	1,169	18½
U.S.A.	4,000	2,400	80
U.S.S.R.	3,200	800*	19
ANTI-AXIS TOTAL	11,135	4,369	117½

*roughly.

(Bulletin of International Affairs, December 13, 1941)

These figures can only give a very rough guide to the present position. Changes since 1939 have not been publicly recorded; the financial valuation of the output is of doubtful use, especially in relation to the U.S.S.R.; the U.S.S.R. has, on the one hand, suffered a considerable destruction of industrial plant through the war and the "scorched earth" policy, while on the other, a great development of production has taken place in the Urals and further East.

President Roosevelt's plan, announced in his Message to Congress on January 6, 1942, envisaged large objectives for United States war production:

U.S. WAR PRODUCTION PROGRAMME

	1942	1943
Aircraft	60,000	125,000
(of which combat planes)	45,000	100,000
Tanks	45,000	75,000
Anti-aircraft guns	20,000	35,000
Merchant ships	8 million tons	10 million tons

These target figures give some indication of the enormous potential capacity of American production for war purposes.

These vitally important facts, however, of the overwhelming superiority of the anti-fascist world coalition in man-power and material resources, as well as of the gigantic possibilities of development of American production, are often misused in propaganda, not to create active confidence and determination to use these advantages to the utmost for speedy victory, but to spread complacency, deduce from these figures the misleading conclusion of automatic victory, and thus encourage passivity.

Every one is familiar with the way in which governmental spokesmen and official economists used to demonstrate triumphantly, especially in the days of the "frozen war" in 1939-40, how because Britain and France and America held one hundred per cent of this essential material, ninety per cent of that, or eighty per cent of the other, therefore *in consequence* victory was certain, and Hitler would inevitably collapse for want of oil, for want of cotton, for want of rubber, for want of tin, and so forth. This did not prevent France collapsing. Echoes of this type of propaganda still survive to-day. It was Lord Halifax who as late as May, 1941, in a speech at Minneapolis, solemnly proclaimed that rubber, oil and copper were "the trump cards in the hands of freedom," because the British Empire and America held 91 per cent. of the world's rubber, 70 per cent. of its oil and 85 per cent. of its copper; and that these "hard and simple facts" were "the certain assurance of the ultimate collapse and defeat of Hitler." To-day, when Japan has annexed the territories providing 89 per cent. of the world's rubber leaving a doubtful 11 per cent. for the Allies, this kind of wisdom looks less profound.

The value of the superiority in resources of the anti-fascist world coalition depends on the full mobilisation of those resources. Delay in full mobilisation would mean indefinite prolongation of the war.

3. MOBILISED STRENGTH

A serious examination of the immediate position, as soon as we turn from potential strength to mobilised strength, will show that we must not underrate the intensified effort which we need to make in order to ensure speedy victory over Nazism.

It is obvious that one heavily armed gangster can have a considerable initial advantage over four unprepared or inadequately armed citizens. Decisive is not arithmetical numbers

alone, but the degree of organisation and mobilisation, the level of technique, industrial development, military training, armaments and war production; and only a co-efficient of all these could produce a measure of relative strength.

Within the anti-fascist coalition only the Soviet Union is fully mobilised. We must not close our eyes to the fact some nine hundred millions out of the total populations of the States composing the coalition consist of indubitably anti-fascist, but also heavily undeveloped, poverty-stricken and unarmed or under-armed masses of India, and the colonial countries of the British Empire (still also held back and to a serious extent alienated by reactionary policies), or even of China, where, despite the magnificent resistance of the army and heroic building up of strength against untold difficulties, it remains true, as Marshal Chiang Kai Shek recently stated, that "90 per cent of our strength is unused; and that even in Britain and the United States we are still far from having organised our full strength.

If we exclude the regions of colonial (or semi-colonial) technique and development, we would reach a different picture of effectively organised man-power in the two camps.

On the basis of the "home" populations Nazi Germany and Japan represent a total of 230 millions. Britain and the white population of the Dominions, together with the Soviet Union and the United States represent a total of 393 millions. The balance is less uneven, especially if we take into account the temporary Nazi occupation of a portion of Soviet territory, including important industrial regions.

But to this estimate of available man-power in regions of more advanced technical development, it is necessary to add on the Axis side the subjugated peoples of Nazi Europe, directly or indirectly controlled by Nazi Germany, who, while not representing available military man-power except in a very limited degree, are compelled to labour for the Nazi masters, and represent (if we include the nominally independent and neutral, but in fact economically subjected and integrated Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal) some 200 millions, bringing the Axis total to 430 millions. It is evident that on this estimate, on the basis of available man-power in the regions of relatively more advanced technical development, the balance between the two camps would be far more even.

This estimate is reinforced by the recent calculation already quoted from the Royal Institute of International Affairs (see table on page 71), showing the number of workers employed in

the metal, engineering, chemical and precision instrument industries in the Axis countries (Nazi Europe and Japan) and in the democratic countries (British Empire, U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.) in 1939. The result revealed 9.8 million workers employed in these key industries for war in the Axis countries, as against 11.1 million in the democratic countries.

It has been estimated that some 10.2 per cent of the population in Germany has been mobilised for military service, as against a considerably lower percentage in Britain and barely one per cent of the population of the British Empire.

Vast reserves of man-power undoubtedly exist on the side of the anti-fascist coalition. But these reserves are still far from being fully used. Out of the four hundred millions of India the nominal total in the armed services is only one million ("the Indian Army's reputed million strength is still largely a paper figure", *Observer*, March 8, 1942), with only 50,000 in the ordnance factories. Of the five millions in Malaya or the fifteen millions in Burma practically none were trained or armed, thus leaving an easy road for Japan. Even in Britain there is still far from the fullest effective utilisation of man-power and woman-power. In the United States the changeover is only beginning.

The old illusions of the rentier coupon-clipping capitalist, the international financier or triumphant organiser of monopolist restriction, typical of the dominant forces of economy in this country in the modern era and governing official economic thought, who sought to identify the mere possession of wealth and investments all over the world, or parasitic "prosperity" on the basis of world tribute (alongside decay of the basic industries), with the economic strength and efficiency of the nation, have received a rude shock in the testing of the present struggle. As late as the summer of 1940 the Editor of the leading City organ, the *Economist*, Geoffrey Crowther, in his book on "Ways and Means of War", could lay down as an obvious truism that the economic output of Britain was higher than that of Germany because the national income was higher.

"Germany, in spite of her larger population, has a smaller National Income than Great Britain; it follows that the average German has a lower economic output than the average Englishman. On Mr. Colin Clark's figures for 1925-34 the ratio was approximately 1,000 Englishmen—1,600 Germans. In other words, the economic output of the average German actually in work at that time was only 62 per cent of that of the average Englishman, and there is no evidence that the relative position has changed in the intervening years."

(G. Crowther, "Ways and Means of War," 1940, pp. 39-40).

The fallacy of this attempt to measure the productive strength of a nation by the aggregate of monetary incomes under modern imperialist conditions is manifest. It was the same *Economist* which in 1937 declared "foreign investment" to be the "nation's greatest single industry". The towering pyramid of incomes of a host of retired pensioners, gentlemen of independent means, rubber and tin speculators, or of the swelling army of their dependants and hangers on, luxury trades in their service, butlers, footmen, racing touts, motor salesmen, publicity agents or stockjobbers and their clerks (alongside decline of the working population in agriculture, mining, shipbuilding or textiles) is solemnly held forward as "proof" of the superior economic efficiency of the nation. These typical illusions of peacetime capitalist economy have received merciless exposure in war, when the decisive test is the ability to produce.

Output in war production is still far from having reached its maximum in the countries of the anti-fascist coalition. The notion that mere possession of wealth and resources is equivalent to its effective utilisation still dies hard.

It is obvious that a more serious measure of relative strength will need to be based on productive power in the main industries, especially in heavy industry. If Germany produced 23 million tons of steel in 1938, against 10½ million tons for the United Kingdom, it is no use arguing that Britain was in reality economically stronger because 16 per cent of the population were employed in transport, commerce, finance and personal service, as against 11 per cent in Germany.

In the year 1940-41 (April, 1940 to March, 1941), according to the League of Nations "World Economic Survey 1939-41", the proportion of the national income devoted to war showed:

	National Income	War Expenditure	Percentage of National Income
	(in millions of dollars)		
U.S.A.	77,000	5,400	7
United Kingdom	23,400	10,100	43
Germany	29,100	16,600	57
Japan	6,100	1,800	30

Thus the proportion of the national income of the United States devoted to war, which only stood at 7 per cent in 1940-41, (compared to 43 per cent in Britain and 57 per cent in Germany), and which had only been raised to 15 per cent by the end of 1941, would need to be steeply raised in 1942 to reach a comparable level with the other Powers.

It is not only the question of laying down the plan and the expenditure. It is above all the question of the actual organisation of war production, the laying down of the plant, construction of machine-tools and transfer of existing production. The experience of the last war showed already the extent of the time-lag between the laying down of plans for war production and the final outcome in munitions of war..

"One of the military lessons of the World War for the U.S.A. was that she could train soldiers two and a half times as quickly as she could equip them with war material."

("Army Ordnance", July-August, 1937).

Although the United States had had two and a half years of preparation in supplying Britain and France before entering into the war, it turned out that

"only four cannon produced in the U.S.A. during the war to meet its war requirements reached the front before the close of hostilities—nineteen months after the declaration of war."

(Victor Lefebure, "Scientific Disarmament", 1931).

The American soldiers dispatched to the Western Front had to be equipped with British and French artillery, rifles, aeroplanes and tanks. Further, if a long preliminary period had to be reckoned already for the old established weapons, the development of the new war industries took even longer. It took fifteen months in Britain for the first tank to be produced from the moment the plans were accepted, and a further year passed before the tanks could be used in action. Generally speaking, considerably over a year must be reckoned before an aero-motor or plane design can be given over to mass production.

All this emphasises the importance of speeding the fullest effective mobilisation of man-power and production, in order to meet the expanding needs of war in two hemispheres, for all the various fronts developing, and especially for the maximum supply to the Soviet Union for the decisive Eastern Front, and for the establishment of the indispensable Second Front in Europe.

The facts of unpreparedness are often used by official spokesmen to justify inaction and a defensive, waiting strategy. But inaction in turn, and the absence of a main fighting front, breeds passivity, and does not spur to greater effort. Thus a vicious circle sets in. It is necessary to break this vicious circle from both sides. The problems of strategy and preparedness are vitally interlinked. A positive, forward, offensive policy of maximum effort is equally necessary in the field of strategy and in the field of mobilisation and production, in order to meet the urgent

needs of the coming months, to prevent the indefinite prolongation of the war and ensure speediest victory over Fascism.

There is no legitimate reason in the available facts of the present relations of strength of the two camps in respect of resources, production or mobilisation, to justify a passive, waiting strategy. This is the main practical conclusion from any present survey of the relative position of the two camps. The United States War Production Chief, Mr. Donald Nelson, has stated on April 29, 1942, that "the war output of the United Nations now exceeds that of the Axis by a considerable margin". There is still urgent need to expand production further and to extend mobilisation. But the decisive question now is the question of the most effective strategy to use the already available resources of the Allies for speedy victory.

CHAPTER V.

STRATEGY FOR VICTORY

THE British-Soviet Pact and the establishment of the World Alliance against Fascism brought completely new conditions for strategy. But in order to utilise the new possibilities, a basic recasting of strategy is imperative.

What is the position and prospect for the year 1942? Britain is now fighting, no longer in isolation, but with powerful allies representing an aggregate of resources and striking power very much greater than that of Hitler and the Axis. The Soviet Union, after having inflicted losses which have irreparably weakened the Nazi armies during the second half of 1941, is delivering heavy blows with its counter-offensive during the early months of the year, designed to prepare the way for the combined offensive of the allied forces for victory over Hitler in 1942. American war production is swinging into its stride, on a scale to dwarf all Nazi resources; and American expeditionary forces are preparing, with inexhaustible reserves of man-power. British war production, despite all difficulties, is now at a high level; air parity has been achieved with Hitler since the last quarter of last year; sea power is maintained in the Western hemisphere; millions of British soldiers are now trained, armed and equipped for modern warfare. The cracks in Hitler's "New Order" in Europe are widening; the warfare in Yugoslavia takes on the character of a full military front. All the conditions are gathering for the decisive combined offensive which can defeat Hitler this year.

But we must use our opportunities and organise our action, without delay, if we are to win the victory. Hitler is still strong, and has gathered powerful forces and mechanical equipment for the spring and the summer. The increasing desperateness of his position will intensify his efforts for early victory before the full strength of the alliance has been brought to bear. Japan has won for the time being sea power in the Pacific war area, and has been able on this basis to achieve a rapid series of military victories and territorial conquests, with consequent increase of resources. The shipping situation is serious. The conflicts of this coming year will be decisive for the whole future. There

can be no question of automatic victory. We must end with the passive, waiting policy which expected victory to fall into our lap, by the effects of the blockade, by air bombing, or by the internal collapse of Fascism, and which in fact was the outcome of the conditions before the summer of 1941, when Britain was isolated and had not the possibility of the initiative. Passivity breeds demoralisation. We need now to bring into action all the forces of the alliance, on the basis of a united strategy, which will combine a simultaneous offensive to strike the heaviest blows upon the enemy at the weakest points, in order to win the speediest victory. The time has come to pass from the defensive to the offensive.

The situation in 1942 calls for a decisive break with the defensive waiting policy and the speediest advance to the new phase of active strategy corresponding with the new possibilities. The defensive strategy was the inevitable reflection of the conditions between the summer of 1940 and the summer of 1941, when Britain was isolated, the possibilities of action were lacking, British production was still heavily outstripped by Nazi production, and American production was still at an early stage. But to-day these conditions are changed. They are changed, not only by the formation of the alliance in the summer of 1941, but by the further events since the summer of 1941: the defeat of the Nazi blitzkrieg and first Nazi retreat; the consequent desperate need of Hitler to stake all on the chances of 1942; the determination of the Soviet Union to press the offensive to victory in 1942; the winning of air superiority in the West; the participation of the United States in the war; and the increased strength of British and American war production.

Why, despite all the advantages on our side since the formation of the world alliance, the defeat of the Nazi blitzkrieg by the Red Army, and the enormous superiority of resources now gathered in the anti-fascist coalition, have the experiences of Britain in the war still continued to show what Mr. Churchill has called in his speech of March 26, 1942, to the Conservative Associations an "almost unbroken series of military misfortunes"? Because the new strategic opportunities presented by the British-Soviet Pact and the formation of the world alliance have not yet been seized. Because the old passive, defensive strategy has still continued and left the initiative in the hands of the enemy. Because, despite all the talk of co-ordination of strategy, there has not yet been in practice a common Grand Strategy of the Alliance. The measure of political unity achieved has not been accompanied by a corresponding unity

of military action. This is the contradiction which must now be overcome.

Mr. Churchill's prompt response to the new situation created by the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, and the speedy adoption of the British-Soviet Pact on the basis of a full military alliance for common victory against Hitlerite Germany brought into being the conditions for the establishment of a two-front war against Hitler from the East and from the West—the nightmare of Hitler and the German General Staff.

Yet the greater part of a year has passed up to the time of writing, and so far the new possibilities thus opened up have not been realised. No Second Front in Europe has so far been established. Whereas in the war of 1914-18 German imperialism had to fight simultaneously on a series of fronts against the combined armies, many millions strong, of Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and eventually the United States, and still carried on for four and a quarter years, with many successes until the final collapse, to-day Hitler, with in certain respects a more powerfully developed and equipped military machine, with control of Continental Europe, with Italy an ally, with France a partial ally and a source of supplies, with additional troops from a whole series of satellite States, has been able to concentrate almost his entire forces during these crucial months on a single front against the Soviet Union. The overwhelming majority of the British armed forces have remained out of action during this period. Under these conditions the resistance of the Red Army against this onslaught and the counter-offensive launched in the winter of 1941-42 has been an outstanding military achievement. Supplies from Britain and the United States to the Eastern Front have been able to play a part in this achievement. But the decisive need of active military collaboration still remains to be fulfilled.

The general British strategy which prevailed before June, 1941, has so far continued without any basic change: a mainly defensive strategy, with limited offensive action in the form of air bombing in Germany and Western Europe, and the secondary campaign in Libya. The demand for a Second Front on the Continent, which has been voiced with increasing urgency by important sections of military opinion in this country as well as by leading Allied and Soviet representatives, has up to the present met with official opposition and criticism as a premature demand. The Government's perspective has emphasised the necessity of a waiting policy until 1943, when the accumulation of resources from British and American war production would

make possible the assumption of the initiative. This contrast between the Anglo-American perspective of decisive action in 1943 and the declared Soviet aim of the maximum offensive of all forces of the alliance for victory in 1942, and the consequent lack of co-ordination of allied strategy thus revealed, has aroused widespread concern.

This conception of a defensive strategy and a waiting policy with a relatively distant perspective of action has been continuously expressed by Government spokesmen both before and after the turning point of June, 1941, and the date of prospective action has been continuously postponed. Leaving aside the original declarations at the beginning of the "frozen war" in 1939, when decisive Anglo-French action was prophesied for the spring of 1940, and beginning from the formation of the Churchill Government and after the collapse of France, we may trace the successive Government declarations and the continuous postponement of the hour of action—unaffected by the fundamental change represented by the establishment of the British-Soviet Alliance in the summer of 1941:

"Our offensive springs are being slowly compressed, and we must resolutely and methodically prepare ourselves for the campaigns of 1941 and 1942."

(Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons, August 20, 1940).

"In 1941 we may hope to be a well-armed nation, and that will open up possibilities to us which have not been open to us up to the present."

(Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons, December 19, 1940).

"As 1941 moves along its course we shall gradually become a well-armed nation, and the fight will then be conducted on more even terms. I hope that by the end of this year and the beginning of next year we may on the air and on the land be at no disadvantage, so far as equipment is concerned, with the German forces."

(Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons, January 17, 1941).

"I think it will be reasonable to hope that the end of 1942 will see us quite definitely in a better position than we are now, and that the year 1943 will enable us to assume the initiative upon an emphatic scale."

(Mr. Churchill, speech to the United States Senate, December 26, 1941).

"We shall be able to set about our task in good style in 1943."

(Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons, January 27, 1942).

During this period of successive postponements of decisive action the enemy has not been inactive; the resources of the Axis have been increased by the extension of Nazi conquests in Europe and the organisation of European industrial output for Nazi war purposes, and by the extensive Japanese conquests in the

Far East, although these increases have in fact been more than counterbalanced by the heavy losses at the hands of the Soviet forces on the Eastern front and by the rising tempo of American production.

The reasons given for opposing up to the present the establishment of a Second Front on the European Continent, either alongside the terrific battles engaging the main Nazi military forces during the autumn of 1941, or alongside the planned Soviet offensive for victory in 1942, may be summarised as follows:

1. Risk of a fiasco, of "another and far worse Dunkirk." (Churchill in the House of Commons, January 17, 1942).
2. Inadequacy of arms and equipment to meet Nazi armaments.
3. Lack of shipping.
4. Prior necessities of other fronts in Libya and the Far East.
5. Supply of arms to the Soviet Union as the best help, rather than an ill-considered offensive.
6. Requirements of defence of the British Isles, the Middle East and threatened Empire regions, with consequent necessity of immobilisation of the main forces in preparation for a Nazi attack.

Before dealing with these arguments in detail, it is necessary to consider the basic conception of strategy here involved, and the fundamental conditions of strategy of a war between Hitlerism and the anti-fascist coalition.

Strategy is a reflection of politics—of political aims. Just as war is the continuation of politics by other methods, so strategy is the practical working out of the necessary means and action to realise these political aims.

Strategical questions can thus never be treated in isolation or separated from the social-political conditions governing them, i.e. not only the development of the technical and productive forces, but also internal class relations, the forms of State and the relations of States. This is especially marked in the modern period, when the questions of war develop under exceptionally complex conditions, in the midst of the dissolution of the old society, rapid technical and economic changes, extreme class antagonisms, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggles, and great instability in the relations of States.

Why, for example, was German imperialism the first to elaborate the methods of "total war" and the blitzkrieg? The explanation of this cannot be found in technical grounds alone or the general development of military science, utilising the experience of the first world war. That experience was equally available to the General Staffs of the Western Powers. Britain

was the inventor of the tank. The French General De Gaulle first worked out the new possibilities of mobile warfare on the basis of tanks and motorised detachments; but it was the German General Staff which studied his writings, while the French General Staff boycotted him. Germany until Hitler was prohibited from constructing tanks or military aeroplanes. Yet it was German imperialism which first developed the new technique, because this corresponded to its special conditions and requirements in the post-1918 era. German imperialism had been defeated in the war of 1914-18 by a superior coalition with superior resources, waging a two-front war, and by a final collapse of the rear through the advance of the revolutionary struggle; and it was held under by the maintenance of a superior coalition against it. In order to break through and resume its offensive for the new division of the world, German imperialism required a form of State which would enable it to crush all resistance on the home front; a diplomacy which would divide its opponents; a technique of war which would enable it to mobilise and launch its entire resources before the potentially superior resources of the coalition which would inevitably be formed against it could be mobilised; and a strategy which would enable it to strike down its enemies one by one with annihilating speed before their unity and effective war organisation could be established. - The State form of Fascism; the diplomacy of the Fifth Column and the Anti-Comintern Crusade; the technique of "total war"; and the strategy of the blitzkrieg corresponded to these requirements.

Why did French imperialism, which held military supremacy at Versailles and for so long enjoyed the reputation of the first military Power in Europe, become ossified in military technique and sink to the military decay and unpreparedness revealed in 1939-1940? Why was De Gaulle boycotted? Why did the French Army, which held complete dominance in 1919, equally in tanks and air power against a disarmed Germany, emerge in 1939 with 3,000 tanks against Germany's 7,000 tanks (Daladier's figures) and 1,030 planes against Germany's 10,000 planes (figures of the Air Minister, La Chambre)? Again the reasons can only be found in the whole complex of conditions. French imperialism, with an inadequate economic-political basis to sustain the Continental hegemony temporarily won by the victory of 1918, concentrated all its forces to establish an elaborate defensive mechanism in order to sustain that hegemony, by the system of alliances encircling Germany in Europe, by the rigid diplomatic maintenance of Versailles, and by the Maginot

Line. The defensive strategy ruled out interest in the new aggressive possibilities of mechanised warfare; De Gaulle's theories did not suit the dominant school of French strategy. On the other hand, the social-political contradictions dissolved the defensive system. The keystone of the arch on which had been constructed the coalition and the two-front war leading to the victory of 1918, the Franco-Russian Alliance, had disappeared with the dissolution of Tsarism; and when the German military menace re-emerged with Hitler, hostility to the Soviet Union prevented its serious replacement; the Franco-Soviet Pact, whose ratification was only compelled by the support of the Popular Front, was never made effective or followed up by military conversations, and was finally annulled by Munich. The pro-fascist sympathies of the ruling class destroyed the system of alliances in Europe and surrendered Spain; the betrayal of Czechoslovakia meant the end of France as a Great Power. There remained only the Maginot Line, which was never completed to the coast, and an army under a Fifth Column in the commanding positions. The sequel was the collapse of 1940.

Why did British imperialism, which emerged from the war of 1914-18 seemingly at the highest point of its strength as a World Power, with its German rival seemingly crushed, so rapidly sink to the position of precarious weakness revealed in 1939 and its sequel? The conventional explanations which seek to cast the blame on the League of Nations, disarmament, pacifism and the Labour Party will not bear scrutiny. A solid Conservative majority was in power for eighteen of these twenty-one years, and for all the eight years preceding the war, including the whole time since Hitler came to power. Between 1918 and 1933 Britain and France spent ten times as much on armaments as Germany, and rigidly excluded Germany from any right to the possession of tanks, submarines, military aeroplanes or heavy artillery. If a change took place after 1933, there were other reasons at work.

British strategy prior to 1939 was in fact designed for a different war than the war which took place. Herein lies the secret of the unpreparedness and present dilemmas. The British Empire emerged from the victory of 1918 with a swollen territory, expanded by one and a half million square miles, and a new Middle Eastern sphere of dominion; but its vast extent, sprawling over one quarter of the globe, did not correspond with the internal strength of Britain, which was entering on economic decline, with accompanying centrifugal

and disintegrating tendencies of the Empire. Once the victorious Allies fell apart after victory, the dissatisfied and challenging imperialist Powers, Germany, Italy and Japan looked with greedy eyes on the British Empire as the future spoils of war; while the relative economic and political strength of the United States was rapidly growing and extending its penetration at the expense of the British world monopoly. Here was a situation full of acute problems for the British rulers. Before 1914 the strategic problem had been seen entirely in terms of the North Sea and the one enemy, Germany; the two-power standard of naval superiority had been maintained; and even so a powerful coalition had been skilfully and with single-minded policy built up for ten years before war. Now the potential menace had to be seen simultaneously in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Pacific; and the navy after Washington no longer held world supremacy. Under these conditions no conceivable isolationist strategy or building of armaments could have protected the Empire against all potential opponents simultaneously in every ocean and continent of the world. The only practical strategy in face of the offensive of Germany, Italy and Japan would have been to build the most steadfast combined front with all Powers opposed to aggression, so as to check the menace before it grew strong. Collective security was no utopia, but the only practical policy for the British Empire.

But here, as with France, the social-political contradictions stood in the way. The League of Nations, especially after the Soviet Union had joined it, became suspect as a panacea of left cranks; and every undermining of its authority was hailed as a triumph of realism, while British statesmen led the way in demanding the revision of the Covenant to allow of greater latitude for Powers which wished to expand territorially. A firm collective stand against aggression would have meant a common stand with People's Front France, Republican Spain, the Socialist Soviet Union and the Chinese National Revolution against Fascist Germany, Italy and Japan. All the instincts of Conservatism under the leadership of the Baldwins and Chamberlains revolted against such an alignment. The open aggression and mounting insolence of the Fascist Powers were condoned and whitewashed; Bolshevism was seen as the danger; a blind eye was resolutely turned to the fascist spearhead directed against the British Empire. Instead, the alternative theory was evolved that, if only the Fascist Powers were encouraged and allowed adequate armaments and suitable expansion at the

expense of minor victims, their final expansion would reach satiety at the expense of the Soviet Union and China, while the British Empire would remain blissfully immune, a benevolent spectator of a world made safe for reaction. So followed the policy of "appeasement," "non-intervention" and Munich.

The strategy pursued up to 1939 corresponded to this theory. Sufficient defensive rearmament of Britain and France was considered necessary to prevent the risk of a break to the West and ensure the expansion East. But there was no serious expectation of a war in the West; and the rearmament was conducted with spendthrift corruption and small results, while no inconsistency was seen in simultaneously equipping Germany with a much greater volume of armaments. British finance and traders supplied Nazi Germany with armaments and war materials; questions on the subject in the House of Commons were evaded or suppressed; the Anglo-German Naval Treaty gave Germany back a navy and the right to build submarines up to 100 per cent of the strength of those of the British Empire; the Munich settlement and consequent surrender of Czechoslovakia handed to Germany 1,582 planes, 469 tanks, 43,876 machine guns, and 25 arms factories, including the great Skoda and Bren works.

The "appeasement" policy is sometimes to-day still defended by apologists on the grounds that it was a well-intentioned policy of peace, rendered inevitably necessary by German superiority in armaments and British unpreparedness, and only criticised by those unaware of British unpreparedness. This apologia also will not hold water. In this fairy-tale picture the gaze is fixed on the last stages of the outcome of a suicidal policy, and not on the decisive early years, when Germany was disarmed and helpless, and when British policy shattered the restricting regulations of Versailles, vetoed Franco-Polish resistance to German rearmament, supplied the main finance for German rearmament, protected the armed reoccupation of the Rhineland and introduction of conscription, gave the right to a navy, etc. When the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935 gave Germany the right to build a navy up to one-third of British strength, and added a special clause conceding the right to build submarines up to 100 per cent of British strength, the insertion of such a special clause is not explicable except on the confident assumption that those submarines would not be used against Britain, but elsewhere. The same assumption underlay the peace illusions spread by Ministers to the last, the "Peace In Our Time" of Chamberlain, the "New Golden Era" of

Hoare, or the declaration of the Minister of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, on August 3, 1939, that "war is unlikely; the Government has very good reasons for saying that." The entire strategy was built on the assumption of the wrong war, not of the real war. Hence the present dilemmas.

This "appeasement" or Munichite policy for many years permeated every pore of administration, military, industrial, the civil service and the political leadership of the country. It rotted and corrupted the entire fabric and brought the country to the extreme edge of degeneration. In France it led to the final catastrophe. It inculcated lethargy, illusions of security, blindness to the real danger and anti-democratic prejudice. It throttled all initiative and energy, and encouraged only servility, time-serving, hypocrisy and routinism. The outcome has been experienced in the scandals of the rearmament chaos, the economic backwardness, the military disasters and the colonial bankruptcy. The Churchill group, which in the later stages criticised this policy, was pursued with venomous hatred and boycott by the Conservative Party machine. The poison penetrated even the labour movement, which barred unity, cursed the Soviet Union, blessed "non-intervention," gave Godspeed to Munich, expelled a Cripps for advocating democratic anti-fascist unity or a Pritt for advocating friendship with the Soviet Union, and bred time-serving stagnation. Only the left, led by the Communist Party, conducted a consistent fight against this corrupting plague during these black years; its representatives were already giving their lives on the fields of Spain against Fascism.

In contrast to the blindness of the British and French rulers, the Soviet Union understood with firm clearness from the outset the menace to all other States represented by the victory of Fascism in Germany and the necessary conditions of resistance to fascist aggression. From the moment of Hitler's coming to power, the Soviet Union hastened forward the most intensive armed preparations. Between 1933 and 1939 Soviet arms expenditure was multiplied twenty-seven times, from 1.5 thousand million roubles in 1933, to five thousand million in 1934, eight in 1935, fourteen in 1936, twenty in 1937, twenty-seven in 1938 and 40.8 thousand million in 1939. These armaments are to-day standing the world in good stead and have won time for Britain and the United States to re-arm. The trials of 1936-38 smashed the Fifth Column, which was running riot without check in Britain and France. The fight for a collective peace front against fascist aggression, conducted through the League

of Nations and every diplomatic channel, won the Soviet Union the recognised leadership of all progressive forces throughout the world. The progressive forces in Britain and France proved insufficiently united to defeat their Munichite Governments, and the Munichite policy was in consequence able to prevent a collective peace front, thus making war inevitable. The aim of the Munichite policy was directed towards the alliance of the Western Powers with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union. The success of this policy would have meant the world victory of Fascism. But the counter-stroke of the Soviet-German Pact smashed the Munichite policy, won time for the Soviet Union to increase still further its armaments and hasten its strategic preparations by the extension of the Western frontiers, and enabled the British and French peoples to learn in the grim school of war, since no other lesson would teach, the deadly consequences of their isolationist policy.

The British awakening began in the spring of 1939 after the occupation of Prague. But it was still a half-hearted awakening, which could not face a basic revision of strategy, but clung to the relics of the Munichite dreams. The result was the half-and-half policy; the ramshackle system of alliances with Poland, Rumania and Greece; but the refusal of the Soviet offer of a reciprocal British-Soviet alliance of mutual defence. The latter was refused on the grounds that it would mean the division of Europe into two ideological camps, of Fascist and anti-fascist States. ("The real effect of this proposal would be to do what we at any rate have always set our faces against, to divide Europe into two opposing blocs or camps": Neville Chamberlain on the proposal of a British-Soviet Pact in the House of Commons on April 4, 1939). Desultory negotiations were entered into with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939, but without readiness to enter into binding commitments of a full alliance of mutual defence or consider any strategic plan against the impending German offensive. It was still assumed that, if the worst came to the worst, the Soviet Union would in any case pull the chestnuts out of the fire, without need of a binding agreement, while the absence of a specific agreement would enable the parallel negotiations with Nazi Germany to go forward successfully ("A hard and fast alliance with Russia would hamper other negotiations," *Times* editorial, May 4, 1939). The specific Soviet warning that Soviet intervention would only take place on the basis of a firm collective front, and not otherwise, fell on deaf ears as much as the previous Soviet warning that the Munichite policy would prove a boomerang to the

Munichites.* Thus the half-and-half strategy of the summer of 1939 ensured the worst of both worlds.

When the Munichite Governments of Britain and France, having refused a collective front, in September, 1939, declared their isolationist war on Germany, they were still under the illusions of their own superior strength, with Germany as merely the pawn that had got temporarily out of hand. They regarded the conflict as an easy preliminary canter preceding the real war. Mr. Greenwood's declaration in the House of Commons, "May the war be swift and short," voiced the prevailing illusion. "When the war began . . . the French Army was supposed to be the strongest in Europe, and with the Polish Army and the British Navy and Air Force thrown in, the chances of the revived German militarism seemed far from bright" (Scrutator in the *Sunday Times*, September 14, 1941). This was the period of the "frozen war," of leaflet raids on Germany and Duff-Cooper's announcement in Paris of the discovery of "a new way of making war, without casualties." Ministers light-heartedly speculated on the substitute régime to be set up in Germany, in order to resume the basic strategy, after purging what the officially issued "British Case" (by the Minister, Lord Lloyd, with the blessing of the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax) declared to be Hitler's "supreme apostasy" in signing a non-aggression agreement with the Soviet Union. The height of this megalomania was reached with the Finland adventure, when the British and French Expeditionary Forces were equipped for dispatch to the Second Front in Finland, on the assumption that Britain and France could easily take on both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union at once; and nearly three times as many British planes were sent to serve Finnish Fascism against the Soviet Union (420 fighters and 24 bombers) as were three months later available for the British Expeditionary Force (50 fighters—Lord Gort on May 12, 1940) in the hour of extremity on the Western Front.

This entire strategy ended in final shipwreck in the spring and summer of 1940. France went down in the shipwreck. Britain survived, but in a dangerous and isolated situation. In the hour

* "The evasion of specific obligations in the hope that in the event of war the Soviet Union, despite the absence of any pledges, would attract the fire of the aggressor by rushing to the aid of the attacked country, is a calculation as naïve as it is cynical.

"But any genuine attempt to build a bloc against aggression will find the Soviet Union anxious as always to throw all its power into the scales on the side of peace and democracy."

(Soviet Union official statement, May, 1939).

of need the vigilant strength of the Soviet Union already began to operate to turn the balance in favour of the British people, just as in the preceding year it had already saved seventeen millions in the former Polish territories from the Nazi claws; the concentration of Soviet forces on Germany's Eastern frontier—as Hitler later complained in seeking to justify his attack on the Soviet Union—assisted to divide the Nazi forces.

By the autumn of 1940 Hitler reached the decision, as he stated in his speech in January, 1942, that he would have to destroy the power of the Soviet Union, if he wished to win the war. He recognised that all his military victories would be in vain, and his hopes of world domination doomed to failure, so long as the independent power of the Soviet Union on his flank grew daily in relative strength, while Britain and the United States were still undefeated and preparing eventually superior forces. He accordingly calculated that if by a lightning thrust he could smash the Soviet Union in a speedy war he could then turn, with his rear secure and with renewed resources to settle finally with Britain and the United States. He recognised that such an attack, with Britain still in the field, raised the danger of a two-front war; but he hoped, as the Hess Mission indicated, to be able so far to divide and confuse opinion in Britain and the United States as to paralyse their action and to secure, if not their support, at any rate their passivity and the absence of a Second Front.

But Hitler's calculations were doomed to frustration no less than the previous calculations of the Munichites. His treacherous attack on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 did not win the speedy victory before winter which he had promised; instead, he found his forces locked up in the most dangerous campaign he had undertaken, while, despite gains of territory, he had not won the hoped-for new resources. His appeal to reactionary circles in Britain and the United States did not win the response intended; instead, the attack on the Soviet Union led to the establishment of the alliance of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. For by the summer of 1941 the political situation in Britain was profoundly different from the time when the Munichites ruled the roost. There was now universal recognition, by ruling class opinion no less than by popular opinion (which had always been in favour of the British-Soviet Pact, as the 87 per cent poll for it in the spring of 1939 had shown) that the interests of Britain and the interests of the Soviet Union were united in opposition to Hitler's aggression. The British-Soviet Pact, which had previously been turned

down, now received unanimous support, with not a voice raised against it. At last the political conditions had been established for that two-front strategy which means the doom of Hitlerism.

From this point the decisive question for Britain has been and remains the speediest execution in action of that two-front strategy which means victory over Hitlerism. Yet the necessary revision of strategy corresponding to the new political conditions of the war has been delayed. This delay reflects the survival of past conceptions still lurking in the present. This is not only a question of the still influential, though no longer dominant role of the remaining Munichite forces, who are still strongly entrenched in many leading political positions and in the High Command, and whose outlook was expressed in the notorious indiscretion of the Minister, Moore-Brabazon, when he expressed the hope that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union would destroy one another, leaving the British Empire on top.* These representatives have been weakened; some of them have been removed from political leadership, though others still need to be removed. But, in addition to this, there remains the still strongly entrenched tradition of the defensive strategy; the under-estimation of the strength of the Soviet Union; the lack of confidence in the possibilities of combined offensive action with the Soviet Union; the conception of waiting for the United States, or for an ultimate overwhelming preponderance of forces, without calculating what happens in the meantime; the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi forces; the disillusionment through previous failure and reverses consequent on an entirely different situation and the wrong policy; the fear of the initiative.

* This poisonous Munichite conception, seeking to disrupt allied solidarity against Fascism, and thus working for fascist victory, is also expressed by the remaining bourgeois relics of Continental Social Democracy. Thus the declaration of the German Social Democratic Party Executive in July, 1941:

"From the Arctic to the Black Sea the world's strongest armies are locked in battle. Should one of the two achieve a quick victory, that army would henceforth be irresistible on the continent of Europe and Asia. It is only by exhausting each other in prolonged struggle that the nations of the Continent can be relieved of oppression, and that the power of Anglo-American Democracy can become the dominant factor in shaping a new World Order."

After ten years of Hitler's power, and the destruction of the German working class organisations through the refusal of the united front, the lesson of unity against Fascism has not yet been learned by these surviving exiles.

We need now fearlessly to draw the lessons of these months in order to determine the necessary strategy for the future. The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union provided the most favourable opportunity for immediate maximum offensive action against Hitler in the West, while his forces were inescapably locked up in the East against the fresh Soviet armies. This opportunity was not taken, owing to under-estimation of the strength and capacity of resistance of the Red Army (the fantastic reports of the military correspondents in Finland a year earlier were producing their boomerang effect). The initial strategy following the adoption of the British-Soviet Pact was based on the assumption (1) that the Nazi attack would speedily smash the Soviet resistance, or at best lead to a retreat beyond the Volga; (2) that in consequence any British action in the West would be speedily faced with the main Nazi forces and would as a result be in an untenable position; (3) that in consequence preparations should be concentrated, not on action, but on equipping the front in the Caucasus and the Middle East to receive the Nazi forces after they should have broken through the Soviet Union.

The outcome proved the incorrectness of this calculation. This basic strategic error, which governed the first phase following the British-Soviet Pact and prevented the Second Front in the West in the autumn of 1941, has since been officially admitted. The Soviet successes, declared Mr. Churchill on January 27, 1942, were "unhoped for, undreamed of by us, because we little knew the Russian strength." The Government would have sent more help to the Soviet Union, declared Mr. Noel Baker in the same debate, "but for the disastrous advice which they received about the power of Russia to resist." But the consequences of this basic strategic error have not yet been corrected.

What was the consequence of this strategy? Official circles in this country in the summer of 1941, after having seen the French Army, "supposed to be the strongest in Europe", collapse in six weeks before the Nazi onslaught, were convinced that the Nazi forces would inevitably defeat the Soviet Union in a matter of weeks or, at best, of months. From this followed the universal official opinion in the opening phase that the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union represented, not an opportunity for action, but a short "respite", a "lull", a welcome relief from air raids, an opportunity to rest and re-equip ("Chiefly, it has given us a lull to re-equip and to rest. . . . It has given us

valuable rest here": General Wavell in a press interview, *Times*, July 5, 1941). Hence also the delay for three months before the conference was held in Moscow to organise supplies. Hence the utilisation of the time gained, not for maximum endeavour, but to ease off; the utilisation of the improved shipping situation, not to establish a Second Front in the West, but to pile up food reserves in Britain.* Alongside the most terrific fighting of any war ever known on the Eastern Front, the British people were offered "better Christmas dinners" as their share in the fight.

What was the further consequence of this strategy? For five months, until the campaign in Libya in November, 1941, not a single British soldier was fighting a Nazi soldier. Hitler was enabled to concentrate his forces against the Soviet Union in isolation and thus to fulfil the Nazi strategic principle of "one at a time." Not only this, but the open proclamation of this passivity by Lord Halifax's declaration in America that there would be no question of a Second Front in Europe in 1941 passed the tip to Hitler and enabled him to transfer additional forces, estimated at from twenty-five to thirty divisions, from the already depleted garrisons in Western Europe to the East. Thus this passivity not only denied to the Soviet Union the advantage of allied fighting forces; it actually reinforced Hitler's forces against the Soviet Union by close on half a million men.

The Libyan campaign after five months represented a wel-

* "During the second half of 1941, however, a substantial improvement occurred in the supply position, with the result that the total for the year rose to a very satisfactory level. The Ministry of Food has taken advantage of this improvement to build up stocks of essential foods, and the stocks in December, 1941, were 30 per cent higher than in December, 1940."

(Major G. Lloyd-George, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in the House of Commons on March 3, 1942).

Thus the shipping, which might have been used to help to equip the Second Front in Europe, was used instead, to expand food reserves in Britain and to equip the hypothetical front in the Caucasus and the Middle East. The main difficulty in the way of the Second Front in the autumn of 1941 was not the lack of shipping. The main difficulty was the defensive strategy, which used the available shipping for other purposes. It should be borne in mind that, according to military experts, "the tonnage necessary for carrying a single division to a Red Sea port and maintaining it there, would carry and maintain twenty six divisions if landed on the Continent within a radius of three days' steaming from a home port." (Major Philip Gribble, *News Chronicle*, March 23, 1942).

come beginning of action.* But the scale of the campaign was still limited, in relation to the total forces on both sides. In the whole Libyan campaign "we have never had in action more than 45,000 men" (Churchill in the House of Commons on January 27, 1942)—or one-fifth of the forces which Rumania put into the field alongside Hitler against the Soviet Union. What of the remaining millions of the British armed forces? Apart from the limited forces dispatched to the Far East, no less than one and a half millions of the regular forces, or three millions, including the Home Guards, were held immobilised, according to Lord Halifax's broadcast in the United States on March 18, 1942, for the defence of the British Isles. Three-quarters of a million, according to Mr. Alexander's statement, were concentrated for the armies of the Middle East. The best forces and the best equipment which could be shipped overseas were gathered, according to Mr. Churchill's statement, for the "front from the Levant to the Caspian"—that is, for the defence of the Caucasus and the Middle East in the event of the hypothetical break-through of the Nazi troops and collapse of Soviet resistance. Hence, as explained, the shortage for the Far East.

What was the further consequence of this strategy? Japan watched the situation for six months from June to December, 1941. Had the Second Front been established in Europe in the autumn of 1941, with the consequent extreme weakening of Hitler's position, since the division of his forces would have established effective Soviet superiority already in the autumn of 1941, it is evident that Japan would have exercised extreme caution in the consequent new international situation before committing itself to the sinking fortunes of the Axis. The passivity in the West encouraged Japan to open its initiative in the Far East.

Thus the situation at the opening of 1942 presents at once new dangers and new possibilities: On the one hand, the exten-

* The Libyan campaign was misrepresented by the Munichites as already fulfilling the role of the Second Front in the West, urged by Stalin a fortnight before its inception. "By starting an offensive against Libya Britain has opened a Second Front against the Axis. . . . In his latest speech Stalin emphasised the importance of a Second Front, and in some quarters it was wrongly assumed that he was referring to Western Europe" (*Daily Telegraph* Diplomatic Correspondent, November 20, 1931). In fact Stalin had stated in his speech of November 6 that "one of the reasons for the setbacks to the Red Army consists in the absence of a Second Front in Europe against the German fascist troops" and that "the appearance of a Second Front on the Continent of Europe—and it must appear in the nearest future—will render substantially easier the position of the Red Army to the detriment of the German Army."

sion of Japan's offensive in the Far East and the loss of sea power in this region has led to the loss of important bases and territories, involving the loss of important sources of raw materials, without any prospect of speedy effective counter-action. The setback of the Libyan campaign has re-opened the danger of a new Axis offensive in the Mediterranean or the Near East. The effects of these developments and of the intensified attack on shipping sharpen the problems of supplies, and thereby further weaken the ground for the present passive waiting strategy. On the other hand, the centre of the world situation at the opening of 1942 has been dominated by the successes of the Soviet counter-offensive on the decisive Eastern Front, the consequent heavy losses of the Nazi forces, and the declared aim of Soviet strategy to advance to the general offensive for finally driving out the Nazi forces from all Soviet territories in the course of the year. The Nazi rear in Europe is becoming increasingly unstable. The United States, with all the gigantic strength that it represents, is now a full partner in the war against Hitlerism. All these developments, and the improved relative position of Anglo-American production and preparations have strengthened the position for successful offensive action in Europe by Britain and the United States to coincide with the Soviet offensive. The question of the possibility of the complete defeat of Hitler in 1942, given the correct strategy, has become a burning practical issue.

The conclusions to be drawn from this situation for the strategy for victory to be followed in the period now opening are inescapable. Both President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill have made abundantly clear their recognition that, grave as are the events in the Far East, the decisive sphere of the world war is and must be on the Continent of Europe for the defeat of Hitler, whose defeat is the indispensable condition of success against the remaining elements of Axis power. But Hitler can only be finally defeated, not by the blockade alone, not by air bombing alone, but on land by the destruction of his armies, by the action of the allied armies in collaboration with the European peoples and finally with the German people. The logical conclusion of this strategic line, the necessity of the Second Front on the Continent of Europe, not at some remote future date, but in the period immediately now opening, when the maximum forces are being thrown into the field on both sides in Eastern Europe, requires now to be accepted as the basis of strategy.

At present there is a dangerous divergence between two

alternative strategical perspectives being held out by the official spokesmen of the Governments of the United Nations: the perspective of decisive action in 1942, and the perspective of decisive action in 1943 or later. Such a divergence is a denial of the very conception of a unified allied strategy. It means the weakening and division of the forces whose combination and combined action should be their strength. A common planned strategy of the alliance, reached and agreed by the Governments and general staffs, is essential and must be reached.

What are the two alternative strategies thus put forward, between which the choice must be made by the people of this country?

One is the passive, waiting, defensive strategy which sets the perspective for decisive action in 1943 or later. This strategy opposes present action as risky and inadequately equipped, and defines the present task as (1) maintaining the main forces on the defensive in the British Isles and remaining bases of the British Empire in readiness for invasion or attack; (2) maintaining the blockade; (3) maintaining supplies to the Soviet Union; (4) confining offensive action principally to air bombing over Germany and the occupied countries, with possible occasional minor Commando raids and diversions; (5) accumulating war material and preparations with a view to awaiting a decisive superiority before attempting any general offensive with the main forces in 1943, 1944 or 1945. This is the policy so far indicated in Government statements.

The other is the policy of offensive action for victory over Hitler in 1942, by opening out the Second Front in Europe this year to coincide with the Soviet offensive and unite with the Soviet strategy of throwing all the main forces of the alliance into action in Europe against Hitler this year, with a view to securing victory in 1942. This is the strategy officially proclaimed by the Soviet Union, and advocated by many leading military and political representatives in this country, the United States, Canada and other countries of the alliance, as well as representatives of the European Allied Governments.

Between these two main lines of strategy the decision must be made.

The policy of the offensive can in the present situation only be the policy of the Second Front in Europe. This is the decisive ground. In the Far East for the time being only a defensive policy is possible: the main immediate task here is to mobilise Indian resistance by the free collaboration of the Indian people, and to develop the co-operation of India, China

and Australia with Britain and the United States. But the pivot of the war is in Europe against Hitler. Hitler must be defeated, and Hitler can only finally be defeated on land, by the combined action of the land armies of the alliance.

Can the old arguments against the Second Front be regarded as valid?

It is argued that the difficulties now arising on other fronts, in Libya and the Far East, rule out the possibility of a new front in the West. But this argument cuts both ways. In fact the diversion of Hitler's forces in Europe would represent the best aid to the front in Libya and Northern Africa, and the best insurance against a new attack towards the Middle East, while the weakening of Hitler is the indispensable condition for strengthening the position against Japan in the Far East. The defensive strategy, by leaving the initiative to the enemy to concentrate his forces where he chooses, opens the way to reverses; and then these reverses are used as a further argument for the continuance of the defensive strategy. Only the policy of the offensive, given the concentration of forces at the right place and the right time, can break this sequence and bring a new situation.

Again it is argued that the policy of maintaining supplies to the Soviet Union is more important as the best practical help to the main front against Hitler rather than the use of war material to open a front in the West. But the policy of supplies to the Soviet Union cannot be a substitute for military action alongside the Soviet Union. We cannot fall back on the old formula, favoured by the ruling class of this country in the past, by which other nations are expected to bear the brunt of the fighting, while Britain supplies the equipment. The call of the Soviet leaders themselves for the Second Front in the West shows that they are ready to face any diversion of supplies which the opening of such a front might necessitate, because they understand very well that the direct use of British arms, tanks and planes on such a front, drawing off a portion of Hitler's forces, would be the most effective help of all to their fight on the Eastern Front. The maintenance of the maximum possible supplies to the Soviet Union and the maintenance of the supply routes is of vital importance for the critical battles developing in 1942. But the situation still remains, so long as the Second Front in the West has not been opened, that, as stated in Stalin's Order of the Day on the Red Army anniversary on February 23, 1942, "the German Fascist army is directly supported at the front by the troops of Italy, Rumania

and Finland; the Red Army so far has no such support." This advantage on Hitler's side it is necessary to wipe out, and to show in action that a more powerful coalition is fighting against him.

Similarly with regard to the question of arms, equipment and shipping. The successive postponement of action on the grounds that it is first necessary to accumulate an overwhelming superiority of equipment to guarantee success overlooks the fact that in the meantime Nazi production is also being expanded; and it further overlooks the fact that in the meantime the action of the enemy, in consequence of the passive defensive policy, may vitally change the balance of resources and supplies for production, and thus defeat the very purpose for the sake of which action was postponed. The successive miscalculations on the relative production position have illustrated this. The crucial question is not simply the amount of arms and shipping available, but their use. The holding of large stocks of arms and war material immobilised and unused in the midst of critical battles is a gift to the enemy. We have seen how the available shipping was used in the second half of 1941 to increase very greatly the imports of food into this country, rather than to establish the Second Front, and to send troops and equipment overseas for the hypothetical front in the Caucasus, when the same tonnage could have transported and maintained twenty-six times the number of divisions for the Continent of Europe.

Undoubtedly the most intensified drive on production must be an integral part of the strategy of the offensive. But the fighting front is the indispensable stimulus to intensified production. The policy of passivity demoralises production. The enthusiastic response to "Tanks for Russia" Week powerfully demonstrated the truth of this. The people of this country will undoubtedly be ready for every sacrifice that is necessary, for the further restriction of consumption imports into this country, and for the most intensive effort in production, when they feel that their efforts and sacrifices are immediately directed to delivering the heaviest blows against the fascist enemy for the aim of winning victory this year.

Finally, with regard to the argument that the attempt to establish the Second Front in Europe involves the risk of "another and worse Dunkirk." Risks are inescapable in war; without risk, no victory; and the real question is whether the risks of the passive waiting policy are not in fact greater. But the analogy with Dunkirk is out of place. Dunkirk was the

disastrous consequence of the collapse of an ally, the liquidation of the French Army, and the passing over of the French State to the enemy. Such an analogy has no bearing on the question of co-operation with the advancing Soviet armies for the common offensive for the destruction of Hitlerism, when these Soviet armies are in fact already engaging nine-tenths of the Nazi forces, and the remaining one-tenth is thinly dispersed over a wide territory amidst a hostile population.

The defensive strategy plays into Hitler's hands by leaving him the initiative. A strategy which aims at the maximum concentration of forces at a well selected point to deliver there the heaviest blow compels a corresponding disposition of the enemy's forces, and is thus in fact the best defence of every other front. On the other hand the policy of maintaining the defensive on every front until such future time as an overwhelming accumulation of strength will make possible an ultimate general counter-offensive at a distant date means in practice that in the crucial present phase the existing available strength is dispersed to cover every point, with the inevitable consequence of inadequacy at every point to meet the enemy's attack. While delay is being maintained to secure the ultimate advantage of the potential superiority of resources, the basis of the superiority of resources is being meanwhile lost through the action of the enemy. Victory depends on the decisive concentration of forces at the decisive point, and the conditions of modern war have demonstrated that this is above all a question of the initiative and of speed in action.

The defensive strategy has further unfavourable results in maintaining passivity, weakening morale, sowing doubts among the people of the intentions of the Government, demoralising armed forces held too long inactive, discouraging our allies, spreading doubts and criticism in the Dominions, in the United States, in the Soviet Union, among the colonial peoples, and depressing and damping down the unrest and activity of our potential allies, the European peoples, who look anxiously for the signs of our action.

It is a measure of the cunning of Hitler's strategy that he has been able to calculate on the British defensive strategy for his own purposes. At the relatively inexpensive cost of maintaining invasion barges and other equipment in the French ports, and without having sea power, he has been able to hold immobilised three million trained British soldiers for two years. This is in itself equivalent in its strategic effect to a major victory. At the same time, faced with an opponent in possession

of sea power, and with air parity since the autumn of 1941, and with a much longer sea coast to defend, he has been able to denude the occupied territories of troops in order to concentrate all his forces on the single Eastern Front.

Military opinion is increasingly in revolt against this fatal defensive strategy.

"If we lose the spirit of adventure, the will to attack—Heaven help us! I cannot believe that the descendants of those who fought under Marlborough and Wellington are going to be condemned for long to the ignoble role of sitting in trenches and pill-boxes round the shores of Britain."

(Major-General Sir Andrew McCulloch, K.B.E., D.S.O., D.C.M., in the "Volunteer for Liberty", October, 1941).

The emphatic declaration of the United States Army Chief of Staff against the policy of immobilisation for home defence had its significant point not only for the United States:

"The time has come when we must proceed with the business of carrying the war to the enemy. We must not permit the greater proportion of our armed forces and our valuable material to be immobilised in the United States."

(General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, letter to the Senate, March, 1942).

No less emphatic has been the declaration of the Canadian Overseas Army Commander for the offensive in Europe:

"We Canadians believe in the offensive in Europe. We are building up our forces in Britain. We did not send them simply to move them across the Atlantic. . . . None of us hopes to win the war simply by sitting in Britain."

(Lt.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, Commander of the Canadian Overseas Army, interview in Washington, March 10, 1942).

The question of the Second Front in Europe is no longer, as in the autumn of 1941, the question of action to relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union during the initial retreat before the blitzkrieg offensive. It is now a question of co-operation with the Soviet strategy for throwing all forces into the field in order to press forward the offensive to complete victory over Hitlerism in 1942.

Such a strategy must be a planned and united strategy of the alliance, and not an isolated action. Close collaboration, political and diplomatic as well as military, between Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, is the indispensable condition of an allied strategy for victory. It is essential to establish close military collaboration. It is essential to establish close political collaboration. Neither yet exists; and the absence weakens the whole action of the alliance.

Politics cannot be separated from strategy. Full collaboration and the mobilisation of all forces for victory can only be achieved on the basis of an unhesitating democratic anti-fascist policy. It is essential to clear out of the way such obstacles to full collaboration as the continued hesitation to recognise even such an elementary aim as the restoration of all Soviet territories invaded by the Nazi forces. The survival of the old pro-fascist tendencies, shown in the protracted delay in declaring war on Finland, Rumania and Hungary, even when these were fighting side by side with the Nazis; the appeasement of Franco and dispatch of loans and supplies which became loans and supplies for Hitler; or the appeasement of Vichy France and discouragement of the Free French forces: all these weaken the anti-fascist front and cut across any strategy for victory. It is essential to take decisive steps to break these influences. Above all, in the sphere of political propaganda, it is necessary to establish firmly the line of democratic anti-fascist appeal to the enslaved European peoples and the German people against Hitler, and to end the reactionary racial policy of threats against the German people as a whole, including against a future People's Anti-Fascist Germany, which only helps to consolidate the German people around Hitler.

A united strategy for victory must set itself to mobilise all the forces of the peoples against Fascism. It must win the confidence and collaboration of the Indian people and all the colonial peoples, and promote the organisation of their full resources and man-power for the common struggle. It must win the confidence and collaboration of the European peoples under the Nazi heel, who are looking anxiously for our action to assist their struggle. Not only propaganda, but direct organisational help, arms, and above all military action through the establishment of the Second Front represents the most practical help to stimulate and rally the action of the subjugated European peoples, the vast army of potential allies whose heroic struggle is playing an increasing role and will play a yet more decisive role in the final destruction of Hitlerism. It is necessary to win the confidence and collaboration of the German people against Hitler and the Nazi clique as an integral part of the democratic strategy of disintegration of Nazism in unison with military action against the Nazi armies. The success of such an approach can only be achieved on the basis of an unqualified democratic anti-fascist outlook and policy, repudiation of all aims of domination of the Versailles type, and full recognition

of national self-determination and the right of every people to determine their own political and social régime.

We need to organise all our forces and action for the aim of speediest victory, for the aim of victory, not at some distant future date, but in this year of decision in 1942.

Can we achieve this aim? Yes; provided that we carry out the necessary conditions:

(1) Co-ordination of allied strategy, with concentration on the immediate aim of two-front war in Europe for the speediest defeat of Hitlerism;

(2) Strengthening of collaboration, political, diplomatic and military, with the Soviet Union and the United States;

(3) Winning the confidence and collaboration of the subject peoples in Europe and assistance to their struggle;

(4) Winning the confidence and collaboration of the German people;

(5) Freedom for India, and the free collaboration of all the peoples in the colonial countries for the common struggle;

(6) Maximum production, mobilisation of man-power and woman-power, readiness for sacrifice, unity and the will to victory in Britain.

To carry out this policy it is necessary to strengthen the Government, the political and administrative leadership and the military, naval and air command by eliminating all elements which hamper an active anti-fascist strategy, and promoting the most capable and energetic democratic anti-fascist representatives.

The pursuance by the Government of such an active all-out strategy for the aim of speediest victory over Hitlerism, with the avowed objective of achieving it in the coming decisive year by the maximum operation of all our forces, would win the full confidence of the people in the Government, dissipate all existing doubts and hesitations, and rally their unhesitating support and readiness for every sacrifice and effort to achieve this great aim.

CHAPTER VI

INDIA AND THE COLONIAL PEOPLES

BRITAIN holds a special responsibility in the World Alliance to assist in winning the free and full collaboration of the Indian people and the colonial peoples.

Fascism is the enemy of all peoples in the world—equally of those who have already won a greater or less degree of freedom and self-government and of those who are still held subject under colonial rule. The aims of the struggle for freedom of the twelve hundred millions of humanity who live in India, China, Eastern Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and Africa require the victory of the world anti-fascist alliance and the complete defeat of fascism. But the mobilisation of these gigantic reserves of the anti-fascist army will only be effective to the extent that their willing collaboration is won on the basis of their own understanding of their own interests, as voluntary allies, and not as servants called on to give their lives in the interests of their masters. The question of the freedom of the colonial peoples is no longer only a first-class political issue. It is a first-class strategic issue for the victory of the democratic anti-fascist alliance.

Fascism's war aims are openly directed against the colonial peoples; against India; against the former colonial country of China, which Fascism seeks to subjugate anew; against the peoples of Eastern Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Mussolini's war of conquest and plunder against Abyssinia and Japan's invasion and conquest of Manchuria and Northern China opened the fascist war offensive. Hitler's drive towards the Middle East and India, strategic concentration in Northern Africa, and Fifth Column penetration in South Africa and South America, and Japan's lightning military conquest of Eastern Asia and extending advance to India and Australia, are the expression of the expansionist drive of Fascism for the carving out of the new fascist empires over the bodies of all the colonial peoples of the world, no less than of the free democratic peoples.

Fascism seeks to mask these designs of aggression, plunder and conquest behind a smokescreen of hypocritical slogans

about the liberation of the colonial peoples from their present rulers. Japan puts out the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics!"—by which they mean "Asia for the Japanese War Lords!" The Annual Report of the German General Staff in 1939, already before the war, emphasised the importance of supporting every freedom movement anywhere in the British Empire as a means of securing a strategic foothold. Wherever adventurist, mercenary or misguided individuals can be found from the national liberation movements in the colonial countries, like Bose who was expelled from the Indian National Congress, Rashid Ali from Iraq or the Grand Mufti from Palestine, these are taken into the service of Fascism and exploited as fascist propaganda agents to confuse and mislead the masses in the colonial countries.

The colonial peoples have every reason to understand that Fascism is to-day their deadliest and most dangerous enemy, and that the interests of their struggle for liberation are bound up with the victory of the world anti-fascist alliance and the destruction of Fascism. All the most responsible and enlightened leaders of the national liberation movements have recognised that the interests of the colonial peoples are irreconcilably opposed to Fascism. The Chinese National Republic has fought with arms against the Japanese fascist invaders for years before the formation of the world anti-fascist alliance. The Indian National Congress has played an outstanding and honourable role in the vanguard of the struggle against Fascism, in support of China, Abyssinia and Spain, for years before the ruling authorities in this country began to move from their policies of conciliation to Fascism.

The world victory of fascist barbarism would mean the destruction for a long period of all hopes of freedom of the colonial peoples. Heavy as is the lot of the colonial peoples under the existing imperialist rule, it would be immeasurably worse under Fascism, which is the most aggressive and brutal form of imperialism. Every imperialist system means the oppression and degradation, the arresting of development of the subject peoples under its rule. The aim of every colonial people can only be for complete liberation from imperialism. But in the existing types of colonial régime the mass struggle has already won in the majority of cases a varying measure of rights of organisation and political expression (trade unions, political organisation, press, despite heavy restrictions and intimidation) which, though limited and precarious, are of the utmost importance for further advance, and which would be

completely swept away under Fascism. On the other hand, the development and victory of the world anti-fascist alliance represents the most favourable conditions for the complete liberation of the colonial peoples.

The principles of the fascist colonial system (already exemplified in the Japanese reign of terror in Manchuria and the occupied provinces of China) have been expressed with unconcealed brutality in the publications of the Nazi colonial office, which glorify the bloodthirsty Dr. Peters as the model colonial ruler. Reference may be made to the authoritative exposition of Dr. Günther Hecht, expert for racial colonial problems in the racial-political office of the National-Socialist Party, under the title "The Colonial Question and Racial Thought", published in 1938, which lays down the racial principles intended to govern the future treatment of natives by the Nazi rulers.

Fascist colonial theories, drenched in racial chauvinism, pour contempt on what they term the pernicious humanitarian conceptions of the colonial system of the Western democratic Powers, which they declare, by opening the doors of European culture to the colonial peoples, sow the seeds for the disintegration of the colonial system. As against this, they state that Nazi rule will finally root out all such conceptions and establish the permanent inferior status of the colonial peoples. Fascism, with its pretence of Aryan superiority, assigns to the coloured people the status of human slaves. Higher schools and universities must be closed to them; no native of a Nazi colony must be allowed to travel outside it to Europe. The Nazi racial law must be extended to the colonies.

Blindness to what fascist victory would mean for the colonial peoples would be equivalent to betrayal of the interests of the colonial peoples.

Against this menace the victory of the world front of the peoples fighting to defeat fascist enslavement represents the hope of all colonial and semi-colonial peoples of the world. The Soviet Union has always been recognised by the subject peoples of the world as the pioneer and protagonist of the liberty and equality of oppressed peoples. In the free union of nations composing the Soviet Union, as *Pravda* wrote on May 1, 1941, "the dead ideology dividing man into 'higher and lower' races has been thrown onto the rubbish heap of history." The freedom and equality won and enjoyed by the former oppressed peoples of the Tsarist Empire, the assistance which the Soviet Union has given to peoples struggling for

national freedom, such as the Turkish, Spanish and Chinese peoples, and the insistence of the Soviet Union on equality in foreign relations, shown by the scrapping of the old grasping Tsarist treaties with China and Iran, have won respect and admiration throughout the world. The Chinese National Republic represents the vanguard of the national liberation movements of the world. There can be no question where the hopes and sympathies of all colonial peoples lie in this conflict.

But the effective participation of the colonial peoples in the world anti-fascist front cannot depend on their own efforts alone. The reactionary obstacles which still hinder that full participation must be removed. And here a special responsibility lies on the peoples in the imperialist countries participating in the anti-fascist coalition, and above all on the people of Britain, at the centre of the British Empire, with its four hundred and fifty millions of subject colonial peoples.

Reactionary policy in relation to India, Burma, Ceylon and all the colonial peoples has deeply injured and weakened the anti-fascist front.

The Indian people and all the colonial peoples represent a gigantic reservoir of democratic and anti-fascist strength. Their man-power is vast. Their resources are abundant in all the raw materials for war. Their will to freedom, their capacity for struggle and sacrifice, demonstrated in their national struggles, could play a powerful role in the common front and the common victory, and in Asia the decisive role.

Yet barely the fringe of this man-power and of these resources has so far been mobilised. Their democratic willingness has been repulsed and discouraged. In India the army so far raised amounts to one million men out of a population of nearly four hundred millions; recruitment is limited; masses are turned away from the recruiting offices.

"There is no lack of men; since the outbreak of war recruiting offices all over the country have been congested with volunteers from every class, community and occupation to such an extent that it soon became impossible to deal with their numbers."

("India At War" Government Report, 1941).

In proportion to population the man-power would provide twice the armed forces of the Soviet Union. On the Canadian scale of recruitment, it would provide fifteen to twenty millions. The actual outcome is one quarter of one per cent of the population, or a total less than that of a secondary European State. Even this figure has been stated to be "largely a paper figure. Arms are lacking for the training of a mass army, and as a

result recruiting, until recently, was rather discouraged" (Military Correspondent of the "Observer," March 8, 1942). The Chinese example has shown the possibility, under national leadership, of organising and training armies even with limited resources, capable of meeting the Japanese armies; but the Chinese Command's offer to send military instructors to India to assist in solving the problem of training has not so far been accepted.

Similarly in respect of resources and war production. India has abundant resources of all the key raw materials for war production, with the exception of nickel, molybdenum and vanadium. But only the tiniest fraction is utilised. With coal reserves of 36,000 million tons, the annual production before the war reached 25 million tons, or one-tenth of the British level; and coal output dropped in 1940. With iron ore reserves of 3,000 million tons, the output of steel on the eve of war was not yet one million tons, or one-thirtieth of the British level, and below the level of Poland. By 1941 steel output had advanced to one and a quarter million tons: "the expansion might have been larger, but . . . we are large importers of pig iron from India. It would have meant absorbing in India pig iron which was urgently required for our industry here" (the Duke of Devonshire, Under-Secretary for India, in the House of Lords, February 3, 1942). Thus shipping, urgently needed for war transport between Britain and the Far East, is used to transport pig iron from India to Britain and finished steel back to India, rather than manufacture in India. There is no motor industry and no aero-engine industry; India is dependent on overseas supply for all its heavy weapons: planes, tanks and heavy artillery. Yet India with industrial development could have been the arsenal of the war in the Far East. The Government announced in the House of Commons on October 9, 1941, that the manufacture of internal-combustion engines in India would not be "a practical proposition so far as the present war is concerned." By the spring of 1942, after two and a half years of war, it was announced that an exploratory commission was being appointed "to examine the question of production of components of internal-combustion engines of complete engines." Indian industrialists have vociferously complained that, in contrast to the gigantic industrial development in the Dominions since the war, industrial development in India has received a setback. "Unlike the last war, there has been very little industrial expansion" ("Great Britain and the East," June 19, 1941).

The gigantic available man-power for war production is thus scarcely used. Despite the inexhaustible resources of raw materials for industrial production, and the inexhaustible reserves of man-power, to-day after nearly two centuries of British rule in India not one per cent. of the population is employed in factories, mines, railways or docks. It was reported as an achievement in November, 1941, that 50,000 workers are now employed in the Government Ordnance Factories, or one in eight thousand of the population. By the end of 1941 two batches of *fifty* Indian workers each had arrived in Britain for industrial training—from a population of four hundred millions. And meanwhile the authorities here wring their hands over the problem of man-power.

This policy of throttling Indian industrial development, already criminal in peacetime against the interests and needs of the Indian people, becomes doubly criminal to-day against the vital needs of the World Alliance and equivalent to direct help to Fascism.

Behind this lies the influence of the entire policy of colonial domination and exploitation: the denial of national self-determination, the policy which would rather lose the colonial territories temporarily to the fascist invaders than yield power to the peoples themselves; the fear of too rapid advance of the colonial peoples, fear of their industrial development, fear of arming the people, fear of their inevitable advance to freedom.

The consequences of this policy have been seen in Malaya and Singapore, in Java and Burma; where the Japanese invaders were able to sweep forward without popular resistance, or even with active support from sections of the population; where the Government, in the words of the *Times* report on Malaya, "had no roots in the life of the people" and "with the exception of certain sections of the Chinese community—some inspired by Free China's struggle for survival, others by Soviet precept and example—the bulk of the Asiatic population remained spectators from start to finish"; where the great naval base of Singapore was paralysed because out of the 12,000 Asiatic labourers only 800 remained, while ships could not be unloaded or put to sea because the Asiatic dockers and crews were gone; where the populations were not mobilised or trained or armed to defend themselves, but where, in Burma, the Japanese could recruit and organise whole companies of soldiers for their own purposes.

A radical change of policy is imperative in relation to India and all the colonial peoples. The events in the Far East have

brought a shock of twelfth hour awakening even to many who were previously indifferent to this question.

But the necessary concrete steps to effect such a change have still to be taken.

The Atlantic Charter proclaimed the "right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." Mr. Aitlee, in a speech to West African students on the day following its promulgation, declared, according to the *Daily Herald* of August 16, 1941, that "coloured peoples, as well as white, will share the benefits of the Churchill-Roosevelt Atlantic Charter." The subsequent pronouncement of Mr. Churchill on September 9, 1941, specifically excluding the application of the Atlantic Charter from "India, Burma or any other parts of the British Empire", and explaining that "we had in mind primarily the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the States and nations of Europe," was a blow in the face to the aspirations of India and the colonial peoples.

With the rapid collapse in the autocratically governed Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Java, etc., may be contrasted the relatively more prolonged resistance in the Philippines, where a large measure of self-government had been granted, with a Filipino President, Cabinet and elected National Assembly, and a fixed date for complete independence by 1945.

The power of national independence to inspire and mobilise a people to fight in their own defence has been shown for all time by the heroic example and leadership of Free China, which, in the face of a thousand obstacles and shortage of arms, equipment or developed productive resources, has been able for five years to maintain its successful and united resistance to the assault of Japan, and has now been able to send its soldiers to the assistance of other Asiatic nations.

The alliance of Free China and Free India must be the corner-stone of freedom and the fight for freedom in Eastern Asia. The advance of Japan to the gates of India has brought the question of Indian national freedom and self-defence to the forefront of world politics. It is essential that a basis of agreement should be found between the British Government and the representatives of the Indian people to make possible the willing cooperation of the Indian people, as equal partners in the alliance of the United Nations, for the common struggle against the common enemy. This basis of agreement can be found, provided that the present dictatorial system of government in India is replaced by the formation of a National Coalition Government, representative of Indian political leaders of all

sections prepared to collaborate in the common cause, and with full responsibility and powers, subject to the practical requirements of military cooperation with Britain and the United Nations.

The failure of the Cripps Mission to India to reach an agreement on this basis represented a major strategical defeat for the alliance against Fascism. The Cripps Mission failed, not because agreement was impossible, but because it refused the elementary demand for the formation of a representative National Government to mobilise the Indian people for the common struggle. The breakdown did not arise over the hypothetical post-war scheme for the future political regulation of India; this scheme, so far from being an offer of self-government, was of a dubious and undemocratic character, since it refused the first basis of self-determination, that the democratically elected representatives of the Indian people should be free to determine their own form of government, and it included projects, both fantastic and unworkable, for the future balkanisation of India; but the Indian politicians were sufficiently realist to recognise that these post-war speculations were of minor practical importance to-day. Nor did the breakdown occur over the alleged communal difficulty and divisions of the Indian people; this question never arose in the discussions and was only subsequently produced as a supposed explanation of the breakdown. The explicit statement of Jawaharlal Nehru that "at no stage during the talks did any communal or minority difficulty occur" compelled the final admission by Sir Stafford Cripps that "it is quite true that I did not discuss the minority question with Congress" and that "it was not, in form on the communal question that the breakdown came." All sections of Indian political opinion demanded the formation of a responsible National Government, even though the composition of such a Government would have had to be the subject of subsequent negotiation. But this stage was never reached, because the principle was refused; it was made clear that, even if all sections were united in this demand, it would be refused. This was the cause of the breakdown.

Urgent steps need now to be taken to remedy this situation before it is too late. The refusal to concede a National Government to India has led to serious deterioration of the political situation in India, tendencies to disintegration and demoralisation, and the increased influence of the fatal tendencies to pacifism, passivity and theories of neutrality in this life-and-death struggle.

The greatest responsibility rests on democratic opinion in this country to do all in its power to remove the reactionary obstacles from the side of British policy in the way of a settlement; and to ensure that the Government immediately reopen negotiations with the Indian National Congress with a view to the formation of a representative and responsible National Government in India, capable of enjoying the confidence of the Indian people and mobilising them for active defence, in cooperation with the other nations opposed to fascist aggression. Pending the establishment of such a Government, all the thousands of anti-fascist prisoners (now mainly working class and peasant prisoners, socialists, communists and trade unionists, who would be in the forefront of rallying the nation for resistance against Fascism) should be immediately released, and every form of assistance should be given to the National Congress to rally and organise the resistance of the people to the Japanese attack. Further, the most urgent steps need to be taken to speed the development of Indian industry for war production, to assist with equipment, machine-tools, etc., from Britain and the United States, to harness the available small-scale industry and handicraft, and to mobilise the man-power for a mighty effort comparable with that of China.

In the Middle East the Treaty of Britain and the Soviet Union with Iran, guaranteeing Iran's territorial integrity and independence in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, represents a blow to the aims of Nazi penetration in these regions. The proclamation of the independent Syrian and Lebanon Republics, and the establishment of the Wafdist (Nationalist) Government in Egypt represent further important progressive steps for the furtherance of unity against Fascism. The way forward here lies through the Federation of the Arabian countries in common resistance to fascist aggression.

In the African colonial countries and in the West Indies the path of democratic anti-fascist advance needs to be pressed forward: in the West Indies, by the immediate establishment of full self-government; and in the African colonial countries, by the extension of civil rights, rights of organisation and press, release of political prisoners, removal of racial disabilities, minimum labour and social legislation, and economic assistance, in such a way as to encourage the initiative and active role of the African peoples as common participants in the struggle against Fascism. There must be no room in the countries associated with the anti-fascist alliance for the racial repressive laws and disabilities which in fact reproduce the principles at the basis

of Nazism, and which are most actively pressed forward (as in South Africa) especially by the open adherents and admirers of the Nazi model, the Pirows, Malans and their associates. Failure of the democratic peoples to undertake an active fight on this issue can prepare a sequel in Africa as menacing as that already experienced in the Far East.

The colonial peoples in all the countries of the world represent a powerful force for freedom. They are the natural enemies of Fascism and all oppression and tyranny. It is for the peoples in the democratic countries to understand their strivings, and to find a way to forge their close alliance with them in the common struggle against the fascist aims of world domination. This struggle will prepare the conditions for the full liberation of all peoples and nations throughout the world.

CHAPTER VII

PRODUCTION FOR VICTORY

THE problems of strategy and production are closely related. In modern mechanised warfare it is estimated that four to five industrial workers and auxiliaries are needed behind every soldier in the firing line. Production is thus the main field of effort for the majority of the population in the fight against Fascism. Here every man and woman can play their part and express their will to victory over Fascism.

The resolution to fight and defeat Fascism, and the strategic aim to concentrate all our forces for the decisive offensive for victory in 1942 means that we must equip the armed forces with adequate weapons of war to meet and overpower the Nazi military machine; we must ensure the effective transport of such weapons of war in time to the fighting front; we must produce the necessary industrial materials and machinery, and import the necessary raw materials, to produce these weapons of war; we must provide the means of livelihood, food, clothing, etc., for the fighting and producing forces to maintain standards and efficiency. All this is war production, direct or indirect. In the total war of the peoples to meet the total war of Fascism there is no room for any other production, not directed to the maximum output of munitions of war.

This all-out effort of production for victory is not merely the job of the Government or of those in command of industry. It is the conscious job of every one to participate with the highest personal effort, and to assist in the tasks of organisation and the overcoming of obstacles. Criticisms of existing shortcomings are only valid to the extent that they are accompanied by such maximum effort, on which the outcome finally depends, and are based on a constructive understanding of the difficulties.

Fascism has won its victories in this war mainly by its superior armament, especially in planes and tanks. Fascism can only be finally defeated, not by heroism alone, but by superior weight of planes, tanks, guns and shells to arm that heroism. This is the decisive test in modern war, which is in the last resort not merely a test of fighting capacity and of morale, but an industrial test of equipment, organisation, skill and the capacity for united effort and sacrifice.

Great efforts have already been made in the field of war production. Yet the fact remains, as the experience of every front shows, that we still need more planes, more tanks, more guns, more shells and more ships. We need them for more fronts, over a wider area and on a far greater scale, than this country has had to face in any previous war. We need them, not only for the existing fronts, in Northern Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, in the Far East, in the Battle of the Atlantic and for the defence of these islands, but also for stronger offensive warfare to crush Fascism, for the decisive Eastern European front, through the sending of the most extensive supplies to the Soviet Union, and for the establishment of the Western Front on the Continent of Europe, which can combine with the Soviet offensive to finish off Hitlerism.

We can and must achieve this necessary increase and speeding up of war production, which is the indispensable basis for the strategy of the offensive for victory in 1942. The achievement of such an increase of war production adequate to our strategic needs requires (1) a political leadership and strategy of action capable of arousing the maximum response of the people; (2) the conscious co-operation of every man and woman in the highest common effort; (3) the most efficient organisation of war production, full utilisation of all resources, plant, machinery, manpower and woman-power, and elimination of waste.

The organisation of war production within the conditions we have to face in this country is no easy task. The many controversies and criticisms from all sides which have accompanied its development have illustrated the difficulties. The transformation of the pre-war economic structure, with its strongly entrenched vested interests, monopolist preserves, restrictive policies, parasitism and waste of productive resources and manpower for unproductive purposes, and rigid demarcations of labour and industrial practices, to a unified, smooth-running and efficient machine of war production is a gigantic operation, which can only receive rough-and-ready methods of fulfilment within the existing conditions of class relations and ownership. The fact that the Government has so far only proceeded by gradual stages and a series of compromises, especially where its action affects powerful vested interests, is a reflection of the political conditions of the problem. There is therefore no matter for surprise that even in the third year of war the problems of war production cannot be regarded as solved, and many urgent questions require attention. We must now

approach these problems from the standpoint of the principle that the supreme common aim of the defeat of Fascism must outweigh all sectional interests and considerations which hamper maximum production.

The appointment of a Minister of Production in the spring of 1942, after two and a half years of war, has shown the recognition of the need for a more effective unified planning and organisation of production. This is a first step forward: but the conditions and limitations under which the appointment has been made, of a Minister without a Ministry or single administrative department in direct charge of production, with a supervisory rather than executive role, with the existing multiplicity of departments still conducting their separate contracting and placing of orders, and with the Big Business Controls intact, mean that the basic problems of the effective unification of war production still remain to be solved.

Undoubtedly a very considerable increase of production has already been achieved by the spring of 1942. According to Government claims, by May 1942, twenty two million men and women out of the total of thirty-three millions of working age, are now directly engaged in the fighting services, the auxiliary services and civil defence, or war industry (Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons on May 21, 1942). The increase in war production by 40 per cent., called for in September, 1941, was stated in March, 1942, to have been "not only achieved, but passed." It was further stated that sixty per cent. of the national income is now being spent on war purposes.

Nevertheless, it is universally recognised that we have not yet reached the highest possible output, or the full use of existing plant and machinery, man-power and woman-power. The evidence for this is inescapable. It is borne out by the general testimony of workers in the arms factories, of shop stewards' conferences and deputations, of managers, of production engineers, of economists and also of Government spokesmen. It is further borne out by the bitter experience of soldiers, sailors and airmen who have found themselves again and again compelled to fight under crippling conditions of shortage of adequate equipment, protection or weapons.

From Dunkirk to Crete, to Malaya, to Burma, the practical test of the fighting front has again and again revealed a record of disastrous shortages. In some cases these shortages reflect strategic calculations or miscalculations as to the use or disposition of available material. But in all cases they reflect the

inadequacy of the total material available. Nor can these merely be regarded as inevitable shortages because of the multiplicity of fronts requiring to be furnished. We have to recognise that we are concerned with needless, preventable shortages because we have not yet organised our resources for maximum production.

It is sometimes urged that these difficulties during the first three years of war are understandable because "we had to start from scratch", "the Germans had the start of us", "we only began rearming after the war", etc. These explanations are too easy. In fact the Government rearmament programme has been in operation for seven years. There are other causes behind the trouble.

For seven years this country has been engaged on intensive rearmament, the lines of which were first laid down in the White Paper of March, 1935—for four and a half pre-war years and two and a half years of war. In those pre-war years nearly two thousand million pounds were spent on armaments. Yet when the test came, where were the armaments? Where had the money gone? An examination of the fantastically soaring profits of the arms firms during those years (subsequently taken as "standard years" for the calculation of "excess profits" during the war) might throw some light on the answer. It is no use attempting, as is now the fashionable explanation, to throw a smokescreen over this record by blaming the Labour Opposition or pacifism, or the League of Nations for the "disarmed" condition of the country when war came. The Conservative Party possessed a solid majority and was in power for eight years preceding the war, for all the years since Japan opened the war crisis and since Hitler came to power in a legally disarmed Germany without a navy, air force, tanks, heavy artillery or conscription, and was responsible for every step taken or not taken.

The White Paper of March, 1936, announced that plans had been adopted to ensure "the fullest and the most effective use of the industrial capacity and the man-power available for production", and to "organise the industrial resources of the country to allow of immediate expansion of productive capacity in case of emergency." By the end of 1938 and the beginning of 1939 the Government boasts of complete preparedness were incessant:

"There is nothing unready about the Air Force."
(Sir Thomas Inskip, October 12, 1938).

"There is in almost everything—I think I may say everything—a stream which might fairly be called a flood of these armaments and equipment which we need to complete our defences."

(Sir Thomas Inskip, October 26, 1938).

"Our arms are so great that, without taking into account the Dominions' contribution, 'Come the three corners of the world in arms, and we shall shock them.'"

(Neville Chamberlain, February 22, 1939).

Yet, when the test came with the Expeditionary Force in France in the summer of 1940 (after a winter of war production for additional preparation), what was revealed? Against the ten armoured divisions of the enemy, Lord Gort had not under his command a single armoured division.

"The situation as regards equipment, though later there was some improvement in certain directions, caused me serious misgivings . . . the shortage of almost every nature of ammunition. . . . There was a shortage of guns in some of the anti-tank regiments of the Royal Artillery, while armour-piercing shells for field guns had not, by May 10th, been provided. . . . The presence of the Armoured Division and a complete Army Tank Brigade would have been an invaluable aid."

"The ascendancy in equipment which the enemy possessed played a great part in the operations. He was able to place in the field and to concentrate no less than ten armoured divisions in the area which he selected and later to employ at least five of these against the British rearward defences. On the other hand, the British armoured forces in the theatre of war amounted to seven divisional cavalry regiments equipped with light tanks, one regiment of armoured cars of an obsolete pattern, and two battalions of infantry tanks, the latter, except for twenty-three Mark II tanks, being armed each with one machine-gun only."

(Viscount Gort, Dispatches, published October 17, 1941).

Nor was this a question of failure to dispatch the equipment which Chamberlain had previously declared to be so "formidable" to the Expeditionary Force. On the contrary, the loss of this equipment at Dunkirk was announced to represent the loss of the main equipment then possessed.

"We lost something like 1,000 guns in France—not a very large figure from the standpoint of a great Continental Army, but a very large figure in relation to our resources at that time—and the guns which remained in this country last summer after that event were very many fewer than a thousand. At one time last summer there was not in this country even one fully trained and fully equipped division."

(Anthony Eden, House of Commons, October 23, 1941).

And in 1942 the Minister of War, who had been in charge of the Tory machine behind Chamberlain during all those years of rearmament preceding the war, could coolly declare:

"This is largely a war of equipment. We started a very long way behind scratch. Since Dunkirk, when we lost so much of the ground we had gained, we have been forced to start all over afresh on the outside of the circle. . . . The difficulties of re-organisation were increased after Dunkirk. Practically all the technical equipment was lost."

(Captain Margesson, House of Commons, February 19, 1942).

After Dunkirk, an intensive effort followed. But the succeeding period still showed that the difficulties were not yet solved. Successive Government statements on the progress of production alternated between optimism and alarm, while shortage on the field continued. In the face of critics, a rosy picture was painted of the progress of production, the percentages of increase and the prospect of rapidly overtaking the Nazi level. On the other hand, all military difficulties were explained in terms of shortage of output.

In November, 1940, Mr. Bevin declared:

"Give us another six months' intensive production and we shall have passed Germany, and the ugly Nazi régime will crumple up in Hitler's hands."

"In another six months we shall have passed Germany in aircraft, ships and guns, and I venture to prophesy that immediately we have done that, the world will move forward to a peaceful time of reconstruction."

(E. Bevin, speech on November 6, 1940).

Yet what happened in six months? Six months later, in June, 1941, Mr. Bevin was declaring:

"We are behind with our aerodromes and some of our factories. We are behind with lots of our work, and we must catch up. . . . The enemy has had a seven years' start."

(E. Bevin, speech on June 6, 1941).

And in August, 1941, Lord Beaverbrook, on his return from the United States gave an interview to the press in which he described his

"disappointment at the scale of home production . . . failure to fulfil the programme. . . . At present we are in the state of having more troops than weapons."

In December, 1940, the Prime Minister had declared:

"In 1941 we may hope to be a well-armed nation, and that will open up possibilities which have not been open to us up to the present."

(Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, December 19, 1940).

Yet, when 1941 came, and when by the second half of 1941, the Soviet Union was holding engaged nine-tenths of the Nazi military machine (a factor on which it would not have been possible to calculate in 1940), it was found impossible for the

"well-armed nation" to meet the remaining one-tenth of the Nazi forces, of twenty-five inferior divisions, in Western Europe; and the reason most commonly given was inadequacy of equipment.

Once again Crete in the summer of 1941 had revealed the same situation. Lieutenant Brabner staggered the House of Commons in July, 1941, with his personal experience:

"chronic lack of the most important materials of the air . . . It was incredible but true that those of them who were at Maleme were in a position to put not more than two aircraft into the air for a continuous patrol during daylight hours."

(Lieutenant R. A. Brabner, in the House of Commons, July 9, 1941).

In November, 1941, the Prime Minister declared that air parity had been attained with Germany:

"Now we have an Air Force that is at least equal in size and numbers, not to speak of quality, to the German Air Force."

(Winston Churchill, speech at the Mansion House, November 10, 1941).

And again in December, 1941:

"The crisis of equipment is largely over, and an ever broadening flow is now assured."

(Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, December 2, 1941).

There followed the grave shortage revealed in the Far East, and the shortage of aircraft revealed in the passage of the German warships through the Channel.

What is wrong? What lies behind the chaos of conflicting Government statements on the programme of production alternating between extreme optimism and alarmist appeals, and accompanied by the most disquieting revelations of actual shortage in every practical testing in the field (the fifteen planes in Crete; the out-ranging of the tanks in Libya; the handful of obsolete aircraft in Malaya; the half-dozen obsolete Swordfish torpedo planes, with the pilots sent to their death, in the Channel)? Apart from the wider questions of strategy, leadership and disposition of forces here involved, the chaos in the conflicting Government statements reflects also the chaos in the whole sphere of production.

The Chairman of the Engineering Industries Association made the grave statement in September, 1941:

"It was the unpleasant truth that war production in the engineering industries, measured by square feet of factory space or pound weight of production for each man-hour, had declined. The principal cause was the lack of an adequate and comprehen-

sive plan to use to the full all productive capacity and every available man-hour, both managerial and operative. . . . Production engineers and manufacturers knew that efficiency could be greatly increased, and that the total capacity of the country was far from being fully employed."

(E. C. Gordon England, Chairman of the Engineering Industries Association, *Times* report, September 25, 1941).

When this serious estimation of the position was raised in parliament, the Minister deputed to answer for the Government, Lt.-Col. Moore-Brabazon, replied in jocular mood that "there will always be an England (laughter)" (House of Commons, February 1, 1942).

When the Soviet Trade Union delegation, with expert industrial experience, visited the industrial establishments of this country at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, the Chairman, N. M. Schvernik, in summing up their impressions, paid tribute to the first-class equipment of the factories and morale of the workers, but added a note of friendly warning on the failure to use the reserves of capacity:

"British industry possesses all that is requisite to increase the output of all forms of armaments. The Delegation asserts that there are still in industry very considerable unutilised reserves.

"Summing it up as a whole, these reserves are represented by the following:—the insufficient utilisation in a number of factories of the equipment, machine-tools, lathes, etc., on hand; the inadequate introduction of women into industry in spite of the decision on this subject of the British Government; an incorrect attitude in some factories to the initiative of the working men and women, to their rationalising proposals; unwillingness to listen to the voice of working men and women and their shop stewards; and even, in individual factories, in limiting the level of output."

These friendly criticisms were widely reported in the press, and their justice and helpfulness were recognised.

What is wrong? We have to face the fact that we are dealing with very deep-seated difficulties arising from the traditional structure of British industry and from the present system of organisation of war production. These difficulties require to be overcome, and their overcoming will require more drastic methods than have yet been used.

Britain was once the workshop of the world. It might seem an ironical commentary that this cradle of modern industry should find such difficulty in organising its productive resources for mechanised war output—the severest test of industrial efficiency—in comparison with later arrivals in the field. But in fact this former priority has to-day

become a hindrance. The old nineteenth century manufacturing pre-eminence laid the basis of a long unchallenged monopoly in the markets of the world, in shipping, commerce, international finance and the export of capital, as well as in colonial expansion. When in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, younger rivals, especially American and German industry, began to overtake and outstrip British industry by more modern technique and organisation, the still continuing strength of the British world position, and the volume of world tribute flowing into this island from every quarter of the globe removed any driving compulsion to carry through a corresponding modernisation of technique and organisation of British industry. American and German industry shot forward; British industry fell relatively backward. British capitalism in the twentieth century became more and more a *rentier* capitalism, living on world tribute and the results of past accumulation rather than present productive efficiency. The basic industries and agriculture were neglected; the luxury trades, home consumption industries and unproductive services advanced. By 1937 this degeneration had reached such a pitch that the *Economist* (20.11.37) could describe "foreign investment" as "the nation's greatest single industry."

Especially during the two decades after the war of 1914-18 this process was hastened by the rapid extension of monopoly concentration with the objective of restricting production for the purpose of maintaining maximum profit. During these two decades the monopolist owners of industry and controllers of the economic life of this country were actively engaged in destroying and dismantling productive resources, the loss of which were later to be bitterly felt.

In *Steel*, the British Iron and Steel Federation, the most powerful cartel in the country, directly dominated by the Bank of England, brought down the number of blast furnaces from 394 in 1929 to 200 in 1937, and the number of furnaces in blast from 158 to 134. "There was still in 1937 a dearth of modern blast furnaces and too few all told for the steel capacity of the country" (D. L. Burn, "Economic History of Steelmaking"). Schemes such as that for the development of a modern steel plant at Jarrow were strangled by the Steel Cartel. British steel production moved from 9.2 million tons in 1920 to 10.5 million in 1938 (pre-war peak of 13.2 million in 1937), while German steel production moved from 7.8 million tons in 1920 to 23.2 million in 1938 (about three million of the latter figure being accounted for by the incorporation of the Saar and Austria).

In 1941 the American iron and steel journal, the *Iron Age* commented:

"England is suffering from the past sins of her Tory Party. The watchword for too many years was high profits, no disrupting technological changes and a beautiful belief that after-dinner speeches would overawe those Germans who were grinding out steel as fast as it would grind. Now England has completely inadequate capacity, about 14 million tons a year, and her equipment over-all ranks just about so-so. She must import well over 500,000 tons monthly just to stave off Germany."

(*Iron Age*, January 2, 1941).

Since the war steel production is officially stated to have fallen "slightly below the maximum pre-war rate of 12½ million tons" (*Financial News*, October 8, 1941):

"The recent disclosure that present ingot steel production is slightly below the maximum pre-war rate has caused some disquiet. . . . There is no room for complacency or facile explanation."

(*Financial News*, December 18, 1941).

In *Shipbuilding*, the National Shipbuilders Security Ltd. was formed in 1930, with £10 million capital, and with the backing of the Bank of England, for the purpose (according to the Memorandum of Association) "to assist the shipbuilding industry by the purchase of redundant and/or obsolete shipyards, the dismantling and disposal of their contents, and the re-sale of their sites under restrictions against further use for shipbuilding." Within a few months its successful activities were reported in the press:

"National Shipbuilders Security Ltd. has purchased Dalmuir Shipbuilding Yard, owned by William Beardmore and Co., and in consequence it is to be closed down by the end of the year. This shipyard was one of the largest on the Clyde, employing six thousand men during the war. Negotiations for the purchase and closing down of other shipyards are in progress."

Between 1918 and 1938 British shipbuilding capacity was brought down from three million tons annually to two million tons; dismantled shipbuilding plant was sold as scrap at scrap prices to Germany; skilled workers, to-day desperately needed, were dispersed. Between 1925 and 1937 British shipping tonnage was reduced by 1,869,000 tons, while German was increased by 922,000 tons. British proportion of world shipping fell from 41 per cent. in 1914 to 26 per cent. in 1937. By 1941 the First Lord of the Admiralty was complaining:

"We had far fewer shipyards available and little more than half the number of workers compared to 1914-18."

(A. V. Alexander, speech on June 29, 1941).

In *Coal*, the Coal Mines Acts of 1930 and 1936 established an elaborate machinery for the restriction of production on a district basis, involving control of output, control of prices and control of sales. British coal production, which had already fallen from 287 million tons in 1913 to 257 million tons in 1929 fell to 230 million tons in 1938. The number of pits was brought down from 3,267 in 1913 and 3,000 in 1918 to 2,125 in 1938; the number of men from 990,000 in 1918 to 725,000 in 1938.

In *Textiles* the formation of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation in 1930, with the backing of the Bank of England, the Spindles Act of 1935 and the Cotton Industry Reorganisation Act of 1939 carried through an even more extensive process of dismantling and destroying machinery on a colossal scale. Between 1920 and 1935 fourteen million spindles were destroyed, or more than the total amount in Germany. Out of a total of 140 mills acquired by the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, 80 were in process of being scrapped by 1936. The Woolcombers' Mutual Association Ltd. was formed in 1933 "to assist the woolcombing industry by the purchase and dismantling of redundant and obsolete mills, plant and machinery, for re-sale under restrictive covenants against their further use for woolcombing."

In *Agriculture*, between 1918 and 1939 over two million acres were allowed to pass out of cultivation, the decrease in arable land being over four million acres. Nearly 200,000 men or one-fifth of the labour force quit the land. The proportion of the cultivable land under crops fell from 38 per cent. in 1918 to 28 per cent. by 1939. In 1936 Sir George Stapledon, the leading agricultural scientist, stated that there were about 16½ million acres of land in a more or less neglected condition, and most of it absolutely derelict; while every single acre of this enormous area, representing two-fifths of the land surface of England and Wales, was capable of radical improvement.

Hand in hand with this destruction of the productive resources of the country went the destruction and cutting down of the skilled labour force, on whom production depends, through the long agony and demoralisation of unemployment, as well as the decline of training. By 1941 the Minister of Labour was bitterly complaining of the disastrous consequences of this destruction of the skilled labour power of the country, the most precious asset of the nation:

"Addressing three thousand people at a meeting at Llanely yesterday, Mr. Bevin said that we started this war with far too

limited a number of skilled men. That was not the working people's fault. We had allowed them to rot instead of maintaining them in a proper physical and mental condition." (*Times*, November 3, 1941).

It is a terrible record, this destruction of the productive resources of the nation in the years preceding the present war, the peacetime "scorched earth" policy of the British monopolists. This black economic record was the counterpart of the Munich policy in international politics. Indeed, both were carried out by the same ruling group in finance, industry and government, under the guidance of a Montagu Norman at the head of the Bank of England, a Sir Horace Wilson (colleague of Chamberlain in the journey to Munich) at the head of the Treasury and Civil Service, and the great industrialists who were at the same time members of the Anglo-German Fellowship and attended the Nazi Party rallies at Nuremburg.

When the approach of war and the onset of war brought to the forefront the necessity of rearmament, a complete reversal of policy in the entire economic sphere, from the policies of restriction to the policies of expansion, from limited production to maximum production, became necessary. Yet the entire machinery of rearmament and of the wartime economic controls was placed in the hands of the same monopolist representatives who had previously carried through the policies of restriction, and who continued in practice to protect the interests of the monopolies rather than to serve the interests of maximum production.

In every key position the monopolists were placed in command. Thus in the governmental sphere, to take the examples at the time of writing, in May, 1942, the Minister of Production is Captain Oliver Lyttelton who was previously Managing Director of the powerful British Metal Corporation, and till the war Director of the Metallgesellschaft A.G., the corresponding German metal combine, closely linked with the British Metal Corporation by interlocking shares and directors. The Minister of Supply is Sir Andrew Duncan, former President of the Iron and Steel Federation, the most powerful, the most profitable and the most restrictive monopoly in British industry, and including the main armaments firms. The Minister of War Transport is Lord Leathers, former Deputy-Chairman of William Cory and Co., the coal and shipping combine, and director of forty to fifty other companies. The Minister of Economic Warfare is Lord Selborne, former Chairman of the Cement Makers' Federation. The Minister of Works is Lord

Portal, former Director of Wiggins Teape Ltd., and of the Great Western Railway and other companies. The Minister of Food is Lord Woolton, former Managing Director of the multiple firm of Lewis Ltd. The Minister for Agriculture is R. S. Hudson, son of the millionaire owner of Hudson's Soap, now part of the Unilever Combine.

This picture is still more powerfully illustrated in the case of the wartime controls, the key positions in the war supply ministries, and the controllers for the various industries, raw materials and foodstuffs. Thus in the Ministry of Aircraft Production the Controller-General is Sir Charles Craven, former Managing Director of Vickers-Armstrongs, and the Director-General of Materials Production is Alex Dunbar, of Vickers-Armstrongs. In the Admiralty the Controller of Merchant Shipping and Repair is Sir James Lithgow, of Lithgows, Colvilles and National Shipbuilders Security. In the Ministry of War Transport the Railways Controller is Sir Alan Anderson, of the London, Midland and Scottish, the P. and O. and the Bank of England. In the Ministry of Supply the Chairman of the Supply Council is W. A. Rootes, of Rootes Motor and Aircraft group; the Director-General of Mechanical Equipment is C. D. Burton, of Birmingham Small Arms; the Director-General of Ammunition production and the Director-General of Explosives and Chemical Supplies come from Imperial Chemical Industries.

Similarly with the commodity controls. The control of each particular industry, raw material or commodity is placed in the hands of a leading representative of the most powerful firm dealing in it. The Chairman of the Chemicals Control Board is a representative of Imperial Chemical Industries; Steel is in the hands of a representative of Baldwin's; Timber is handed over to a former President of the Timber Trades Federation; Cotton to a representative of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation; Wool to the Chairman of the Woollen and Worsted Trades Association; Leather to the Chairman of the United Tanners' Federation; Rubber to a Director of the Dunlop Rubber Co.

More recently a Director-General of Controls has been appointed, in April, 1942, by the Minister of Supply (not by the Minister of Production). The Director-General is Sir George Beharrel, Chairman of the Dunlop Rubber Company. "It is impossible not to express regret over the appointment to such a key post of the Chairman of the Dunlop Rubber Company, one of those semi-monopolies whose staffing of the Controls is

by far the largest defect of their structure" (*Economist*, April 11, 1942).

This system of war organisation has thus strengthened, in place of correcting, the deficiencies of the existing monopolist restrictive structure of British industry. The monopolies have been set up in control of themselves. This self-rule of the monopolies, masquerading as public control, has made it possible for them to use the controlling machinery, not to drive forward maximum production, but to strengthen their monopolist position and protect their special interests even at the expense of maximum production. Criticism of this system has been expressed by all sections of opinion. Thus on the appointment of Sir Andrew Duncan as Minister of Supply the *Economist* commended:

"He has devoted many of the best years of his life to restricting production, which is not the most fitting apprenticeship for the task of increasing production by every possible means. . . It is difficult to feel very happy about the development of raw material policy under the man who presided over the Iron and Steel Federation in the years when it was building itself into one of the tightest and most parasitic monopolies this country has ever known. Sir Andrew is wholly in sympathy with the governing oligarchy of industry and finance, whose twin pillars are the Bank of England and the Federation of British Industries."

(*Economist*, October 5, 1940).

The Select Committee on National Expenditure recorded its opinion:

"We feel bound to record the impression that in some cases the Trade Directors, by virtue of their special knowledge and personality, may have a strong influence. In at least one case an important "Trade" official has been, simultaneously with his official duties in the Ministry, engaged as a Trade representative in negotiations with the Ministry as regards the operating margins to be allowed to his own Trade."

(Select Committee on National Expenditure, Fourth Report, 1940).

Similarly the present Home Secretary commented, before he entered the Government:

"It is an axiom of good public administration that men in public authority should not be judges on matters where their private interests are or may be concerned. This sound principle . . . has been broken wholesale by the Government, who have appointed as controllers or to other official positions men who have private interests in the matters with which they deal on behalf of the State."

(Herbert Morrison, *Picture Post*, January 3, 1940).

While the sectional monopolist interests have thus been strongly entrenched, the central controlling authority has up to the present been weak and dispersed. Until the appointment of a Minister of Production in 1942, the machinery of control in the sphere of production has been divided between nine separate and independent Ministries, with an additional complicated network of committees superimposed upon them. The nearest approach to a single executive authority was the Production Executive, which existed in varying stages from the beginning of 1941 to the beginning of 1942. In practice, however, this did not function as an executive authority, initiating and controlling a single plan, but only as a Committee of busy Ministers for arbitral purposes to adjust conflicting departmental claims.

The appointment of a Minister of Production, functioning since March, 1942, represents the first step towards a single planning and controlling authority. But it is so far only a very limited first step. According to the Minister's initial description of his functions, in his speech of March 24, 1942, there is to be no Ministry of Production or single administrative authority unifying the demands of the different departments and directly controlling production; administration is to be left in the hands of the existing multiplicity of departments and controls; the role of the Minister is rather seen as a personal supervisory role, controlling plans and programmes with the aid of a network of committees, and with general ultimate responsibility.

"The other alternative would involve me in the whole apparatus of administration. It would oblige me to set up a large Department . . . I know that the House sets great store upon War Cabinet Ministers not being overburdened with departmental duties.

"It is not the object of this Secretariat (of the Minister of Production) to become engaged in any of the details of production or factory management."

Thus the Minister of Production is to be free from "departmental duties" or concern with the "details of production." This is still a long way from the real Ministry of Production or single executive authority which has been widely demanded.

Full emergency powers were assumed by the Government by the Act of May, 1940, in relation to the entire field of production, industry and labour. In originally introducing the proposals Mr. Attlee explained that "the whole resources of the country must be mobilised to the full; every private interest must give way to the urgent needs of the community; and the

Government must have complete control over all persons and property." It was further explicitly stated that the powers would be equally used in relation to employers and workers. In practice, however, these compulsory powers have been extensively used in relation to the workers (compulsory transfer, essential work order, compulsory arbitration), but hardly at all to put compulsion on the big employers.* It would be difficult to find a case in which the expressed resistance of a big employer or financier to measures necessary in the interests of production has been overcome by Government order. Even Regulation 78, empowering the replacement of the management by a Government controller in firms obstructing the war effort, has remained a dead letter. Government factories have been transferred to private management, but not vice versa. The "shadow" factories, built with public money, have been handed over to the agents of the aircraft ring to run. Coalowners who have refused to allow the Mines Department to intervene when they have wished to close down pits on financial grounds (in the midst of coal shortage) have got away with it. The big firms in iron and steel, aluminium, machine-tool and aircraft have refused to allow government inspection of their books and costing; and the Committee of Public Accounts in their report of 1940, have had to complain that the powers to compel unwilling firms to agree to such inspection have not been used, with the result that no proper investigation has been possible.

* In a parliamentary question on May 14, 1942, Mr. Pritt asked the Minister of Labour in how many cases up to March 25, 1942, proceedings had been brought against employers for disobeying directions of National Service officers to reinstate employees under the provisions of the Essential Works Orders from time to time in force; in how many cases there had been convictions; what terms of imprisonment, if any, had been imposed and what fines; in how many cases, up to 25th March, proceedings had been brought against employees for disobeying directions of National Service officers to perform their work, present themselves for work, or remain at work, under the provisions of such orders; and in how many such cases there had been convictions, what terms of imprisonment had been imposed and what fines?

Mr. Bevin: "Up to March last proceedings were brought in two cases against employers for the offences mentioned in the Question. In one of these cases the employer was bound over under the Probation of Offenders Act; in the other he was convicted and fined £10 and 5 guineas costs on each of two summonses. Up to the same date proceedings were brought against 308 employees for the offences mentioned in the Question, and convictions were recorded in 289 of these cases. Of the penalties imposed the fines ranged from 10s. to £30 and sentences of imprisonment from 14 days to six months."

Idle machine-tools are still not requisitioned from owner-firms and transferred where they can be used. Firms have not been compelled to pool their technical information and designs and trade secrets for the greater efficiency of the industry as a whole. Powers to compel employers to increase the proportion of women's labour or to train labour have not been used.

Thus the existing system of organisation of war production is based on (1) dominance of the controlling machinery by the big monopolies; (2) absence of a strong central authority or unifying plan and single executive control; (3) consequent free play of sectional big business interests, which do not necessarily coincide with maximum production, especially as the normal capitalist incentive of unrestricted profits is considerably limited by taxation. The result is neither a "normal" profit-system, nor an effective controlled system, but a slipshod compromise between both, ensuring the worst of both worlds. On the one hand there remains the anarchy and waste of profiteering (for E.P.T. does not rule out very high war profits, but is mainly a device of the securely placed big monopolies to cripple the expansion of small growing firms), of financial calculations with an eye on post-war markets, and of private contracting, not on the basis of the best use of total capacity, but according to the pull and influence of the particular firm. But on the other hand, to this is added the additional red-tape departmental complication and delay of a superimposed bureaucratic control, which becomes a further clog on the mechanism of production instead of being in responsible charge of the organisation of production.

The consequences of this system of organisation of war production (or rather, absence of effective unified system, and enthronement of sectional monopolist interests) have shown themselves in the continuing inadequacy of output, recognised by all experts as falling considerably below the potentialities of existing resources, plant and man-power, if fully used. In the third year of war, steel output, the basis of all production of arms, planes, tanks, ships, machinery or factory construction, is below the pre-war peak, which was already less than one-third of the level of Nazi Europe; yet the Steel Control, manned and paid by the Steel Trust, is able to announce in August, 1941, that "some sections of the industry will be able to close down for the duration of the war", since the existing low supply is "able to meet all demands" (demands having been rigidly rationed to meet the low figure of output previously

announced by the Steel Control)*. Coal output, the basis of all industry, is below pre-war; yet the coalowners are able to close down the pits on financial grounds, concentrate on the most unproductive seams in order to save the more profitable seams for after the war, and maintain the peacetime machinery of the district quota system, invented to restrict production, and obstruct the necessary national unification.** Transport bottlenecks are one of the main factors holding up production; yet the Railway Executive, consisting of the General Managers of the main lines, is able to maintain the overlapping and refusal of full pooling consequent on the sectional interests of the different main lines; and even proposals for the unification of all transport put forward by the Ministry of War Transport have been turned down by the pull of private interests.*** Shipbuilding showed an estimated output, between September, 1939 and the end of 1941, of one and three-quarter million tons

* "The full potentialities of the machine have not been realised. The Iron and Steel Control, which is little more than the British Iron and Steel Federation in wartime dress, has somehow been unable to put the full power behind the wheels. This failing is perhaps inherent in an organisation which must balance the interests of its members with those of a nation at war. . . . The end of the short-lived post-war boom found it (the trade) saddled with excessive plant which had to be pared away painfully. The memory of this operation has remained almost an obsession with the industry. It explains the resistance to the extension of the primary production departments which has not been completely broken in a war where weight of metal means everything."

(*Manchester Guardian Annual Trade Review*, January 21, 1941).

** "There were several lists of mines closing recently in Lancashire; one was in my own constituency and another on the borders of it, each employing five or six hundred men. Last month a colliery in my own division was closed, and we miners' representatives felt that some kind of enquiry ought to take place before it closed at which the coalowners could justify themselves to the Mines Department and prove that it was necessary to close. . . . But when we approached the coalowners they refused to have a representative of the Mines Department present and said that the closing of the mine was their own responsibility."

(J. Tinker, M.P., in the House of Commons, August 5, 1941).

*** "After two years of war the transport services of the country are not coherently organised. There is virtually no co-ordination of operations (supply of transport) or of the requirements of those having traffic to move (demand for transport). We have a heterogeneous mass of unco-ordinated overlapping services, leading to congestion and apparent shortage of equipment, although equipment and services, measured by reasonable standards of efficiency, are much under-employed. . . . Failure to deal with transport scientifically strikes at the very roots of the war effort." (*Times*, November 4, 1941).

(*Shipping World*, January 14, 1942), as against reported sinkings of British and Allied shipping, during the same period, of eight and a half million tons (*Times*, February 25, 1942); yet the proposals put forward by the Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Shop Stewards for assisting in meeting this grave problem by the rationalisation and standardisation of shipbuilding, planned use of yards, and extension of women's labour, have still to be put into practice. In the industries directly producing munitions of war, where information of output is not available, the deficiencies have been shown by the very widespread evidence, afforded by managers and workers, of idle machinery and idle time, beyond what could be justified by unavoidable causes.*

The further consequences have shown themselves in the very considerable degree of disorganisation experienced by all engaged in war industry, whether manufacturers, managers or workers; the absence of any systematic long-term planning; the irregularity of the flow of production (not only through inevitable causes consequent on interruptions in the supply of imported materials or necessary changes of design, but through the lack of system in the placing of orders); the simultaneous overburdening of some plant and under-utilisation of other plant; the scramble for orders and anarchy of sub-contracting; the lack of standardisation of design, or of interchange of tools, or of pooling of trade secrets. The Regional Boards and Capacity Clearing Exchanges have revealed some of this confusion and under-utilisation; but they have been without executive powers. We have suffered here also from the worst of both worlds: on the one hand, of privately owned monopoly, each

* "Machines are standing idle; dozens of precious precision tools work only for a few hours a day; some work not at all."

(Letter of a Manager of a large Coventry engineering firm to the *Coventry Daily Telegraph*, January 17, 1942).

"Allegations* that a new aircraft factory in the north-west of England was open for 18 months without producing a single engine were made at a Shop Stewards' National Council press conference in London yesterday. Seven deputations from shop stewards and workers mainly engaged in aircraft factories have been in London for over a week meeting M.P.s and Ministers to call attention to complaints of an alleged serious 'lag' in production.

"Another representative of two aviation factories said that for six months the workers had either not been fully employed or had been on idle time . . . A deputation of the workers at a Royal Ordnance factory in the West of Scotland had left Glasgow for London to demand a Government enquiry into war production. In a statement issued by the shop stewards they say that 50 per cent of the working time of the machinery is not being utilised."

(*Times*, February 28, 1942).

ruling its own field unchecked, crowding out small industry, and resisting expansion for fear of excess capacity after the war; on the other hand, of competitive private enterprise, fighting for orders and maintaining its irrational duplication or jigsaw of criss-cross organisation reflecting special financial interests or company connections without regard to the most economic allocation of the work to be done. Enlightened manufacturers have been themselves compelled to recognise the wasteful anarchy of this system which compels them to direct their efforts against the interests of maximum war production. Thus a managing Director writes:

"I am a managing director of a firm engaged exclusively since the war in the production of munitions. . . . The whole national policy still seeks to reach maximum output of war supplies without seriously interfering with the competitive individualist and profit-making basis of our industrial system. The Government is in fact endeavouring to parry the enemy's ruthless sword with a bow-and-arrow system of industrial organisation. . . . We are daily forced to do things which are contrary to the public interest, and to omit doing things which would be in the public interest, because the system imposes upon us as a first consideration the need for making our own living, insuring our future and securing our financial stability. Waste of time and energy, overlapping and competitive struggles go on, and we work first for personal security and only secondly for national victory. My time as a Managing Director is employed, not in getting on with the job, but in fighting to secure contracts in opposition to competitors."

(Letter of a Managing Director in the *Daily Telegraph*, May 17, 1941).

Is the conclusion to be drawn from this, as is sometimes urged, that there is no solution for the present problem of war production save by a basic change of economic system or by the establishment of all-round nationalisation? This answer is no real answer to the present problem, since it proposes a change which would require a whole series of prior conditions and a long-term process of political and practical development to establish, in place of the urgent present task to drive forward and speed up war production during these weeks and months, within the existing conditions, with the existing forces in industry, and with the co-operation of all sections, whatever their social or political outlook, who seriously stand for victory over Hitlerism and are prepared to make sacrifices for this aim.

Undoubtedly the question of the basic social reorganisation for which the economy of Britain has long been ripe will have to be faced in the near future in this country; and the experience of the war, and of the deficiencies of existing economic

and social organisation revealed in the test of war, is opening the eyes of many to this need. But to put forward this ultimate goal of the future society as the solution for the present problems of war production is to play with serious questions, and to underrate equally the magnitude of the future task of social reorganisation and the gravity and urgency of the present emergency. The example of Soviet economy is often quoted, which very powerfully shows the advantages of socialist economy to organise the productive resources on a planned basis, without the conflicts and waste from which we suffer, and to mobilise the entire people in a united effort and achievement without equal in history. But to imagine that we can at a stroke transfer those conditions here is to overlook the practical and political conditions of our problem, and to overlook the quarter of a century of history behind the Soviet achievement.

Of course we should be in an easier position to-day, if the people of this country were already in possession of its productive resources, and were already in possession of a planned economy. But the establishment of the socialist economy in the Soviet Union required a victorious socialist revolution; it required three Five Year Plans to build up, through long and arduous effort, a planned economy. That task also confronted the labour movement of this country during the past twenty years, and has not been accomplished. We have now to pay the penalty for having left the resources of our country during all these years in the hands of the monopolist owners who have produced the consequent disorganisation. But we cannot undo the mistakes of twenty years by a deathbed repentance in the midst of an entirely different struggle, in which national unity is essential for victory. We have now to face the facts and find the way to organise our war effort in spite of the obstacles.

The crucial present question, for the purpose of war production, is not the question of ownership and the future social order, but of immediate present mobilisation and use. It is essential to secure that all the resources of the country are harnessed and mobilised for the war effort, and that no sectional interests are allowed to stand in the way.*

What is necessary is to use the powers which already exist

* The only comprehensive plan for tackling the present problems of war production on a unified basis has been put forward by the Communist Party in its Memorandum on Production, published in March, 1942; the proposals here discussed are in general accordance with the lines of this plan, to which reference may be usefully made.

in order to establish effective control by the Government of all war industries for the sole purpose of maximum war production. The immediate aim of the democratic movement, and of all, whether from the side of the workers, the management or political representatives, who wish to see the fullest mobilisation of industry for war production, must be to establish effective State Control and unification (with the necessary decentralisation and participation of representatives of the workers, technicians and managements) in place of the existing sham controls which conceal the self-rule of the monopolies. Only such a powerful central controlling authority, acting on a unified plan to use to the full existing resources, plant and man-power, irrespective of the closed preserves and demarcation lines of private interests or the restrictive desires of monopoly, can overcome the heavy obstacles of the existing vested interests and anarchic structure of British industry, and ensure organised combined working for maximum production.

The first necessity is thus the establishment of a real Ministry of Production, which should take control of the mining, transport and decisive aircraft, engineering, shipbuilding and iron and steel industries, to ensure a single control and plan for the production of all war materials. For this purpose the Production Ministry should directly control the allocation of raw materials, machine-tools and man-power; it should receive the different plans and schedules of requirements of the different departments in order to draw them into a single plan, in relation to available materials, plant and man-power, and on this basis unify the placing of orders to secure smooth running and the fullest utilisation of capacity. The various Control Boards and Committees for the different materials and commodities, or for particular industries, working as organs of the Production Ministry on the basis of the unified plan, should be reorganised so as to be independent of the domination of the particular interests financially concerned in the given commodity or industry.

This means that the particular firms and enterprises in the war industries would work, not as independent units on the basis of such contracts as the pull of their directors can secure, extending or restricting their plant and production according to their private judgment of their financial interests, and fighting to preserve their own skilled man-power without regard to the proportions in industry as a whole, but as organised units working under the direction of the Production Ministry, to whom the Boards of Directors and managements would be responsible.

Directors should be working directors only; guinea pigs should be allotted such forms of national service as they may be capable of performing if not over age.* The Production Ministry should have power to replace managements, where necessary, or to transfer managers from one factory to another, just as labour is at present transferred (these powers exist at present on paper, but are not in practice used). All possible opportunities should be encouraged and facilities provided for workers in the factories to train for and advance to managerial positions. This pooling of management would prevent the too close tie-up of a particular management with the financial interests of a particular firm, as a result of which the main concentration of attention is inevitably at present directed to looking after the interests of the particular firm in the scramble for profits or in protecting its interests for the post-war situation, instead of being directed to the sole task of the maximum increase of war production in the national service. It would further open the channels of promotion to initiative and enterprise, which at present are blocked owing to the system of selection of the main directing positions on the basis of the possession of money, titles or influence. At the same time the financial interests of the various firms and enterprises would be protected by the fact that they would be maintained in full running on fixed-price contracts allowing a standard rate of profit.

The most frequent objection to such a unified control is that it would be unworkable in practice, since it would require an unwieldy bureaucratic apparatus which would defeat its purpose. In fact, however, such a unified control, to be effective, would require to be very extensively decentralised and broken up, and to draw in very wide forces from the whole field of industry for its working. Such decentralisation would need to be both functional (for the various materials and commodities, for industries requiring a high degree of unified national direction such as mining and transport, and for certain highly specialised branches of production) and regional (for the main

* "British Big Business sustains 32,000 directorships. About 4,000 of this army of directors really run Big Business; the remaining 28,000 are duds, deadweight. They comprise the countless committees, the numberless bottlenecks of senility and snobbery through which Government orders filter slowly and painfully to our war industries.

"Ten years ago, the average age of British directors was sixty three; twenty seven in every hundred directors were over seventy. Ten years ago, four in every ten British directors were peers or sons of peers or holders of knight-hoods. It is certain that the war has raised the standards of senility and tightened the grip of snobbery."

(*Reynolds News*, March 22, 1942).

body of industry, engineering, aircraft, and most munitions production). The secret of an effective unified plan and control must lie in the operation of the Regional Boards. The existing Regional Boards need to be strengthened in their representative character and endowed with executive powers, as direct executive organs of the Ministry of Production in their region, controlling the factories and enterprises (not only the small ones), allocating the work to be done on the basis of full knowledge of capacity, and ensuring full use of machinery and plant.

Direct representation on the Regional Boards of the workers and management in the regions (through the trade unions, shop stewards, production committees and management representatives), and open access from the factories for all questions requiring attention, would ensure the rapid handling of suggestions and complaints, practical tackling of bottlenecks as they arise, and the life-giving free contact which excludes the dead hand of bureaucratic routine or dilatory Whitehall centralisation. The Ministry of Production, in place of directly seeking to control fifty thousand enterprises, would act through the Regional Boards, allocating to the regions (with consultation) their share in the national plan on the basis of knowledge of their capacity. The main executive organs would be the Regional Boards.

The consequent accompanying principle of decisive importance for full production is the widest participation of the workers in industry, and of the technicians, to co-operate with the management in increasing production, overcoming difficulties, devising new technical methods, improved methods of organising or breaking up the work, more economic use of plant, etc. The Joint Production Committees, whose original establishment in a number of leading arms factories reflected the initiative of the most active workers in seeking to assist practically the anti-fascist struggle, and whose regular organisation has now been agreed in all ordnance factories, engineering arms factories and in mining, need to be extended in every factory and workshop, shipyard, depot, building job, etc., as well as in the pits. These Joint Production Committees need to be established in collaboration with the trade unions and the shop stewards, and composed of representatives of the management, the technicians and the workers. They should have access to all necessary information, plans and data, so that management and workers can really function co-operatively in the development of war production. At present the role of the Joint Production Committee tends in

practice to be too frequently confined to questions of labour discipline, absenteeism, etc.; it needs to be extended to all questions which assist the development of production. As the proceedings of the shop stewards' Conferences and deputations have abundantly shown, it is the workers on the spot, once they act in a collective capacity, who are most closely aware of the actual position, the problems and difficulties, at the point of production, who can see immediately the waste of material or unused plant wherever it arises, and who can make practical suggestions for overcoming the difficulties or speeding up the processes.* There is here a limitless reservoir of creative capacity which has been choked and thwarted in the past, and whose mobilisation now can enormously strengthen the fight against Fascism.

But the full participation of the workers in the drive to increase production requires the essential physical conditions to facilitate this co-operation. Existing low rates of pay of wide sections of the workers (especially of women workers), the extreme inequalities of rates, and the effects of tax reductions from wages as at present operated, hamper the maximum increase of production. The people willingly recognise that all sacrifices necessary for the war must be accepted, and that civilian consumption must be restricted to the minimum for efficiency, in order to concentrate all resources on the production of war materials. But this policy is not being carried out, so long as wide sections are brought below such a minimum, while luxury incomes and expenditure continue. Restriction can only be justified on the basis of equality of sacrifice. Every step needs to be taken to maintain the health and standards of the population to the fullest extent possible within war conditions. Wages policy needs to be consciously directed to the aim of maximum production. This requires: (1) levelling up of rates, wherever necessary, to secure an adequate standard, especially

* The testimony of a Conservative M.P. with regard to a past experience in the building of the Forth Bridge is worth recording in this connection:

" I remember when I was a small boy being one of a party which included Sir William Arrol. He was discussing the building of the Forth Bridge and said: ' Time after time, in spite of most carefully drawn out specifications, there were moments when we did not know how the work could go on, and almost invariably the answer was supplied by one of the workmen who were building the bridge.' "

(A. G. Erskine Hill, M.P., House of Commons, March 24, 1942).

in the case of women workers; (2) equal pay for equal work; (3) protection of all piece rates and bonus earnings, whatever the increase in production, and guarantee of earnings commensurate to the skill of key men at present on times rates; (4) removal of all impediments, such as the present rate and method of deductions on overtime earnings, which discourage maximum effort. It is not the job of wages policy to enforce restriction, as if restriction were only to be required of wage-earners and not of all sections of the population. The necessary restriction of consumption in accordance with war limitations can only be democratically imposed by effective all-round rationing: that is, by effective control of supplies and prices of all consumption goods, the extension of rationing in appropriate forms, and the distribution of available supplies on the basis of registration. At the same time attention needs to be paid to the question of hours, which are still in many cases excessive for optimum production; health and safety conditions in factories; conditions of youth labour; improvement of canteens provision, transport facilities (inadequacy of which is responsible for a very heavy waste of hours and effort), shopping facilities, and billeting or special housing arrangements in the case of transference schemes and the setting up of factories in new areas. All these needs are of decisive importance for increased production.

Alongside the practical conditions in the factories for facilitating the fullest participation of the workers in the drive to increase production, the political conditions are no less important. The war factory and every form of production essential for the war effort is an integral part of the front for the final defeat of Fascism. The consciousness of this aim is the inspiration which can sustain prolonged and arduous labour, overcome all difficulties and accomplish miracles of record-breaking achievement. The response to "Tanks for Russia" week showed the readiness to respond to such an appeal. This political consciousness needs to be strengthened and developed in the entire body of factory workers and war workers. The provision of entertainment for factory workers is an excellent development; there is equal need at the same time to provide also for political enlightenment. The workers in war industry are participating in a most vital sphere of the war; all the questions of the war are of close concern to them; and the stronger their sense of this participation, and the more informed their understanding of all the developments of the war, the stronger will be their response to the tasks of production. The appeal to the workers to increase war production will only be effective

to the extent that it is inspired by the spirit of the democratic anti-fascist fight; that it is freely expressed by their own leaders in whom they have confidence; and that it helps to awaken interest and conscious participation of all working in industry in the aims, achievements and problems of their own factory, their own industry, their own region, and nationally in the planning and advance of production. This makes essential the reversal of the whole policy which has recently sought to tighten the network of repressive regulations around the factories by the prohibition of the holding of meetings, the distribution of leaflets and literature, or the bringing in of anti-fascist speakers. In this connection also, as the unanimous resolutions from all the leading arms factories has shown, the maintenance of the ban on the *Daily Worker* is contrary to the interests of the maximum development of war production.

So far we have discussed the general principles of the organisation of war production to secure that full mobilisation and united effort which can undoubtedly lead to a very considerable increase in output. At the same time a number of urgent measures need to be immediately taken in hand to meet the critical position in a series of leading industries. These include:

(1) the establishment of a National Transport Board, embracing all sections, including the trade unions, to unify all inland transport;

(2) the establishment of a National Coal Board, on the lines of the scheme of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain;

(3) the most rapid possible expansion of steel production, following the reorganisation of the Steel Control to be independent of the Steel Cartel: such expansion to be carried forward through the full utilisation of scrap (despite the present drive, much available scrap throughout the country, in the shape of disused railway lines, etc., is held up through questions of property rights), and through the reconditioning of idle blast furnaces and building of new State blast furnaces for handling low-grade home ores;

(4) expansion of shipbuilding along the lines of the proposals of the National Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Shop Stewards Conference in April, 1942 (Government control and planned production under the Production Ministry, in consultation with the Admiralty, in place of the present inefficient, dilatory and extravagant Admiralty control; planning on the basis of each river as a unit; allocation of shipbuilding and ship repair to yards best equipped to deal with each type, instead of according

to business connections; standardisation of ships and elimination of non-essential alterations; fullest use of machinery and tools, with clearing centres for small tools; expansion of the labour force by increasing the number of women employed);

(5) breaking of the aircraft ring, by fuller utilisation and drawing in of the medium and smaller firms in relation to aircraft production, and by bringing the "shadow" factories into full production as State factories under direct State management.

State factories should be constructed and extended, wherever expansion of plant and industrial capacity is necessary, especially where such expansion is obstructed by the fears of the existing commercial concerns with regard to the prospect of excess capacity after the war. The management of State factories should be strengthened by drawing in the most efficient managers, with appropriate conditions and with full scope for initiative and responsibility.

There remains the wider question of bringing into action the "unused reserves" which are the conspicuous expression of present under-production.

The great part of the machine equipment in this country is still only partially used. It was stated in the parliamentary debate on production on March 24, 1942, that "some 80 per cent of the machine-tools used in this country were not doing more work than one shift." It was further stated that where night-shifts are worked, "they usually have only 10 per cent or 15 per cent of the man-power they require." With this may be compared the estimate of the United States Director of War Production, Donald Nelson, in March, 1942, that the full use of the "critical" machine equipment of war production for 24 hours a day and 168 hours a week would mean doubling the output.

The extent to which the available machinery for war industry can be brought into full use depends on the possibilities of the further expansion of man-power in war industry and the extension of training.

Is there still room for a considerable expansion of man-power in this country? The Prime Minister stated on December 2, 1941: "The crisis of man-power and of woman-power is at hand and will dominate 1942." All the evidence would indicate that there is still considerable room for expansion. In the first place, there is room for more effective utilisation of the existing man-power in war industry and for the extension of

training. Second, many of those at present employed are still employed in occupations not essential for the war. The Report on Man-Power of the Select Committee on National Expenditure, issued in March, 1942, reached the conclusion:

"The fact that the employers' demands have been met does not show that the country's capacity is fully used. . . . There are still large numbers of the population who are only partly occupied; some 188,000 are unemployed; and a great many are employed on work which is either of no essential value or could, by improved organisation, be accomplished with less labour."

Above all, the greatest field for rapid expansion lies through the extension of the entry of women into production. There has still been barely a beginning of drawing in what Mr. Churchill has called "our largest reserve for industry and civil defence", represented by the eleven million married women. But the extension of the entry of women into production requires the extension of the practical conditions to make this possible.

The enormous unused reserves on the side of the democratic anti-fascist forces, represented by the potential resources and man-power of the colonial peoples, have still barely begun to be mobilised.

Even in this country, after three years of war organisation, calling up, rationing, concentration of industries and similar measures, can we yet say that the productive effort of the nation is fully devoted to the needs of the war? Hardly. There is still a considerable proportion of man-power and material devoted to occupations and services which do not, directly or indirectly, serve the war effort. Two trivial examples may be taken. One is from a report of the Royal Horticultural Society's Exhibition at Westminster in March, 1942:

"I spoke to a woman representative of a seed firm. I asked her how she was doing.

"Very well," she told me, brightly. 'I've just taken an order for a whole new flower garden, and the show has been open only five minutes.'" (*Daily Herald*, March 18, 1942).

The construction of new flower gardens for the enjoyment of a few private owners may or may not be an admirable peacetime pursuit. But it is hardly an appropriate accompaniment to the scorched earth of Eastern Europe. England to-day does not need more flower gardens. England needs more planes, guns and tanks, not to mention ploughed fields and allotments. The other example is from a current police court report:

COLOURED WATER AT 5s. 9d. A BOTTLE.

"Twenty men, using eleven cars, travelled the country selling bottles of 'coloured water flavoured with quinine,' costing less than a penny and retailed for 5s. 9d. each.

"At Slough yesterday, Frederick Page, Wendell-road, Hammer-smith, proprietor of the Tonic Wine Company, Kensington, was fined £20 with 15 guineas costs for offering a drug for sale bearing a label calculated to mislead the public."

(Press, April 9, 1942).

"The crisis of man-power is at hand and will dominate the year 1942" (Mr. Churchill). This employer, after all the comb-outs, call-ups and elimination of non-essential industries, can employ twenty men and eleven cars (with petrol no doubt allocated to his essential industry) to sell coloured water, costing less than one penny, for five and ninepence a bottle—and he is fined less than a day's takings for an offence against the Drugs Act.

It is evident that we have not yet reached 100 per cent. war effort in this country. We need still to mobilise the entire people and all our resources for the greatest possible and speediest expansion of war production. The drive to achieve this will need to be carried forward by the united effort of the entire nation, of the Government, the employers and the workers in combination; for this increase of war production is the indispensable condition for an offensive strategy, for effective assistance to the Soviet Union, for the establishment of the Second Front and for speedy victory over Fascism.

To sum up. The essential practical steps which require to be taken in order to achieve maximum war production within the existing social and political conditions are, in short compass:

(1) Co-ordination of strategy and production: a long-term unified plan for mass production (as in the United States) corresponding to a definite strategic aim: variation only by higher strategic decision, not in accordance with a hundred conflicting conceptions of, a hundred different ordering authorities.

(2) Unified control to ensure the carrying out of the unified production plan, through a central planning and controlling authority, under a Minister of Production, exercising direct governmental control over the decisive war industries (coal, iron and steel, transport, engineering, aircraft, shipbuilding, chemicals), and unifying the placing of orders (the present arrangements under Lyttelton as Minister of Production do not yet fulfil this).

(3) Independence of the Commodity and Trade Controls from domination by the private business interests in the commodity or trade concerned.

(4) Regional Boards with executive powers to act as executive organs of the central planning authority and directly control the factories and enterprises in their region, allocating orders according to capacity, securing interchange of machine-tools, parts and materials, and checking execution.

(5) Boards of Directors and managements to be responsible to the central and regional planning authority (on which they will be represented); pooling of management personnel.

(6) Joint Production Committees in every factory, depot, etc.; and representation of the workers and technicians in the controls, both regionally and nationally.

(7) Improvement of labour conditions in respect of wages, hours, food and transport to secure maximum efficiency.

(8) Unification of coal industry under a National Coal Board, and of transport under a National Transport Board.

(9) Expansion of steel production as basis for expansion programmes in the main industries producing war materials, as well as in shipbuilding.

(10) Full utilisation of existing machinery, with area and regional interchange and pooling arrangements for machine-tools and spare parts; pooling of trade secrets.

(11) Expansion of man-power by full utilisation of existing man-power, extension of training, elimination of non-essential occupations and greatly extended entry of women into production.

(12) Political propaganda and education in the factories to strengthen anti-fascist consciousness and the will to victory.

CHAPTER VIII

HOME PRODUCTION OF FOOD

OUR strategy for victory requires a corresponding food policy. In 1937 Mr. Lloyd George declared:

"The front where we nearly broke down in the Great War was the food front. It was food shortage which broke down Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Russia. It nearly broke us down before they broke down."

Not only for defence, but for the offensive, the question of food policy—of the maximum production of food, cutting imports and most economic utilisation of food—is decisive. The key to an offensive strategy for speediest victory over Hitler lies in shipping. The key to shipping lies in food policy. If we wish to win the war against Hitler earlier rather than later, we must use our shipping for war purposes, for the transport of troops and war materials, and for the import of munitions or raw materials for making munitions, and cease using so heavy a proportion of our shipping for importing food into this country.

The grave inadequacy of the existing wartime food policy, waste of food, heavy dependence on food imports, and waste of cultivable land and productive resources in this country, is the Achilles' heel of Britain's war effort. All Hitler's blows, through the air and submarine warfare and the Battle of the Atlantic, are directed against this Achilles' heel, to deliver here the mortal thrust and reduce the British people to surrender by starvation.

It is true that the lost time and opportunities of nearly three years, during which it would have been possible basically to reorganise food production in this country and establish complete security for war needs, with consequent release of shipping for the strongest offensive strategy, cannot be at once made good within the limits of the present year, once the sowing season has passed, although the present year is already the strategically decisive year. But we must be prepared for all possibilities, including the prolongation of the war beyond this year. Therefore we must direct our policy, first, to make the best use of the existing crops this year; second, to make the most economic use of food in this country; and third, to go forward with the programme of full production, even though this can only become effectively operative next year.

At present, although the urgency of developing home food production and the necessity of saving shipping space has been stressed by every Government spokesman, a heavy proportion of shipping space is still devoted to importing food. The Government has stated that an increase of home food production by one twentieth would save one and a half million tons of shipping space; a simple calculation from this figure would indicate that, assuming the most favourable estimate that we have doubled the pre-war proportion of home food production, and now produce two thirds at home in place of one third, the remaining one third imported would represent fifteen million tons of shipping space, or the equivalent of three thousand ship journeys with an average cargo of five thousand tons. Yet Britain began the war with less shipping than in 1914; and the rate of sinking has been heavy. Much of this imported food could either be produced at home, or is non-essential (like the luxury postal packets to private individuals for consumption above their rations), or could be dispensed with in the war emergency; much food is still wasted, owing to incomplete rationing and control; food is still exported from Britain to maintain the overseas market interests of special firms; rationing is less strict than in the last war, owing to meals in restaurants falling outside the rations. On the other hand, home production is still far from developed to its fullest possibilities; millions of acres of land which could be cultivated are left uncultivated, and the difficulties are not only practical difficulties, but questions of policy; and, despite all the Government measures for expanding agricultural production and the officially estimated prospect of attaining in the third year, in 1942, an extension of the arable area by two million acres above the 1918 level, "it is doubtful whether our output of farm products as a whole is any more now than it was then, yet we have several million more mouths to feed" (*Daily Telegraph*, March 19, 1942).

A very much more serious approach is thus necessary to the whole question of food policy, of food production and distribution. Food policy needs to be treated as a vital front of strategy, an integral part of our strategy of the offensive, and an integral part of our plan of war production as a whole. It needs to be planned as a whole, with the closest relationship of production and consumption, entirely on grounds of war strategy, and not on grounds of sectional interests. We cannot afford to continue with a position in which there exists no authority responsible for planning and deciding food policy as a whole, as a part of strategy (apart from the ultimate arbitral authority of the War

Cabinet, which can obviously only give intermittent attention to occasional big controversial issues, and is not the same as a central planning and executive authority for food policy), so that food policy is in practice the shuttlecock between two conflicting departmental Ministries, which are indeed united in the basic policy of limitation of home agriculture and heavy dependence on imports, but one of which represents mainly the interests of the big food traders, with their emphasis on maximum imports, while the other represents mainly the interests of the big farmers and landowners, with their eye on the post-war position of agriculture and hostility to any far-reaching changes in the traditional livestock basis of British agriculture.

The basic food policy of the Government has up to the present, and especially for the first two years of the war, reflected this absence of planning in relation to the serious needs of the war. Both in production and distribution it has taken on the character, not of a long-term plan for a supreme emergency, but of a gradually extending series of partial interventions and hand-to-mouth decisions, which Mr. Lloyd George has aptly described as the "rabbit" policy of "a jump and a nibble." During the first two years of the war it was based on the principle of maintaining large-scale imports and storage of food, with a limited rôle for home agricultural extension as a supplement and emergency reserve, to be developed, not to the maximum, but only to the extent that the situation in respect of shipping facilities might appear to render advisable, with a minimum of disturbance to existing trade interests and the prospect of a return to the "normal" position of agriculture after the war. Proposals at the outset of the war for a programme of large-scale agricultural development and full utilisation of the land were turned down by the Chamberlain Government, which based its policy on the assumption that it would not be a long war or requiring serious effort; that the Navy would be able to maintain imports; and that any drastic measures would alarm the population. Only in 1941, when the heavy pressure of shipping losses, the growing number of war fronts requiring transport, and, at the end of the year, the extension of the war to the Far East, compelled a successively more urgent approach, was a beginning made by the Government towards launching a programme for maximum food production at home.

" Had the ploughing programme that was being called for in

the spring of 1941 been put in hand five or even three years ago, it would have meant security now."

(Sir A. Daniel Hall, "Reconstruction and the Land," 1941).

But even this programme is still shackled by limitations and contradictions which impair its effectiveness. The Government's agricultural policy, especially in respect of the planning of crops, remains hesitant and contradictory in its successive expressions. This lack of clear leadership has been confusing to the agricultural industry, and has led to uncertainty and discontent among wide sections of farmers.

What has held back a programme of full agricultural development? In no sphere of production does the factor of fear and uncertainty of the future loom so large as in agriculture. This has affected both the Government and the farmers. The fundamental difficulty holding back full production lies, not merely in the existing conditions and structure within agriculture, but in the existing economic structure of the country as a whole and the consequent conflict of contradictory views and interests as to the rôle agriculture is to play in the economy of the country. A real drive now for maximum war production would mean a radical change in the position of agriculture. But this raises at once the basic question of the position of agriculture in British economy—not merely as a question of future speculation, but vitally affecting present policy, because of the powerful interests involved. This is the question whether British agriculture is to be developed to feed the British people, or whether it is to be confined to its traditional rôle of providing a reserve for wartime, but reverting in peacetime to its miserable existence of furnishing only supplements to the main fare of the people and expensive table delicacies for the few able to pay the price for home-grown food. The latter view has received typical expression in the work of Viscount Astor and B. Seebohm Rowntree on "British Agriculture" (1939), who recommend that agriculture in this country should concentrate on providing what they call "health-protective foods" such as "milk, fresh fruit, vegetables and eggs: for the production of these Britain is specially fitted by natural conditions"; but that "we do not believe that it will be possible, consistently with the pursuit of a wise international commercial policy, to find scope for an enlarged domestic production of staple foodstuffs such as wheat, meat, bacon, butter and cheese."

It is inevitable that this outlook profoundly affects the development of an effective wartime agricultural programme. Under the stress of war much capital has been sunk by the

Government and by farmers to carry through the necessary technical changes in order to make possible an extended production of basic foodstuffs. The farmers fear that all this will be lost after the war, as it was lost after the war of 1914, if the dominant type of policy expressed by the Astors and big monopoly capitalists rules "the roost, and agriculture is to be allowed to revert to its old position. Hence the suspicious attitude of the farmers to all the Government's wartime agricultural measures; the prolonged haggling and bargaining, in place of whole-hearted co-operation. Thus the question of a wartime agricultural programme is in practice bound up with the basic policy in relation to agriculture. The chronic neglect of agriculture by the ruling class interests of this country has not only weakened the equipment for responding to present war needs, but also hampers the readiness to cooperate in a drive for maximum food production, and is further reflected in hesitancy in the Government's policy.

The neglect and depression of agriculture, with its continuous decline for three quarters of a century, has been one of the pillars of the traditional British economy, corresponding to the requirements of the world industrial monopoly in the nineteenth century and, after that began to weaken, to the continued dominance of the trading, shipping and financial interests, with the swelling volume of overseas capital and foreign tribute, needing to be paid by the largest possible volume of imported foodstuffs. Between 1871-75 and 1939 the arable area of Britain fell from 18.2 million acres to 11.8 million, or a drop of one third; the area under crops fell from 13.9 million to 8.3 million or a drop of two fifths; the area under wheat from 3.5 million to 1.7 million, or a drop of one-half. The numbers engaged in agriculture (farmers and labourers) in England and Wales fell from 1.3 millions in 1871 to 840,000 in 1931, or a decrease of over one third, while the population nearly doubled.

This decline, which expressed itself in more and more land formerly ploughed passing out of cultivation, was allowed to continue by the dominant ruling class interests. The first signs of concern over the process began to make themselves marked from the opening of the twentieth century, that is, from the opening of the imperialist era (Royal Commission on Food Supplies, 1903-5, and Joseph Chamberlain's agitation), when it became clear that the former world industrial monopoly was dwindling and war questions were coming to the forefront. The war of 1914-18 compelled a temporary rapid extension of food production in 1917-18, by which the area under crops

in Britain was extended by over two million acres; but after the war this advance was speedily allowed to drop, and the decline resumed at an even more rapid rate. Whereas in the four and a half decades between 1871 and 1914 the arable area of Britain declined by four million acres, in the two decades between 1918 and 1939 the arable area declined by four million acres. During the nineteen-thirties, following the world economic crisis and with the closer approach of renewed war, a series of measures were adopted to establish duties on imported food (with preference to empire food) and subsidies to agriculture, totalling £41 million a year by 1939; but these did not stem the decline, although the wheat area was slightly increased. Between 1930 and 1939 the arable area declined from 12.9 to 11.8 million acres.

The basic policy of the ruling class in relation to agriculture up to the war was to adapt and restrict it to the requirements of the big finance-capitalist interests: neither to let it die out altogether, nor to develop it, but to keep it in being for a specialised supplementary rôle in peacetime, while the main food supplies, amounting to two thirds, came from abroad, and as a reserve for war needs. In accordance with this principle, the so-called "normal" tendency of pre-war British agriculture (to which the ruling class interests would wish to see it revert after the war) was to concentrate increasingly on livestock (fed mainly with imported feeding stuffs) and market gardening. On this basis the big capitalist farms and specialised smaller farms with high capitalisation were able to make a good profit, while the small farmers, constituting the overwhelming majority, struggled desperately along on a low level. By 1939 it was estimated that four million acres in Britain were producing crops for human consumption, with a starch equivalent of 2.7 million tons, while 20½ million acres were producing crops for cattle, providing the basis for food for human consumption with a starch equivalent of 1.8 million tons (estimate of W. J. Ewing, Acting Principal of the Essex Institute of Agricultural Studies).

This basic pre-war policy received classic expression in the Baldwin Government's White Paper on Agriculture, published in 1926, which rejected even subsidies or other assistance to agriculture:

"The Government have considered various proposals which have been submitted to them involving subsidies either direct or indirect, to encourage corn-growing or the increase of our arable area, but they have come to the definite conclusion that they cannot support or advocate any of them. . . . Any general

scheme of subsidies for agriculture is open to the gravest objections. . . . The Government have also examined the question from the point of view of national defence, and have come to the conclusion that no case has been made out on defence grounds which would justify the expenditure necessary to induce farmers in time of peace to produce more than economic considerations dictate. The maximum possible increase to the national food supply would be relatively small from the defence point of view in comparison to the cost involved. . . . None of these schemes could make the country self-supporting as regards breadstuffs except at an impossible cost. On the other hand, from a purely economic point of view it will probably be better business for the British farmer to devote his energies as largely as possible to the livestock industry and to aim at meeting the demands of the population for meat and milk."

Although the principle of subsidies was adopted by the Wheat Act of 1932 and subsequent measures, the basic policy continued unchanged. It was affirmed again in its sharpest form by Viscount Astor in the House of Lords in 1936:

"We should not attempt to grow so much food here that there would be a danger of reducing substantially our shipping and shipbuilding industries or the man-power associated with our overseas trade, for it was on these we should largely depend to bring into this country a large quantity of munitions; it was vital that in considering the future of our agricultural policy we should not deliberately attempt a policy of self-sufficiency in food production."

Once again it was affirmed by Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister in his speech at Kettering on July 2, 1938:

"I have seen it said that we ought ourselves to grow at home all the food we need, and I want to give you a reason or two why I think that a wrong point of view. . . . If we could, what would happen? The first thing would be that we should ruin those Empire and foreign countries who are dependent on our markets. And the next thing would be of course that . . . those markets would no longer be able to buy our manufactures from us. . . ."

"The idea that we can be starved out in war seems to me entirely fallacious. We can depend upon the Royal Navy and the Mercantile Marine to keep open our trade routes and to enable us to import our food and raw materials indefinitely."

In consequence of this policy, Britain entered the war in 1939 in an even worse condition of preparedness in respect of food production than in 1914. While the population was five millions larger, the arable area was less by two and a half million acres; and the number of agricultural workers was diminished by a quarter of a million. In 1936 Sir George Stapledon, the leading agricultural scientist, had stated that there were 16½ million acres of land in Britain in a more or

less neglected condition, and most of it absolutely derelict, while every single acre of this enormous area, equivalent to over two fifths of the land surface of England and Wales, was capable of rapid improvement.

"At the outbreak of war, the country, with an agriculture based on semi-derelict permanent grass, was producing one third of its total food from its own land. Under correct management the output from most of it could be increased many times over."

("Grassland Survey Report, 1939," published in "Agriculture," the journal of the Ministry of Agriculture, September, 1941).

The proportion of cultivated land under crops, which was 32 per cent in 1916, and had been raised to 38 per cent by 1918, had fallen to 28 per cent, by 1939, the lowest on record. Less than one quarter of the wheat consumed was produced in the country, and one half of all cereals. Even the livestock were dependent on imported feeding stuffs, amounting to nearly eight million tons. Of the total value of the British agricultural output, estimated at £265 million in 1937-38, no less than £187 million or seven tenths came from livestock or livestock products, and one third of this (varyingly estimated at 30 to 35 per cent) was derived from imported feeding stuffs. Much British farming had thus become in effect a manufacturing process from imported raw materials; many farmers had forgotten how to plough. Although agriculture remained the largest single industry, with over a million persons participating in it, its level of development had been left far below that of other branches of production. While other branches of production have reached a considerable degree of concentration, large-scale organisation and technique, and high capitalisation, with a corresponding increase in net output per head, agriculture is still an industry of predominantly small businesses (the majority of farms over five acres being under fifty acres, and 85 per cent under 150 acres), employing on an average three or four people on a farm, with low technique and extreme lack of new capital, and in the grip of the landowners, the church (tithe-charges) and monopoly capital through the banks, food combines, big milling firms, marketing control and the high prices of fertilisers and agricultural machinery and equipment. Alongside the development of efficient mechanised farming with high profits, the majority of farms are technically backward and often semi-derelict small farms with deteriorating equipment. The standards and conditions of the agricultural workers, even after the recent increase to the £3 minimum,

are heavily below the level of the industrial workers; and the whole modern period has seen a continuous drift from the land to industry. Among the mass of the farmers there is deep discontent and chronic suspicion of all government measures; fear of the future, and anxiety that the wartime measures will be followed by renewed post-war neglect. In consequence of these conditions, both of technical backwardness and lack of capital equipment of the majority of farms, and of distrust of the future, the questions of prices and profits loom large in all discussions of wartime agricultural policy.

The programme of the Government at the outbreak of war was directed to a limited extension of the ploughed area, at first by two million acres in 1940, together with diminution of livestock, the rationing of feeding stuffs, and the method of price inducement to influence cropping. This policy was operated through the War Agricultural Committees, on a county basis, predominantly representative of the landed and big farming interests. The operation of the plough-up was thus conducted with considerable unevenness, often bearing very hardly on the small farmers (numbers of whom were evicted for failure to comply), while adjoining parklands were left untouched, and millions of acres requiring capital expenditure and State action to be reclaimed were neglected. On this policy Lord Winterton commented in the House of Commons debate on April 3, 1941:

"What an astonishing thing it is that after nineteen months of war you should still see in this country, within fifty miles of the Empire's capital city, more unused farming land than on any similar tract in any West European country. . . . On the one hand you have small farmers at their wits' end how to carry on on the grass crop even in summer, and who have been ploughing up land. Next to this sort of land, you may see an enormous deer park with nothing but deer."

Mr. Lloyd George commented in the same period (in an interview in *Reynolds News* on April 13, 1941):

"There are seven million derelict acres in this country that could grow food in abundance. They're not touched. Why? Because they could only be cultivated if the State took them over. But, you see, the reactionaries don't want to do anything like that. They are afraid of doing anything that would offend the traditions of land ownership, that looks like handing the control of the land to the nation. . . . These reactionaries would rather run the risk of starvation—which means defeat—than surrender their privileges on the land."

At the same time there was no planned control of the crops to be grown, save through the indirect method of price inducement extended to some crops, nor was there planned control

of the use of the crops. "The choice of crops has sensibly been left largely to the individual farmer, who is the best judge of the capacity of his land and the needs of his farm" (*Times*, December 16, 1940). As a result of this lack of plan, it was found that the fantastic prices offered by the brewers for barley, the price of which was left uncontrolled for two years, led to an extension of the barley acreage in preference to wheat; "the fear is entertained in official quarters that high prices may induce farmers to grow barley instead of the increased acreage of wheat which is being sought" (*Daily Telegraph*, October 30, 1941).

What has been the measure of achievement of this policy? Four million acres have been ploughed up by 1941. It is estimated that another one and a half million acres will have been ploughed up in 1942. A considerable proportion of this, up to one third, may have gone back to grass. Since six and a half million acres had been lost to the arable area between 1871-5 and 1939, it follows that even this increase of the arable area by five and a half to six million acres in 1942 represents from half a million to one million acres less than the 1871-5 level, a peacetime standard (contrasted with an increase in the population from twenty-six to forty-six millions in the same period). Even this leaves out of account the advance of science and technique in the intervening seventy years and consequent increased possibilities of opening up a wider area (more than counterbalancing the minor loss of a certain amount of agricultural land for industrial purposes, new built-up areas, etc). The wheat acreage was increased by 1941 to one third above the pre-war average of 1.6 million acres; this would bring it to 2.2 million acres, as against 3.5 million in 1871-5. How far output has been increased cannot be measured in the absence of published information, which has only been given in respect of vegetables, potatoes and milk, but not in respect of cereals. The public has been encouraged to believe that the main emphasis of Government policy has been directed towards increasing the production of food for direct human consumption, and especially of the food which constitutes the main bulk of foodstuffs imports, wheat:

"We want the maximum possible acreage sown to wheat; wheat is the sheet-anchor of the nation."

(R. S. Hudson, October 19, 1941).

But in practice there is reason to believe that the main increase has gone towards food for livestock, replacing foreign feeding stuffs.

"The public may think of farm production in terms of wheat—and wheat is important in these days when shipping is needed for other cargoes—but Britain is still foremost a livestock country. The contribution which thousands of farmers are making to this second wartime harvest is in increased fodder crops for cattle, sheep and other stock during next winter."

(*Times*, August 4, 1941).

Since this gives a much smaller proportionate increase in food for human consumption, the net increase in the production of food, apart from potatoes and vegetables, would appear likely to be so far very limited.

Even this limited increase in the arable area, however, led to an outcry from the representatives of the landowning and big farming interests in the latter part of 1941; and in response to this outcry the Government gave an assurance that a halt would be called to the plough-up programme, and that the policy would henceforth be to consolidate the gains won and endeavour to win a 5 per cent increase of output on the existing area:

"We had 16 million acres under the plough in the United Kingdom. Next year we should be able to show yet a further increase of arable land. After that our main effort must be to consolidate our gains."

(R. S. Hudson, October 19, 1941).

"He did not think they could contemplate any substantial increase of arable land, having regard to prospective supplies of labour and machinery. We should have to try to concentrate from now on on consolidating our gains."

(R. S. Hudson, November 19, 1941).

"Four million acres had been added to the tillage area since war broke out . . . It might well be that the maximum tillage area had virtually been reached."

(Tom Williams, Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, November 27, 1941).

Yet at the same time the other voice of the Ministry was declaring in January, 1942, after the shock of the extension of the war in the Far East, that four and a half million more acres required to be ploughed up:

"Still more grassland had to be ploughed up to the limit of available facilities. There still remained four and a half million acres of easily ploughable permanent grass."

(The Duke of Norfolk, Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, January 26, 1942).

This contradictory, confused and shifting character of official expression reveals the conflict of interests with regard to the plough-up policy, and the lack of a clear, firm policy and leadership.

We cannot be satisfied with this situation. What does a drive for maximum food production mean? It means making Britain as nearly as possible self-supporting in food. The aim of being self-supporting under wartime conditions means

(1) that we must primarily grow food for direct human consumption;

(2) that we must grow such food as can be cultivated with less labour and less risk;

(3) that we must grow such food as gives maximum food value within these conditions.

This means that we must very greatly further increase our arable acreage, especially our wheat acreage. An area under arable crops produces from five to twenty times as much food as grassland. Sir Thomas Middleton in his "Food Production in War" (Oxford University Press, 1923) has given the following table of the relative food-producing value of 100 acres under wheat as against pasture (a basis of calculation only; no single food is enough by itself):

	<i>Persons maintained per 100 acres</i>
Wheat	208
Average milk-producing pasture	41
Average meat-producing pasture	9

It is true that in extreme emergency of siege conditions, with a limited land area, the final maximum of subsistence could be obtained from potatoes (418 in Sir Thomas Middleton's list). But the Government's pressure in favour of potatoes as against wheat ("It would rest largely with the consumers whether the alternative would be potatoes or bread; it was the Government's duty to persuade the consumer that the choice should be potatoes"—the Duke of Norfolk in the House of Lords, August 6, 1941) is the expression of the desire not to extend to the maximum the arable area or change the basis of agriculture, but to choose in preference lower standards for the people. Potatoes give less food value than wheat, and require very much more labour. Since the land is available, the extension of wheat production is the decisive task in order to cut down food imports and save shipping space ("Of the foodstuffs we imported nothing bulked so large as wheat," Lord Woolton on March 11, 1942).*

* Shipments of wheat, including flour, to this country were estimated by a correspondent in the *Times* of February 21, 1942, at 7 million tons a year. Wheat output and imports for the British Isles before the war and in 1940 were reported by the Food Institute of Stanford University, California, as follows:

Is there room for a very wide further extension of the arable acreage? There is no doubt that the land is available, provided that the practical difficulties can be overcome. We have already seen that the Government in January, 1942, has stated that, beyond the six million acres already claimed as added to the arable area, "there still remained four and a half million acres of easily ploughable permanent grass." If we take Sir George Stapledon's estimate of sixteen and a quarter million acres in 1936 which could be reclaimed and grow food, and deduct the six million acres stated to have been reclaimed by 1942, this would leave over ten million acres available. Corresponding with this, Lord Sempill stated in September, 1941, that there were in England and Scotland ten million acres which could be reclaimed and put into cultivation (*Times*, September 2, 1941). Ten million acres is equivalent to the total area of Sussex, Kent, Surrey, Hampshire, Wiltshire, Berkshire, Oxford, Buckinghamshire, Somerset, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall, or all Southern England—much too great an area to waste at any time, especially in time of war emergency.

A large-scale further extension of the arable area and concentration on cereals, especially wheat, for direct human consumption, may mean a temporary diminution of livestock, though not necessarily of the dairy herd. The programme of both extending the area of cultivation and intensifying production would mean for the Government a somewhat greater expenditure, though small in relation to the scale of war expenditure. For the farmers it would mean driving the soil a little harder; though, with existing scientific knowledge, there need be no fear of loss of fertility. But it would mean security in respect of food supplies for this island; the establishment of the conditions for assured victory over Hitler, even in the event of the most difficult and prolonged war; and the laying of a firm foundation for a prosperous agricultural industry in Britain.

Can such an extension of the arable acreage to secure full utilisation of the land be carried through? There is ground for confidence that it can be done, in spite of all the difficulties, in

	<i>Wheat Output</i> (million bushels)	<i>Wheat Imports</i> (1937-38)
1934-38 (five year average) . .	71	195
1939	71	230
1940	74	222

("Wheat Studies," Food Institute of Stanford University, California, quoted in *The Economist*, March 22, 1941).

spite of all the practical obstacles through the shortage of manpower, machinery and fertilisers, which are brought forward by the Ministry of Agriculture as reasons against any further extension. The arable acreage can be further increased; the yield can be increased, and much present waste can be eliminated. This can be achieved—provided that there is a firm and efficient leadership and a clear policy; provided that the pressure of the landowning and big monopoly interests is not allowed to stand in the way; and provided that there is full cooperation of farmers and farm workers for the achievement of the plan. The Government has already wide powers. But these powers have not yet been used to carry through such a plan as is possible. There has been very great hesitancy, as over cropping and the use of crops, on the grounds that "the farmers will not stand it." The question may be asked: which farmers will not stand it? There has been no hesitation to use compulsory powers with the utmost ruthlessness against small farmers (even to the shooting down of a small farmer resisting eviction from his old homestead), as in other fields against small shopkeepers and small business. But it is against the big interests that there is reluctance to use compulsory powers. The mass of the farmers would only too gladly welcome a clear lead in place of the existing confusion and uncertainty.

The execution of such a single plan requires a single authority in charge of food strategy as an integral front of war strategy. Much of the present difficulty has arisen from the parallel existence of two Ministries, neither of which can envisage a policy as a whole, however harmoniously they work together. The Ministry of Food, concerned only with food supplies and distribution, and controlling a high priority on shipping space imports, bases its calculations on the assumption of high imports, and looks to home production to make good what cannot be imported, informing the Ministry of Agriculture what is required. On the contrary, the plans of home production of food should be drawn up on a maximum basis without regard to the possibilities of importing; and only in relation to such a governing plan the inescapable minimum of imports organised, pending full production. This can only be achieved by a single authority governing both aspects, and independent equally of the food trading interests and of the landowning and big farming interests. At the same time it is necessary to establish central planning of cropping and control of livestock. The central planning authority should determine the quantities of each crop required, with corresponding regional allocation.

In the same way it should determine the proportion of livestock to be maintained, with heavy cutting down of fat cattle.

The decisions of the Government need to be democratically carried out, in order to secure the full cooperation of the farming population. The present County War Agricultural Committees are not sufficiently democratic or representative of all sections of those working on the land. They are entirely appointed from above, and it is widely complained that they are dominated by the interests of the landowning gentry and big farmers. Steps need to be taken to broaden their character by bringing on more representatives of the small farmers and land workers; and their decisions and achievements should be made public, to draw in the active interest and cooperation of the entire farming population. They should have more direct control of machinery and labour, and should be equipped with full assistance of scientific workers.

Such cooperation of the entire farming population can only be strengthened and developed by a political propaganda campaign which brings the war home to every farmer and farm-worker and really elicits and inspires participation in the war effort against the common enemy, in the same spirit that inspires the best of the industrial workers. This means a change from the type of propaganda hitherto customary from government quarters to appeal to the sectional interests of farmers to regard peacetime as a calamity and war as a golden opportunity for making money:

"Don't be frightened of high farming. The market is assured, the prices are guaranteed. *It is not like the bad old days of peace and poverty*, when bumper crops and record outputs were rewarded by another agricultural depression and an unsold surplus to weigh you still further down. The nation wants all you can produce and will pay for it."

(R. S. Hudson, speech to farmers at Newcastle, January 16, 1942).

"*Farming, like the production of armaments, in peacetime is a risky business*, sometimes profitable and sometimes not. In wartime the armament manufacturer has an assured market for his products and small risk. Similarly the Ministry of Food plans to give the farmer an assured market."

(Lord Woolton, interview in the *Daily Telegraph*, March 12, 1942).

This type of appeal to farmers is indicative of the contemptuous official view of agriculture as only a wartime emergency industry, inevitably doomed to depression in peacetime. What would be thought of a Minister of Labour who based his appeal to war workers for a maximum effort on the grounds

that "it is not like the bad old days of peace and unemployment" and that war represented a golden opportunity to make higher wages? Yet this type of appeal is deemed suitable by the Government for the farming population. In place of this contemptuous attitude to the farming population, a new type of political campaign and propaganda is essential to reach to the countryside, and is all the more important in view of the existing widespread political backwardness.

The main practical difficulties in the way of further extension of the arable area, which are quoted by the Ministry of Agriculture as reasons for regarding the present area as the maximum possible, lie in the lack of man-power, the lack of machinery and the lack of fertilisers. These problems are serious, but not insuperable, given the will to overcome them without regard to sectional or vested interests.

In respect of fertilisers, despite the shortage of imported potash, there need be no fear of lack of adequate fertilisers, if all the available material and methods are effectively used in an organised manner, the pressure of sectional vested interests overcome, and the full cooperation of scientific research (hitherto restricted by the pressure of monopoly interests in this field) enlisted. Supplies of nitrogenous fertilisers and sulphate of ammonia exist. Phosphate supplies from basic slag can be greatly increased, as soon as the restrictions against the extension of steel production are overcome.* There need be no shortage of lime. In addition, even if livestock is decreased, there is room for considerable extension of the use and making of farmyard manure, since on many farms this has not been done, owing to the abandonment of arable farming. The system of short-term leys can in suitable cases assist in maintaining fertility. The question of artificial fertilisers and the fear of losing the fertility of the soil by taking successive corn crops has aroused hot discussion. Research has shown that the fear is in fact exaggerated; and it is evident that a wartime emergency policy cannot be the same as a long-term policy. But many of the arguments criticising the use of artificial fertilisers, and insisting on livestock as the only effective fer-

* The hostility of the fertiliser manufacturers to the extended use of basic slag was shown when the Government decided to subsidise its purchase. "Farmers are gratified to be able to obtain basic slag at 25 per cent. discount; but fertiliser manufacturers are not so happy. They feel that an undue preference has been given, and that sale of calcium superphosphate may be adversely affected in consequence" (Parrish and Ogilvie, "Calcium Superphosphate and Compound Fertilisers," 1939).

tilisers, are only the reflection of the landowning, big farming and cattle-breeding interests, which are seeking to maintain the existing basis of agriculture in opposition to the far-reaching changes required by the national need.

The question of man-power is the principal problem to be solved, if a large-scale further extension of the arable area is to be achieved. This problem is a serious one, but it is not insurmountable, provided that the importance of its solution is recognised and the necessary steps are taken. It has been estimated that every additional million of acres brought under the plough requires an additional 25,000 workers. Since the actual extension of the present number of skilled agricultural workers will have to be made by women or unskilled labour, this number will need to be increased by about half as much again. Thus there must be a very considerable increase in the number of workers on the land, equivalent to several hundreds of thousands, in order to make possible the extended plough-up and full utilisation of the land. Can this be achieved?

There are two main lines of approach for the solution of this problem. First, the direct increase of the number of workers on the land. Second, the more economical utilisation and saving of existing man-power.

The methods so far adopted to increase available man-power have been through (1) the Women's Land Army; (2) unskilled labour and C.O.s. employed and trained by the War Agricultural Committees; (3) war prisoners; (4) seasonal employment of women, schoolchildren and soldiers.

The results up to date have been meagre. The strength of the Women's Land Army was reported in March, 1942, to be only 25,000. This is an insignificant total, compared to the one and a half million women workers drawn into war industry, the numbers drawn into and demanded for the auxiliary services, and the still available woman-power. The reasons for this extremely inadequate and unsatisfactory result are not far to seek. First, farm work is not one of the occupations that conscripted women are permitted to choose. The whole attitude of the authorities to the Women's Land Army reflects the under-estimation of the importance of this work. Second, the conditions in respect of wages, accommodation, transport and other facilities, as well as in relation to training, compare unfavourably with other forms of service, and are such as to repel rather than attract large numbers of women workers. Third, the attitude of the majority of farmers to women's labour has lost much time in training women.

The key to the increase in the number of workers on the land must lie in the very greatly extended employment of women. A new approach is necessary to the whole question of the Women's Land Army, and a recognition of its importance on an equality with war industry and other forms of war service. The extension of the employment of married women in war industry (the conditions of which are discussed in the next chapter) should make possible the release of wider numbers of younger single women to work on the land. The levelling up of wages and improvement of conditions, with special reference to accommodation (provision of hostels), mobile canteen arrangements, transport and other facilities, as well as the development of training, would encourage the rapid increase of the number of women workers on the land. The prejudice of farmers against the training of women can be overcome. In practice, the big farmers have been able to make good use of the Women's Land Army. In the case of the small and medium farmers, the problem of accommodation and training has been a handicap. The best way of tackling these difficulties is through the employment and training of women land workers directly under the War Agricultural Committees; this makes easier their most effective use in organised groups as gang labour, and also makes easier their training and accommodation.

If effective steps had been taken from the beginning of the war to train women workers on the land, there would be now available a large complement of skilled agricultural workers. As things are, it is necessary to make the most effective use of the available skilled workers and spread their skill more evenly over the country. Much can be done in this way to expand man-power intensively by more effective use of what exists. Many big farms maintain a large complement of skilled workers, who could be easily transferred to other farms or employed by the War Agricultural Committees for training others. The letter of a patriotic farmer in the *Times* of December 8, 1941, is worth quoting in this connection:

"It is time that someone inside the agricultural industry spoke up to admit frankly that we are not using our man-power to capacity. The trouble is maldistribution. Some farms really have an unnecessarily large complement of skilled workers and some are woefully short of men who know how to do the ploughing, the thatching and the other skilled jobs that are essential in war-time farming. My farm employs eight regular men, all skilled men who know their work. None has left me, and I should be sorry to lose any of them, but the farm could produce just as much food if two of these men were transferred to another farm in a grass county where their experience would be invaluable in

working all the new acres of ploughland. I should have to manage with land girls and take on more soldiers and other unskilled hands at harvest and other busy times, but this sacrifice of convenience is one that the more fortunate farmer should be required to make. It means, I know, putting farmers and farm-workers under orders, but if the nation is to get more home-grown food the agricultural industry will have to use its man-power to better advantage."

This is one side of the question of man-power. The other side, not less important, is the saving of man-power. There are two main ways which are essential to achieve this. First, the more effective use of machinery. Second, the organisation of larger farming units.

Mechanical power means an enormous saving of man-power. Nor is mechanical equipment lacking in this country; the number of tractors, recently reported to exceed 100,000, is more than double the level of 1939. Yet this mechanical equipment is not yet effectively used, because the bulk of it is held by a very small proportion of the total number of farmers.

"The employment of mechanical power cuts the time and labour required for e.g. ploughing by anything up to 90 per cent. But there is still a tractor only to about one in four farms, and the use of neither these nor the other agricultural machines is yet planned to achieve optimum employment" (*Financial News*, April 8, 1942).

Although the Minister of Agriculture claimed in March, 1942, that "I think we are to-day the most highly mechanised farming country in Europe," the comment of the *Farmers' Weekly* (March 27, 1942) that "many of us will hardly recognise ourselves as Europe's most mechanised farmers" was justified. The Minister's claim was based on an abstract arithmetical calculation that the total of over 100,000 tractors exceeded the total in Germany, while the number of farms was one eighth the number in Germany. But the existence of this machinery does not yet mean that it is effectively used, because nine tenths of it is in the hands of the small minority of wealthy big farmers. Despite steps which have been taken for extending the use of machinery by the bigger farmers loaning it to their less fortunate neighbours, through contractors and through the County Committees, the machinery has not been used to the maximum. Much machinery has stood idle. Machinery has been locked up by wealthy big farms as a capital investment.

The main method of making machinery available for the smaller farmers has been through the depots held by the County Committees. But Mr. S. J. Wright, Director of the Oxford

Institute for Research in Agricultural Engineering, has estimated that "although the amount of Government equipment in the hands of the County War Agricultural Committees has increased by perhaps 50 per cent during 1941, it still represents only 2 to 3 per cent of the total amount in everyday use" (*Times*, December 29, 1941). In March, 1942, the Secretary of State for Scotland reported that 7,000 tractors were now in the hands of the County Committees and thus available for the smaller farmers:

"In Great Britain we now have 7,000 tractors under State ownership which we can hire out to farmers. Previously only wealthy farmers could have tractors, and only wealthy farmers could afford employees to drive them, and any number of small farmers had no means of mechanical cultivation."

(Tom Johnston, in the House of Commons, March 18, 1942).

This would mean that no less than 7 per cent of the total number of tractors were in public control, and that the remaining over 93 per cent were in the hands of "only wealthy farmers." Thus less than 7 per cent of the total number of tractors were available for 85 per cent of the farmers.

It is essential that all existing machinery, like man-power, should be brought under public control, in order to ensure effective utilisation. For this purpose the use of machinery under the War Agricultural Committees should be greatly extended.

The full utilisation of machinery, however, which is the key to saving man-power and increasing production, can best be achieved if ways are found to organise larger farming units. The superior efficiency of large-scale mechanised farming has been abundantly proved. The recent costing records of C. S. Orwin, Director of the Oxford Institute for Research in Agricultural Economics, showed that the all-in costs of growing wheat, after deducting the return from the sale of straw at the guaranteed price, averaged, in the case of crops produced with horse traction, 31s. a quarter, and in the case of crops produced on mechanised farms, 19s. 5d. a quarter. But the effective use of machinery requires larger units. 88 per cent of all existing farms are below 150 acres, and 44 per cent do not exceed 20 acres. The overhead cost of modern agricultural machinery bears heavily on even the 150 acre mixed farm.

"There is force in the contention that the uneconomic character of some holdings up to 200 acres or even more in some districts is due mainly to inability to take advantage of large-scale mechanised working and scientific development. Judged by the standards of business efficiency, the farm of 2,000 acres or more,

well equipped in every respect, should be a better food-producing unit than the small farm or the medium-sized farm." (*Times*, November 3, 1941).

"To a considerable degree, British farming, with its present structure, cannot utilise these powers of increasing and cheapening production, because of the smallness of the farming units and the haphazard parcelling of our land, which has been laid out without consideration of economic working under modern conditions." (Sir A. Daniel Hall, "Reconstruction and the Land," 1941).

In the conditions of the war the basic questions of the existing land system and land tenure cannot be dealt with. But even under the existing conditions, with the powers already in the hands of the State, much could be done in the direction of (1) organising large State farms on new reclaimed land; (2) developing cooperation of small and medium farms; (3) taking over any less efficiently farmed large estates. Much labour can also be saved by simplifying the apparatus of marketing and distribution.

The vast changes of technique resulting from the extension of arable farming necessitate expert scientific advice. If existing scientific knowledge were fully used, it should be possible to achieve very much more than the 5 per cent increase in output proclaimed as the immediate goal by the Government. Recent conferences of scientists have complained that especially in the field of agriculture and food production not enough use has been made of the help they could give. The general body of farmers are supposed to be suspicious of science; but the conditions of cooperation in the common national effort should assist in promoting mutual understanding. The fault does not always lie with prejudice or routine conservatism on the part of farmers; sometimes it can lie on the side of the scientific experts, if their advice, however invaluable in principle, fails to take into account the economic difficulties of the farmers. So far as possible, more scientific experts should be attached to the War Agricultural Committees. In so far as scarcity of forces limits the possibility of this, attention should also be paid to extending on the greatest possible scale the use of indirect methods for conveying and popularising technical and scientific advice for farmers through posters, leaflets, pamphlets, practical demonstrations, etc. (much may be learned here from the example of the U.S.S.R.).

The drive for extended war production has so far mainly enriched the already wealthy farmers, while the small man has benefited very little from the government subsidies and increased

prices for crops, owing to the increase of his other expenses and lack of capital to take advantage of new possibilities. Yet the success of the drive-for extended war production depends on the effective cooperation of the small farmers, who constitute over four fifths of the total body of farmers. Their difficulties need to be met with understanding by the War Agricultural Committees, and all possible help given. The complaints of the small farmer arise from the often too ruthless treatment and lack of consideration shown for the practical difficulties he has to face in the transition to arable farming: the necessity to sell his small capital invested in livestock; the immediate cut in income which the transition represents, and which he has not the ready cash to meet, while waiting for the return on his crops; the lack of capital for new equipment, or the difficulties over machinery. The small farmer is commonly in debt: easier credit would be of assistance to him, provided it is very cheap and on a long-term basis; but this could not alone solve the problems of his difficult economic position.

What can be done to assist in meeting the economic difficulties of the small and medium farmers, so that they can play their full part in the drive for maximum war production? This problem finds its sharpest expression in the burning question of farm prices. The price policy of the Government has in practice neither solved the problem of control of cropping, nor has it solved the economic problems of the main body of farmers. While the prices fixed leave a far too generous yield for the big farmers with their lower costs, they still often leave only a narrow margin for the small farmers with their weak economic basis. The successive upward marking of prices only accentuates this dilemma, rather than solving it. An effective policy needs to concern itself, not merely with fixing the level of prices, but with lowering the costs of production for the farmer and lowering the costs of distribution of his products to the public. Only such a policy can give real help to the immediate position of the small and medium farmers, while preventing excessive high prices of farm products.

First, with regard to diminishing the costs of production. The farmer tends to see his main difficulty in the payment of increased wages, because this is his main visible outlay. Thus the recent increase in agricultural wages, estimated to represent an increase in costs of £20 million, was immediately followed by the demand for an increase in prices, the concessions by the Government, the declared satisfaction of the big farmers (who could in any case have easily paid the increased wages, and for

whom the higher prices represented an additional gain), while the small farmers were left complaining that the increase was not sufficient and their difficulties were unsolved. But it is precisely in this direction of wages that the big capitalist interests want the farmer to see his difficulty, in order that he shall turn his main attention there and not to the high prices he has to pay for his farm equipment, building materials, feeding stuffs and fertilisers, or his rent, mortgage interest or bank charges, or the difference between the price he receives for his product and the price the public pays. As against this, a policy of effective help to the farmers should be directed to diminish the costs of production, not at the expense of wages, but by assisting them with machinery and reducing the prices of fertilisers and other equipment. The present control of prices of some agricultural equipment and machinery is partial and ineffective, even where it exists. Thus the prices of new agricultural machinery are controlled at prices averaging 20 to 25 per cent above pre-war; but since new agricultural machinery is in practice very nearly unobtainable, second-hand machines of identical make, and in considerably worse condition, often fetch double the controlled prices.

Second, with regard to diminishing the costs of distribution. The aim should be to destroy the "gap" between the prices received by the farmers for their produce and the prices paid by the public, to the mutual benefit of town and country. The glaring examples of this gap in relation to the prices of vegetables and fruit have often been brought to general attention; but these are only smaller examples of what happens over the whole field. According to recent statements of the Minister of Agriculture, the peacetime cost of home-produced food was £250 million, and of food imports, £400 million, making a total of £650 million; but ultimately the consumer paid £1,500 million for his food. It is only necessary to contrast this "gap" of £850 million with the enormous controversy which arose over the alleged extra cost of £20 million to pay the £3 minimum wage to the agricultural labourer, and the increased prices deemed necessary to meet this extra cost, in order to see that the real problem of costs and prices does not lie in the direction of wages, but elsewhere. It is evident that there is here a gulf which leaves ample room for improved prices for the farmer, if this should be necessary, higher wages for the agricultural worker, and cheaper food for the people. The big monopoly interests prey equally on the farmers, the farm workers and the town workers. If the struggle of the farmers is directed into

the right channels, against the grip of the big monopoly interests, they will get the overwhelming support of the people.

The attempts of Mr. Hudson, representing the big monopoly interests, to create a barrier of division between the town workers and the farming population must not be allowed to succeed:

"The demand of the town workers for cheap food had made it impossible for the farm labourer to earn a decent wage or the farmer to earn a decent profit out of which to live and finance his industry. Not only had the labourers and the employers been sweated, but the land had also been sweated and its fertility diminished."

(R. S. Hudson, speech to farmers at Newcastle, *Times*, November 28, 1941).

The attempt is here made to throw on the shoulders of the exploited town wage-earners the responsibility for the ruling class policy which, in pursuance of its commercial, shipping, financial and overseas capital investment interests, deliberately sabotaged the development of home agriculture; and on the basis of this supposed antagonism between town and country workers to conceal the rôle of the monopoly interests which in fact prey on both, making food dearer than necessary for the town workers, while robbing the mass of the farming population of a decent living. On the contrary, there is room both to cheapen food prices for the town population and to improve the return for the farming population, and the interests of the working people of both town and country can be united in a common policy to achieve this.

The agricultural workers, constituting the majority of the farming population (697,000 in 1938), will best understand the needs of the nation as a whole in the war against Fascism, since they are not tied by sectional interests, and can play a foremost rôle in the drive for maximum production. The improvement of their conditions means the strengthening of agriculture by strengthening its main living forces. In order to play their part in the fight for maximum production and for the improvement of their own conditions, the agricultural workers need to build up and strengthen their trade union organisation through the National Union of Agricultural Workers, and to win extended representation on the War Agricultural Committees. They should give every assistance to the new workers entering agriculture, and especially to the women workers, both to promote their training and to help in fighting for better conditions and wages for them. On the large farms, government depots and tractor stations joint production committees should be organised in the

same way as has been done in the factories. The cooperation of the farmers, farm workers, technicians and War Agricultural Committees is the essential basis for extending maximum production on the land.

The drive for maximum food production necessitated by war strategy demands also careful organisation of consumption, elimination of waste and simplification of the distribution of supplies (which also means releasing man-power). Up to the present the rationing policy of the Government has corresponded to its basic food policy of reliance on large-scale imports with only a limited development of home production. This has been reflected in a hand-to-mouth policy: we have eaten well when the ships were arriving plentifully, and less when the Government has had to draw on its stocks. The formal equality of rationing has been accompanied by very great inequality in practice. Many with a long purse have not even bothered to collect their rations, since they could eat abundantly in restaurants or on unrationed foods. Many workers' families have not even been able to buy their full rations. Food has not found its way to those most needing it. Much food is still being wasted.

Lord Woolton has at regular intervals spoken about "tightening our belts," the necessity to turn to a "simple life" or the need to "eat British." Yet we have continued to use our diminishing shipping space, not to defeat Hitler and shorten the war, but to avoid growing food on our own soil. After two and three quarter years of war the Government has solemnly instituted an "austerity meal" in restaurants at five shillings a head, plus up to seven and sixpence cover charge, plus two and sixpence music charge, plus ten per cent service, or nearly a pound a head, that is, more for a single meal of four people than a worker receives for the maintenance of himself and his family for a week. This laxity and inequality in rationing has contributed to passivity in the population, to social discontent, and to the black market and corruption. The standard defence against every criticism of laxity, or demand for a stricter and more equal policy, has been to claim that "the public won't stand it." Which public? In practice, popular opinion and agitation, echoed in the press demand and in parliament, has continuously been ahead of the Government in calling for the rationing of all food, the closing of loopholes, stronger measures against food speculators and corruption, the ending of class inequalities in food distribution, and better feeding for those performing heavy work. The pressure of the

cooperative movement played a foremost part in securing the extension of rationing to a wider range of goods in short supply by the adoption of the points system.

A planned food policy, as an integral part of war strategy, would need to be developed on the basis of the following governing principles:

(1) establishment of the all-round rationing of food (the rare and normally more costly foods can be made available for hospitals, workers' rest homes, etc.) at controlled prices within the reach of the workers;

(2) distribution of available food on the basis of need and of work requirements in the war effort, and not on the basis of length of purse;

(3) supplies through the shops on the basis of registration, to eliminate shop-crawling;

(4) extension of communal feeling through industrial canteens and British Restaurants;

(5) elimination of manufacture of wasteful luxury food products, and organisation of food processing and manufacturing on a minimum and economical basis, instead of to maintain special brands of particular manufacturers for the protection of particular trade interests;

(6) independence of the various food controls from the trade interests concerned;

(7) direct purchase by the controlling food authority of all food from the producers, and organisation of unified large-scale distribution either directly or through licensed wholesalers, including the cooperative movement, in such a way as to eliminate the waste through the existing marketing system dominated by the food combines and monopoly interests.

Such a planned organisation of the distribution of food should be closely co-ordinated with the planned home production of food, as the two sides of a single plan for feeding the people in wartime, with the aim of releasing the maximum shipping space for war needs by cutting down food imports.

The adoption and carrying through of such a policy for the production and distribution of food would enormously strengthen the strategic position of the British people both to defeat the main immediate line of enemy attack and to concentrate their maximum striking power against the enemy for the winning of speediest victory.

CHAPTER IX

WOMEN IN THE WAR EFFORT

THE enormous demands on man-power required for the present conflict, equally to maintain in the field the highest level of the fighting forces capable of carrying through an offensive strategy, and to develop at the same time the necessary extended industrial and agricultural production, make it imperative that women play the fullest part in the war effort.

The struggle against fascist barbarism is the common cause of men and women. In fighting and working alongside the men in the present struggle, women are at the same time building their own future, both to defeat the deadly menace which Fascism represents to the cause of the freedom of women, and to hasten their advance, through their active present participation, towards the goal of full social freedom and equality.

Women are the main reserve of the nation's strength, of the total available man-power, both for industrial production and for agriculture, as well as for civil defence and for the auxiliary services to release additional forces for the fighting front. Herein lies the pivot of the possibility of extending Britain's war effort. The Government has recognised this and called for the fullest participation of women. Nevertheless, through a variety of reasons and practical difficulties, this participation is still in fact limited.

"Woman power is not being fully enough used. Human energy, talents and personality that would go far towards beating the Nazis are being wasted because men are doing jobs women could do. Soviet women take over the jobs of all men who should be at the front. It is the job of the trade unions to work with the women of the country and to let them know what they can do."

This observation of one of the Soviet women trade union leaders, Mrs. Malkova (reported in a press interview, January 16, 1942), who took part in the visit of the Soviet trade union delegation to the leading factories and industrial centres in Britain at the beginning of 1942, reflected one of the principal conclusions reached by the delegation. Again and again they called attention to the extent to which work was still being done by men which could be done by women. In the Soviet Union, despite the gigantic call-up of men to the armed forces, output

in the factories and on the land has actually been increased, because the women have come forward to take the places of their husbands and brothers as factory workers, tractor drivers and land workers, dockers and railway workers, and in every sphere of production, as well as contributing to the armed forces. Here, where already in peacetime the proportion of women participating in production was much less and the reserves are consequently greater, we have not yet achieved anything like the same level of war mobilisation, although the needs, in view of the smaller population in this country and the manifold tasks we have to perform, are, to say the least of it, not less pressing.

"I don't want to decry the efforts and sacrifices of the women of Britain—in the days of the blitz they showed their calibre. Nevertheless, I should be doing less than my duty as a reporter of facts if I did not say that the sacrifices of the women of Russia are so stupendously greater than our own at home, not merely in extent but in depth, that sometimes they seem like a race apart.

"I am always reluctant to generalise about a people, and even more about a sex, but here, if ever, generalisations are safe. There are no shirkers, taking it by and large, no wealthy women with nothing to do, no prosperous escapist bemoaning the awful war from safe and comfortable ringside seats. If there had been, Russia would have lost the war by now—and Britain might well be knowing the indescribable horrors of a Nazi invasion on her own soil."

(Paul Winterton in the *News Chronicle*, April 10, 1942).

The women of Britain are—with few exceptions—not lacking in willingness, nor in ability. The most serious effort needs to be made to conquer the obstacles which still impede their full participation.

The urgency of this question is manifest as soon as we take into account the relatively restricted numbers of the population in this country (one-half the numbers of Nazi Germany, one-third those of the United States, and one-quarter those of the Soviet Union) in relation to the tasks we have to perform. Of the 46,750,000 people in this country, the numbers of working age, between fourteen and sixty-five years of age, are 33,250,000, of whom sixteen million are men and seventeen and a quarter million are women. The numbers actually engaged in earning work in 1931 were fourteen and three-quarter million men and six and a quarter million women, or twenty one millions in all. This means that if, say, five million men are withdrawn for the armed forces or civil defence, the available industrial productive forces are reduced by one quarter. In fact, however, the situation is more serious. For the number of men of military age, between the ages of twenty and forty-nine, is only ten millions.

These represent the main active and skilled forces in industry; for the majority of the six million occupied women were not employed in industry, and even the minority employed in industry were mainly in light industry. The withdrawal of five million men of military age is therefore equivalent to the withdrawal of half the main forces in productive industry. Yet production needs at the same time to be enormously increased. The cutting out of non-essential industries and occupations can only partially meet this loss, still less meet the need for an increase. The only additional source of strength, to compensate for the transfer of half the main productive workers to the armed forces, and to make possible increased production, must arise from the drawing into production of large numbers of women who were not previously engaged in production. This is the heart of the question of man-power. In order to carry out the absolutely necessary maximum production of war materials and food, alongside the maintenance of the necessary level of the armed forces, every woman who is healthy and not prevented by the direct charge of children must be drawn into productive work (or, where necessary, civil defence or the auxiliary services).

What is the present position? The six and a quarter million women already engaged in earning work before the war represented 34 per cent. of the total number of women in the working ages, as against 49 per cent. in Germany (Crowther, "Ways and Means of War," 1940). Two-thirds of the women of working age were thus not engaged in production. In his statement on December 2, 1941, introducing the new proposals for organising woman-power, Mr. Churchill referred to "our largest reserve for industry and home defence in the future," as represented by "this great field of married women or women doing necessary household work, comprising about eleven million persons."

Since the war, by March, 1942, it has been officially reported that one and a half million women have been drawn into "munitions and other vital industries" above the pre-war numbers already engaged in these industries (statement of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Labour on March 5, 1942). But a considerable proportion of these have been drawn from other non-essential industries and services, so that they represent a transference from within the six and a quarter millions already occupied, and not an addition to the total number occupied or the bringing in of new forces. It must be borne in mind that of the six and a quarter millions occupied in peacetime the majority were engaged in personal service (two millions), commerce and

distribution, as clerks or in the professions, and not in direct production; while those engaged in productive industry were mainly concentrated in textiles, clothing and light industries, which have been most heavily cut down. Thus this transference has provided a first reserve for war industry; but such transference does not yet change the proportion of only 34 per cent. of the total strength of woman-power being mobilised.

How far have women not previously occupied been drawn in? When the total increase in war industry amounted to one million, in December, 1941, it was stated that one quarter of these were drawn from non-essential industries, and three-quarters from those previously not occupied, married or in domestic service. Thus three-quarters of a million not previously engaged in industry had been drawn into industry. But since domestic service constituted by far the largest group in the six and a quarter millions already occupied, it is not clear from this statement what numbers of actual new forces from the two thirds of women of working age not previously employed, had been drawn in. Allowing for such necessary deduction, it would appear probable from this report that by the end of 1941 an optimistic estimate would be about half a million, to which must be added the numbers recruited for civil defence and the auxiliary services, so far as these were not drawn from women already in employment. This is some indication how limited is the achievement so far.

In the war of 1914-18 one and a quarter million additional women were brought into industry. It has been stated that "making allowance for the increase in population, we have already reached, at the twenty-seventh month of this war, the same employment of women in industry, the services and Forces as in the forty-eighth month of the last war" (Mr. Churchill on December 2, 1941). This would mean that only the level of mobilisation of the last war had been reached by the end of 1941. But the requirements now are enormously greater, as should also be the possibilities, with the development of the role of women during the intervening twenty years. The economist, H. Makower, estimated in the *Economic Journal* of January, 1940, that the aim should be set for an inflow of four million women into industry.

This large-scale mobilisation of women for production is not an easy task. We have here to pay the penalty for past policy and prejudices in relation to women and their role in production and society. The powerful traditional obstacles, which still impede present mobilisation, include:

(1) the very limited and slow advance of the entry of women into industry up to the war.

(2) wage discrimination against women workers; systematic low wages paid to women workers (average earnings of women workers in 1935 were 31s. 3d., against 64s. 6d. for men, or less than half the men's level; this discrepancy has increased since the war; in July, 1941, average earnings of women workers were 44s. 4d., against 99s. 3d. for men, or 44.7 per cent. as against 48.4 per cent. in 1935); so that only the pressure of dire economic need has hitherto driven women into industry.

(3) barring of skilled work to women, and lack of training.

(4) barring of married women from many occupations, in some cases by direct regulations, in other cases by discrimination in practice (except in the textile industries).

(5) fear of competition of women's labour, leading to opposition of the skilled*trade unions to the introduction of women into industry or to their training.

(6) low level of trade union organisation of women (one million out of six million employed, or one-sixth as against five millions out of fifteen millions for men, or one-third); neglect of the trade union movement to fight actively for the interests of women workers or to end the wage discrepancies and discrimination.

(7) lack of the necessary social provision, creches, communal feeding arrangements, etc., to facilitate the entry of married women into industry.

(8) the traditional conception of woman's place as the home.

Further, the economic and social development of the modern period has produced a mass of passive, inactive women of the "new middle class," the wives and daughters of the suburban petty bourgeoisie, accustomed to frittering away their lives in a trivial round (often with even the limited degree of housework mainly covered by domestic labour), to whom the conception of entering into productive industry would appear as a lowering of their status. Previously inactive or apathetic in relation to the life of society or communal activity, so far as they have to-day recognised the necessity of participation in the war effort, they tend to regard this as covered by some voluntary part-time activity in a canteen or similar welfare effort, rather than to take part in productive labour. The National Service officers have also tended to regard such participation as adequate in these cases, so that the burden of administrative compulsion to enter war industry has mainly fallen on working

class women in practice, already the most heavily burdened with home obligations and difficult conditions of life.

The same economic and social development has brought to an extreme point the parasitism of the rich, upper class women, without social responsibility (often without even the degree of social and political interest of the previous generation of upper class women who were active in winning their emancipation in the early twentieth century) and living under conditions making for social degeneration.

Finally, the political backwardness of the majority of women, inculcated by the whole preceding development and by the whole tone of existing society in relation to the role of women, hampers now the necessary speed of response to the struggle against the fascist menace and sense of responsible sharing in the democratic anti-fascist front.

How has the Government endeavoured to meet this problem? The approach has been very gradual, cautious and compromising, with pressure mainly reserved for the working class women. Even the idea of a limited measure of legal obligation for some sections of women was not adopted until the end of 1941, after two and a quarter years of war.

During 1940 the principal method, apart from economic pressure, was still the method of general appeal and exhortation. Mr. Churchill appealed for a million women to enter industry.

In the spring of 1941 national registration of women, to be carried out by successive age groups, was adopted. But administration was extremely dilatory. By March, 1942, five million women, covering the age-groups from 21 to 34 years, had registered. Of these, one and a half millions, or less than one in three had been interviewed. There was in practice no check on those who failed to register. The interviews, in the case of those not previously employed, were often very indefinite in character: all kinds of explanations of other obligations, or of performance of voluntary part-time duties, were in general easily accepted.

The result was that, until the introduction of conscription for single young women at the end of 1941, the only compulsion which had in practice been used was economic compulsion for women wage-workers in the non-essential industries which were being closed down. In the cotton, lace, hosiery, boot and shoe, clothing, hat-making, pottery and other industries factories were closed down by government order, and the women previously employed in them were left to be absorbed in war industry, unemployment pay being suspended in cases where such jobs were

refused. Thus working class women were driven by the threat of starvation into the shell-filling factories and similar work, while middle class women were left free.

This class discrimination in the call-up for women has only been partially corrected by the introduction of conscription for single young women at the end of 1941, since in practice the middle class women, where not exempted on the grounds of voluntary duties, have been able to find their way into all kinds of services, in some cases of an exclusive or snobbish character, and soft jobs, and have hardly ever been compelled to enter industry, while it is the daughters of the working class who have been compelled to take on all the heavy, dangerous, unhealthy and disfiguring labour in the munitions factories. The independent women's panels and appeals boards controlling the allocation are dominated by upper and middle class women. In this connection the letter of an enlightened manufacturer, a well-to-do-father, on the war work of his daughters is of interest:

"I am a manufacturer engaged in turning out precision instruments for aircraft. I have a daughter and a daughter-in-law, both of whom I could profitably and productively employ; yet they both prefer to drive staff cars in the services, a job that could very well be undertaken by the staff officers concerned. I suggest that the employment of these girls (who are mostly from the so-called 'sheltered classes') in the ratio of one chauffeur per car is both wasteful and extravagant. They may, as they are told, be 'doing a grand job of work'; nevertheless, I beg to suggest that there is a grander and more vital job awaiting them at the factory benches."

(Letter in the *Times*, March 5, 1942.)

On the other hand, the provision of practical facilities to assist the wider entry of women into industry has moved with extreme slowness.

First, the organised training of women has been very little developed outside the Government training centres, and even the limited numbers trained there are not always employed afterwards on the jobs they have been trained to do. In the factories many employers have been unwilling to introduce training schemes, and the available compulsory powers have not been used to make them do it. Had systematic large-scale training been instituted from the outset of war and carried on for these two and a half years, there would now be an army of skilled women workers able to replace the men on service. The slowness of advance was sharply commented in the debate on man-power in October, 1941:

"If the training of women in factories is to continue at its present rate without any impetus or initiative from any one except the employers, then I think a thirty years war will produce the requisite numbers of skilled women. The thing has to be done on a very large scale, and if we could have a few directions, with a dash of compulsion for the employers, it would have the support of every right-minded man and woman in the country."

(Miss Megan Lloyd George, M.P., in the House of Commons on October 8, 1941).

Second, the system of low wages for women has been in practice maintained. Even where the principle of equal pay has been nominally accepted, this has been in practice negated by the classification of "women's jobs" (the main exceptions have been where the organised men have played an active role, as in bus transport), so that even where women have been doing jobs previously performed by men the rate has been refused on a variety of grounds, such as the breaking up of the job, the need of supervision, etc. The practical outcome is shown in the average earnings of all women workers in July, 1941, of 44s. 4d., and 25s. 2d. for those under eighteen, as against 99s. 3d. for men and 40s. 7d. for youths and boys under twenty-one: this includes overtime, night shifts, piece rates and bonus, and is prior to deductions for taxation. In engineering the average was 48s. 2d. for women and 27s. 10d. for girls. In many industries the average fell below £2 a week. It is worth recalling that in April, 1918, the average earnings of women workers in government shell factories were 42s. 2d. a week (Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry). Statistical investigations have shown that only one woman worker in four is single and without dependants, so that the conventional basis for the supposed lower needs of women is built on a myth. The fact that the inequality is a systematic expression of a lower status, and not based on either services or needs, is most clearly shown by the inequality of government rates in service pay, compensation for disability or pensions: thus a male soldier or civilian who is completely disabled through enemy action receives 37s. 6d. a week as a basic pension, while a woman in exactly the same situation (neither is able to work, so that there is no inequality of work done) receives 27s. 6d.

Third, the provision of hostels and adequate transport facilities for women having to work away from home has been very much neglected. Above all, no serious attempt has yet been made to grapple with the practical conditions to make possible the extended entry into industry of married women with children and household obligations, that is, the main reserve of eleven millions, by the extended provision of day nurseries

and nursery schools, school feeding and school play centres, communal feeding arrangements, communal laundries, etc. The action of the authorities has been half-hearted and dilatory in the extreme. The number of day nurseries in the whole country by the end of January, 1942, was only 276, providing for 11,000 children, together with 374 approved and 257 projected, making a future grand total of 907, or provision for 36,000 children. This would provide for 18,000 married women on the basis of two children each. Of the 276 actually functioning by the end of January, 1942, only 132 were in operation whole time up to fifteen hours daily (those on part time, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. being no use for factory hours), or provision for less than 6,000 children. The shifting of responsibility between reluctant or obstructive local authorities and dilatory sanctions of the Ministry of Health and Treasury further impedes any serious programme. Yet this is one of the main governing factors to facilitate the further participation of married women in industry, which is in turn the key to the problem of man-power. With this actual total of 132 whole-time day nurseries in operation throughout Britain at the end of January, 1942, may be compared the total of 23,000 day nurseries in Germany (*Times*, December 24, 1941). In the Soviet Union, as long ago as 1935, places were provided in creches *at the place of work* for 5,143,600 children.

While in the present conditions of extreme urgency we cannot wait for an elaborate programme of construction to be fulfilled before endeavouring to extend to the utmost the participation of women, including married women, in industry, and must therefore make shift with all kinds of provisional emergency arrangements, such as part-time work, voluntary care of children among groups of neighbours, and even the justly condemned "minder" system, the most serious effort must be made to go forward on a bold, large-scale and speedy programme in order to provide the practical conditions which can facilitate the further entry of women into industry. The real question is not the question of compulsion, except in the case of a relatively small minority (the response from the mass of working class women, and from wide sections of independent professional and progressive middle class women has been magnificent in spirit, sacrifice and achievement, in the face of obstacles and discouragement). The real question is to assist in solving the practical difficulties, as well as to combat the political backwardness of large sections of women and the prejudice of men against their entry into industry.

What is needed ?

First, a bold, imaginative and large-scale Government programme for the rapid extension of the entry of women into production, in terms of millions, and energetic, generous provision of all necessary practical conditions to facilitate this.

Second, large-scale industrial training of women, with compulsion on employers to carry through adequate training schemes, and effective measures to ensure that employers utilise the maximum proportion of women in accordance with their training.

Third, revision of women's wages and rates to establish the universal application of the principle of equal pay for equal work and the payment of the rate for the job, whether performed by a man or a woman; raising of the present low rates paid to women where jobs are classified as "women's jobs"; equal rates for women and men trainees.

Fourth, organisation of improved transport and shopping facilities; improvement of welfare and sanitary provision for women in factories; improvement of housing and billeting arrangements in the case of transfer schemes, with the widest construction of hostels to be run on democratic lines; no transfer without consent in the case of women with dependants.

Fifth, immediate large-scale programme for the establishment of nurseries, canteens and communal feeding centres and communal laundries, in order to diminish the obstacles to the fullest employment of women in industry.

Sixth, an imaginative large-scale political campaign of propaganda and education to reach the masses of women and draw them into active and conscious participation in the democratic anti-fascist fight, as well as to combat the prejudices, both of men and of women, against their full and equal participation.

Seventh, the trade unions to take the initiative in campaigning for and assisting the wider entry of women into industry, fighting to end all wage discrimination, to promote training and to further the interests and organisation of women, and revising all rules and regulations of their organisations which impede the fullest entry of women into industry.

The achievement of such a programme is not only of vital importance for victory over Fascism, but will represent a fundamental advance in the position of women in society. It will mean the establishment of new principles of lasting significance for the future of democracy.

CHAPTER X

THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE

IN a progressive democratic war there can be no barrier of division between the army and the people. Millions of citizens, the cream of the nation's man-power, are undertaking the most responsible, exacting and (under the conditions of modern mechanised warfare) highly skilled task of the common fight against Fascism. In the final resort, as in the case of invasion, the obligation of the military fight against Fascism falls on all able-bodied citizens, on all save the very young, aged or sick. The full-time armed services, whether land, sea or air forces, are the spearhead, the picked, most capable, trained representatives of the entire united nation for bearing and using the arms produced by the rest of the nation for the defeat of the fascist enemy. The interests of the armed services must be the first concern of the civilian population. The care of their families is the responsibility of the nation. The equipment, training, discipline and morale of the armed forces is the measure of the capacity of the nation to defeat Fascism. The army and the people are one.

These elementary governing principles of the role of the army, and of the relations of army and people, in a progressive democratic war mean a great change from previous traditional conceptions with regard to the army, the status of the army in the State or the inner life and organisation of the army. The requirements of modern warfare, and especially of modern anti-fascist war, with its union of military and political tasks, its combination of military strategy with political insurrectionary movements of enslaved peoples, and the special tactical and strategic characteristics of modern mechanised war, with the much higher degree of individual initiative, mechanical training and tactical skill demanded of every soldier, reinforce this necessity of a complete change from traditional conceptions in relation to the army.

Formerly the British Army was a small professional long-service army. Its main function was that of a garrison and police force in the colonial Empire, with availability, in case of civil disorder, against the people at home. Its main training was for colonial wars; it was a limited auxiliary of the principal

weapon of British power, the Navy. Its composition corresponded to this task and function. The officers were drawn from a narrow upper-class section of the nation. The men were recruited mainly by the whip of starvation from the worst-off social stratum of the nation, from long unemployed workers, slum proletarians or those without training or prospect in civilian life (in 1925, out of 89,277 volunteering, no less than 52,200 or 58 per cent. were rejected on physical and medical grounds). The discipline and organisation corresponded to this composition and task. The discipline was a severe barrack-square discipline, making the heaviest calls on blind obedience and the least on intelligence, and assuming, in the whole character of training and of the traditional ethical code and penal regulations, the lowest level of intelligence and moral character of the private soldier ("Drunkenness and absence without leave are the two offences which require to be most frequently dealt with by the commanding officer," "Manual of Military Law," 1929). The Army was, in the fullest sense a class army: "the Army to-day is still fundamentally the same as that which existed throughout the nineteenth century; it is organised on a class basis" (Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee in February, 1938). The Army was cut off from the nation—"monastic in character, an Army from the nation and walled up within an archaic discipline; in a way, an aristocratic caste founded upon ancient traditions" (Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, "The Army in My Time," 1935, p. 17).

To-day the Army is in actual composition a Citizen Army, composed of millions of citizens drawn from all sections of the nation, a cross-section of the people, linked with the civilian population through nearly every family and household, and representing to a considerable degree the most intelligent, capable, trained and politically alert sections of the nation, the best of the younger generation. Yet the framework, the organisation, training, code and system of leadership, into which these millions of citizens are required to fit themselves, is still in the main essentials the framework of the old professional army, devised to meet different conditions, and leading to much unnecessary friction, frustration, misuse of skill and wasted effort. Some changes have already been made to meet the new conditions, to modernise the training, to broaden the area of selection of officers, to make more rational and human the discipline, and to recognise and encourage the cultural and political interests and consciousness of the citizen-soldiers. But these changes have still to advance through heavily entrenched

obstruction of old routine and prejudice; and very much more far-reaching changes are still necessary.

The army of the people for the war against Fascism (using the term, the army, in the most general sense for all the armed forces, not only the land army, but equally the navy, the air force, or the commandos, together with the artillery, tank corps, engineers, signals, anti-aircraft corps, etc.) needs to be well-equipped with all modern weapons of war, well-clothed, well-fed, well-trained and well-led. But this is only the beginning of the responsibilities of the nation in relation to the army. In this war against fascist barbarism the equipment of the anti-fascist soldier needs to be not only tanks, planes and munitions; not only a training, discipline, organisation and use of his skill corresponding with the requirements of modern mechanised warfare. The equipment of the anti-fascist soldier needs to be also a moral and political equipment—all that is embodied in the term "morale."

The anti-fascist soldier must know and hate the enemy, Fascism, and know well and love the cause for which he fights; he must feel himself the representative of the nation, whose fate and honour is entrusted in his hands; he must be filled with a burning resolution to achieve all and endure all on behalf of his own people and for the victory of the anti-fascist cause, the cause of all the peoples of the world. Political education and technical military education are equally necessary for the modern democratic soldier. In place of the old slogan, "no politics in the army", the modern army of the people is and must be a political army, that is, an army of conscious fighters understanding for what they are fighting, an army of citizen soldiers. This necessity has been recognised in principle by the army authorities, with the institution of political lectures, the Army Bureau of Current Affairs, etc. The War Office instruction lays down:

"The soldier who understands the cause for which he fights is likely to be a more reliable soldier than one who does not.

Many soldiers have no such understanding, and many others are losing touch with the sources of knowledge and information they used to possess.

It is the business of the Army to make good this deficiency of knowledge, and therefore to devise what means are possible to keep the men abreast of current affairs."

The first steps which have been taken in this direction still suffer from many weaknesses, and have been carried out in very varying degree, and with very varying standards, in different units. There are still needless restrictions on the political free-

dom of soldiers as citizens. Higher officers are able to make their views felt through parliament and other channels; serving soldiers are hemmed in by restrictions and regulations. Greater freedom of political expression, and greater freedom of contact and association of soldiers with the civilian population in political life, is the indispensable basis to ensure that the political life and consciousness of the army shall not develop in isolation, but as part of the political life and consciousness of the united nation.

The most important source of strength for the soldier is the sense that he is not isolated, but closely linked with the people and their aims. He must feel that the people are united behind him, that the front and the rear are one, with common interests and outlook; that, while he performs his duty in military training and in the fighting front, the civilian population, his brothers and sisters, father and mother, are working and striving unitedly to provide him with equipment, to look after his family, and to take over and share all his responsibilities. Niggardly treatment of the soldiers' dependants, lowering their level below the level of families whose breadwinner has not been called up, means not only injustice to millions who are left without protection and whose well-being is the responsibility of the nation; it means weakening the army and the morale of the army. The concessions which have so far been made are extremely inadequate. The soldier's wife with two children, even if her husband allots her the whole of the 3s. 6d. he receives under the latest increase, is still left with only 36s. 6d., while the single girl emerging from an engineering training centre receives 43s. per week, already a low wage. The demand of the labour movement for a flat rate of £2 for the soldier's wife and 10s. for each child is modest enough; and such a minimum should be immediately established.

The disruptive propaganda which seeks to promote ill-will by making comparisons between soldiers' pay and industrial workers' wages (while ignoring the really extravagant incomes of company directors or parasitic rentiers) needs to be actively combated. The soldiers, sprung from the working class, need to understand that the industrial workers, in protecting their standards and conditions, are protecting the common interests of the whole working class, including the soldiers when they return to industry. At the same time, the industrial workers need to take up actively the fight for the improvement of soldiers' pay and dependants' allowances. Here, as elsewhere in the conditions of existing class society, there can be no ab-

strict justice; but there can be and must be solidarity on the basis of a clear and conscious understanding of the common interests of the working people, whether serving in the army or in industry. Neglect by the labour movement of the interests and daily problems of those in the armed services, or lack of living contact, leads to the danger of alienation and opens the way to harmful influences. The closest understanding between the armed forces and the people is equally essential for the morale of the army and for the most effective production in industry. Everything which promotes closer contact and co-operation, including between particular organisations of the workers and particular units of the army, is in the national interest and strengthens the front against Fascism.

No less important are the necessary steps to strengthen the methods of training, organisation, promotion, leadership and discipline within the army in order to meet the drastic requirements of modern war, utilise more fully the capacities available within the army, and overcome the weaknesses consequent on the still powerful class-system and traditions. It is claimed that the avenues of promotion for the selection of officers are now thrown very much more widely open on the basis of efficiency rather than of class; but the practical results so far show that the effectiveness of this is still limited (it was recently stated on behalf of the War Office in parliament as proof of the new situation that only 24 per cent. of commissioned officers now came from the public schools; but in relation to the proportion of the male population passing through the public schools, estimated at 0.1 per cent., this would still represent 240 times their quota). The Beveridge Committee Report in February, 1942, showed the still "continuing failure to use men of engineering skill according to their skill, which has surprised us by its extent." While methods of drill and training have been widely modernised, reports would indicate that there is still considerable room for improvement. The compatibility of more democratic relations between officers and men, and of more democratic conditions in the life of the army when off duty, with the maintenance of fully efficient discipline, has been abundantly demonstrated in the armies of other countries; but necessary changes are still delayed. Even such a moderate conservative organ as the *Observer* (November 30, 1941) has recommended the formation of representative soldiers' committees, reporting to regular general meetings of the soldiers and dealing with all matters of welfare and common concern, with the exclusion of military operations and training: "a

Unit Forum, meeting regularly to discuss the general welfare of the unit, would do more to democratise the army than anything else." All such measures would help to promote the democratic spirit, morale and efficiency of the army.

The most important need, however, for the army, as for the whole nation, is the ending of the passive waiting strategy of defence, whose prolonged continuance in the midst of crucial conflicts inevitably leads to demoralisation. The overwhelming majority of the army to-day consists of men who have been under arms for over two years without being under fire. This enforced passivity, without taking part in either fighting or production, and being compelled to watch as spectators the titanic conflicts of the Soviet armies on the Eastern Front needing every man, is not good for the spirit of the army. Such passivity behind the Maginot line during the winter of 1939-40 weakened the morale of the French Army. The delay of the Second Front (against the overwhelming feeling of the men, as shown in many manifestations) has done harm. This passivity breeds cynicism, political indifference, slackness, the sense of inferiority and myths of Nazi invincibility. Further, it injures the relations of the army and the civilian population. The presence of a vast idle army of millions living on the country, and neither fighting nor producing, with reports of army waste, abundant rations, and corruption, weakens the stimulus to the maximum effort, sacrifice and production on the part of the civilian population, and leads to bad feeling and a cynical attitude, which becomes the counterpart of the agitation within the army against industrial workers' wages. All these are the evil fruits of the policy of passivity. They can only be finally ended, not by political education and propaganda alone, but by action. The hour of action will sweep these passing clouds away. The opening of the Second Front in Europe, the call to common effort and sacrifice of every fighter and every producer, with the fighting front calling to the workshop and the workshop calling to the front—this is the measure which more than any other will strengthen the morale of the army and the morale of the whole nation, and unite the army and the civilian population in close bonds of comradeship for common achievement and common victory.

CHAPTER XI

THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

FOR the forty-six millions of people in this country the war has profoundly changed all the conditions of life.

What is the picture of Britain to-day ?

“Half the population of Britain—men, women and children—are now directly on national service, according to a statement by Mr. Bevin, Minister of Labour. Speaking at Bristol, he said that he had mobilised into the Army, Navy, R.A.F., Civil Defence or munitions 20,000,000 out of 40,000,000 people.” (*Times*, March 30, 1942).

This vast mobilisation, and the far-reaching social and economic changes accompanying it have uprooted the old conditions of life. Not a home or household is left unaffected. Millions of men have been drawn into the armed forces, millions of women have been drawn into war industry, the auxiliary services, land work or other forms of war service. The call-up and the obligation of national service has been extended for the first time in the history of Britain to the entire population of working age, men and women. Hundreds of thousands of children have been evacuated away from their homes and parents. Masses of workers have been transferred to new centres of industry, and administrative centres and staff have been scattered over the country. Compulsory billeting has broken down the walls of the Englishman's castle. Industries and factories have been closed down by government order. The majority of small businesses and shops are in process of being liquidated (“By midsummer between one-half and one-third of the former 750,000 shops will probably be responsible for the whole of the retail trade distribution”—press report, April 6, 1942). Farmers have to cultivate their land under the direction of committees. The state machinery intervenes in every sphere of life. The food and clothing of the population is nationally regulated and prescribed, on a formally equalitarian basis, even though the length of the purse is still able to circumvent this for the few. A new currency of coupons co-exists with the old currency of cash, and both have to be handed over simultaneously for obtaining most of the

necessaries of life. Communal feeding is extended through 6,300 factory and pit canteens providing seven million meals a day and 1,320 British Restaurants. New forms of organisation develop to meet the new needs. The Home Guard draws in one and a half million men and youths not included in the full-time military forces. Joint Production Committees extend in the factories. Every street in the big towns has its firewatching organisation, which for the first time associates neighbours in a common task. All these beginnings of collective organisation co-exist with the continuing most extreme inequalities of wealth, intensified concentration of capital in the hands of the big monopolies, and gulf between the classes. While the population of Britain has not had to suffer the extreme ordeal of other European countries, of invasion, foreign conquest and spoliation, the period of prolonged air-raids brought war closer, killing fifty thousand civilians and destroying many homes.

The old pre-war conditions have vanished; and the process of change is still only getting under way. The social and economic changes which the war has brought are often described by some leaders of the Labour Party as instalments of socialism. But we must not blind ourselves to the class character of existing society. What the future will bring depends entirely on the present action, consciousness and strength of the people in relation to the present emergency.

The new conditions and problems can only be met by the most active initiative and response of the masses of the people. The war effort has demanded great sacrifices from the people, and is going to demand more. But it is not in the interests of the war effort to ignore the vital needs of the people or the vital democratic principles which are and must be the mainspring in this war against Fascism. An effective war against Fascism can only be a progressive democratic war built on the governing principles:

- (1) Maximum united effort of the entire people for the war;
- (2) Combination of democratic initiative, freedom of expression and popular participation in organisation, with strong central authority and discipline and ruthless action against all enemies of the people;
- (3) Equality of sacrifice as the aim in all war economic and social organisation;
- (4) Fullest possible protection of the standards and health of the people within the limits of war needs and possibilities, and priority in protection of the standards, health and cultural interests of the young generation.

It is not easy within the existing social and political conditions, that is, within the existing class society, to carry out effectively these principles. But our whole policy must be directed to the aim to achieve this. War organisation and war discipline of the strictest kind are not necessarily anti-democratic. The examples of the political role of Cromwell's army, or of Jacobin France, in the past, or of Democratic Spain or National China in the modern period, show how the ruthless needs of war, if it is a progressive democratic war, can hasten popular advance and weaken reaction and privilege.

The people have demonstrated their will to victory over Fascism. They want a united war effort, demanding active participation, responsibility and sacrifices from all.

But there is by no means yet equality of sacrifice. The sedulously repeated propaganda that the rich are now taxed to extinction, that war profiteering has been abolished by the 100 per cent. Excess Profits Tax, that the millionaire only receives sixpence in the pound of his income, while the workers riot on high wages, that the present state capitalist organisation is "war socialism", and that class distinctions have practically disappeared or are disappearing, is the customary whitewash to conceal hard facts. The distinction between life in the Dorchester Hotel and life in Poplar has not disappeared. One per cent. of the nation still owns sixty per cent. of the nation's capital (latest pre-war estimate of Daniels and Champion); since the war, with the heavy destruction of small enterprise and acceleration of monopoly, this concentration is likely to have increased. Before the war "between a third and a half of the population of the United Kingdom did not enjoy a diet adequate for health in pre-war days." (Sir John Orr, speech to the Association of Scientific Workers on January 10, 1942), while the Rowntree enquiry found 31 per cent. of the wage earning population below the poverty line; since the war, food and living conditions have grown more difficult and consumption has been cut; and, even though unemployment has been largely removed, millions of families have been reduced from the basis of an industrial worker's wage to the restricted level of dependants' allowances.

Sir John Anderson coolly stated in parliament on December 3, 1941:

"The earnings of the wage-earning community—I merely state it as a fact—have during the war gone up by something like 42 per cent. The returns of companies' earnings, on the other hand, show that business profits, after deduction of taxes, are in terms of money, at least 20 per cent. less than before the war. These facts should be known.

This brazen statement is worthy of its author. The alleged figure for wages is based on the return of earnings in one week of heaviest overwork in July, 1941, including overtime, night-shift, piece rates and bonus earnings. Even so, this figure was never received, since all deductions for health insurance, unemployment benefit contributions, and, above all, income tax, are ignored by this calculation. This imaginary figure is then extended to represent a year, and is further extended to represent the whole wage-earning community, ignoring the heavy fall in the standards of large sections from the level of wages to the level of dependants' allowances. On the other hand, when it comes to profits, tiffs apologist of wealth is scrupulous to take only the publicly admitted earnings, and to deduct from these all taxation. In fact, there are a thousand ways of concealing profits:

"Profits are a roguish thing: they vary with the length of the accountant's foot. Directors make their allocations to hidden reserves; they treat taxation charges arbitrarily, making no attempt to observe a standard practice in this and many other items, like depreciation. Even E.P.T. standards, for the most part, are not disclosed to shareholders. In the absence of facts of this sort, it is not surprising that industrial workers should greet 'with a roar of laughter' the self-evident proposition that under a régime of 100 per cent. E.P.T. the profit motive in industry has disappeared." (*Economist*, January 24, 1942).

The window-dressing of 100 per cent. E.P.T. has been a useful instrument of the wealthy monopolies, not only to mislead the public, but to cripple the expansion of small and medium firms which had little capital and no high profits before the war; it leaves untouched the sheltered position of the banks and big monopolies, which were already winning riotous profits in the "standard years" before the war and can continue to maintain them unchanged. Similarly the supposed taxation of high incomes to extinction (in fact, even on the official returns, the rich, or those with incomes of over £2,000 a year, retain 39 per cent. of their incomes after taxation) ignores the many devices for shifting the burden, dividing incomes between members of a family, formation of special companies, receipt of incomes as directorial expenses, tax-free incomes of directors, etc.

The hard facts, even on the basis of the carefully devised official White Paper of April, 1942, show the following proportions of the main divisions of personal incomes in 1941, out of a total of £6,207 millions.

THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

PERSONAL INCOMES, 1941

	£ million	Per cent of total
Rent, interest, profit and salaries (including officers' pay and allowances)	2,922	47.0
Wages (including pay and allowances of non-commissioned ranks in the services)	3,021	48.7

Thus the few receive a total practically equal to that of the mass of the nation. It is worth noting that the first group does not include undistributed profits. On the other hand, the total for the second group is swollen by actually including an estimate of the cash value of what the soldier receives in kind; it is further swollen, since this computation includes with the wage earners many former owners of small businesses, professional people and independent workers who are now receiving soldiers' pay.

Further, the burden of war taxation falls very heavily on consumption, which hits lower incomes harder than high. According to the White Paper of April, 1942, Direct Taxes in 1941 amounted to £1,215 million, and Indirect Taxes, less subsidies, to £1,103 million. In terms of personal incomes, Direct Taxes (Income Tax, Surtax, Death Duties, etc.) amounted to £842 million, and Indirect Taxes specifically on consumption, after deducting subsidies (a considerable proportion of the value of which do not go into the pockets of the consumers, but of the big combines), amounted to £687 million. From the former figure, which includes the contributions of the wealthy, must be deducted the War Debt interest, amounting to £325 million, most of which goes back into the pockets of the wealthy, and reducing the real figure to £517 million; and there must be further deducted the now very large volume of income tax paid from wages and low incomes (seven million income tax payers). Thus the main burden of taxation falls on the working class and low incomes; and the 1942 Budget has carried this disproportion further.

In the sphere of taxation and national finance there is accordingly urgent need for drastic measures to make more of an approach towards equality of sacrifice by

- (1) taking in taxation all income exceeding £1,000 a year;
- (2) making the exemption limit for income tax £3 a week for single workers and £4 a week for married workers, and (in the interests of maximum production) leaving overtime earnings free of tax;
- (3) raising the allowances of dependants of those in the forces, and of old age and other pensioners.

At the same time in the sphere of consumption drastic measures need to be taken to make more of an approach to the aim of equality and sacrifice, and curtail the luxury expenditure of the rich, by extending and making effective the system of rationing and price-control in relation to all main articles of consumption. Only such methods, combined with drastic action against the black market, can end the scandal of the practical evasion of rationing by the rich, through their unrestricted expenditure on costly unrationed goods or luxury meals in restaurants, or the similar extreme inequality of the clothes rationing, through the rationing of articles irrespective of price.

All these measures are necessary, equally in the interests of the most efficient war economy, and for the protection of the standards of the people. Similarly in the sphere of public health, education and the protection of the youth, we need to set our faces against the suicidal tendency to neglect and cripple these services on the ground that "there's a war on", and insist on their fullest maintenance and development, compatible with the inevitable limitations of personnel, in the interests equally of the war effort and the future of the people. In this connection the spirit of the Soviet Union, under conditions of far heavier strain, is worthy of note. Under the title "Guard the Young Generation!" the organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, *Pravda*, wrote in March, 1942:

"The whole of our country is working strenuously for victory. Every minute is calculated. The motherland has thousands of cares. Everything for the front! But however deeply we are engrossed in the war, the care and education of the children will remain important tasks for the Soviet people.

"Deep in the rear of the country many thousands of children are being fed, educated and given medical treatment by the Government. The finest products are reserved specially for them. . . . In Sverdlovsk the first children's dining room was opened a short time ago. It is housed in one of the city's finest buildings and serves dinners to 3,500 schoolchildren daily. Who are these children? They are boys and girls whose fathers are at the front, children who have been evacuated from other districts or whose health is not up to standard. This dining room has priority as regards meat, fats and other products.

"Anyone who thinks we have no time to care for the children because 'there's a war on' is politically short-sighted and narrow-minded, not to say a simpleton. It is precisely to-day that child welfare accords most closely with the interests of our motherland. . . .

"We must educate all our children and educate them well. On no account must the war be made an excuse for neglect."

Here also there is much to be done, although the worst confusion and neglect of the first year of the war has been partially overcome. In the early months of the war education of the workers' children was allowed to go to pieces; all schools were closed for the emergency in the evacuation areas; school buildings were taken over wholesale for other purposes (3 out of 4 requisitioned in London, 122 out of 203 partly or wholly requisitioned in Manchester); in the evacuation areas by November, 1939, 500,000 children were reported running wild, while the remainder were only receiving home tuition; and of the two and a half million children in the reception areas only half were receiving full-time education. With the disappearance of compulsory education, the laws on child labour were freely disregarded. After the first six months the situation began to be taken in hand and improved. By the last returns (July, 1941), 28,306 children of elementary school age were still receiving no instruction, and 72,505 were receiving part-time (for many children the term "full-time" covers a school day of 3 hours only as compared with 5-5½ hours pre-war). School feeding still reaches only to 350,000 meals daily for five million schoolchildren. Relaxation of the protection of youth labour has been further illustrated in 1942 with the Orders extending the hours of young pottery workers under 16 years to 53 per week (finally withdrawn in face of public protest) and of young cotton workers under 16 years to 52 per week. Meantime, while basic needs of education and of protection of youth labour and conditions still need urgent attention, the authorities and influential busybodies have been shaking their heads over "juvenile delinquency" and the supposed "high wages" of young people (officially recorded as averaging £2 a week for youths under 21 and 25s. for girls under 18 years), and considering favourably proposals sponsored by the Archbishop's Committee for still further strengthening the grip of the religious denominations on education, the teachers and the schools. Such reactionary tendencies need to be combatted; and the close co-operation of the teachers with the parents' organisations, women's guilds, etc., in association with the progressive elements of educational administration and of the political parties, and with an active democratic youth service movement, can do much to promote the necessary development of education and the welfare of the nation's children.

In the sphere of public health there are certain signs of deterioration in the advance of infant mortality (71 per 1,000 live births in 1941, as against 61 in 1940 in 126 large towns

with regular figures), and in the increase of tuberculosis deaths (11.1 per cent. more in 1940-41 in England and Wales than in 1938-39). In industry there has been a sharp increase in accidents, the number of fatal accidents showing an increase of 17 per cent. in 1939 against the previous year, and a further increase of 24 per cent. in 1940 against 1939; while the loss of 31½ million week's work a year by industrial workers through sickness (B.M.A. Report) is equivalent to the diminution of the labour force for a whole year by 617,000 workers, or one hundred and seventy-five times as many working days lost through sickness as through industrial disputes in 1941. It is evident from this how serious is the problem to tackle from the standpoint of the interests of war production alone; for much of the sickness is due to relaxation of health provisions in the factories, faulty black-out equipment with bad ventilation, lack of sanitary provision for extended personnel or the enlarged number of women workers, and similar inhuman and wasteful economies. The lack of a unified health service, and the cumbersome, obsolete and inefficient character of the existing semi-public, semi-charitable, semi-commercial system, has made itself strongly felt under the exacting needs of wartime, with the relative shortage of medical personnel and the necessity to provide for war emergency requirements as well as the normal needs of the population. The attempt to meet this without interfering with the existing unworkable system of organisation, by grafting the war emergency medical service on to the complex of private hospitals and myriad other institutions, has led to considerable confusion and lack of co-ordination, as well as serious worsening of provision, especially in respect of hospital accommodation, for the civilian population. The precipitate decanting of patients out of the hospitals in order to clear 100,000 beds for potential casualties (the total of hospital beds for England and Wales being 292,592), and the extreme overcrowding of the remaining space to provide for further potential needs, with delays or denial of accommodation for those needing it, while restricting new construction to a minimum (provision for increase by only 40,000 beds in wooden huts), was a policy of false economy, which has not only caused needless human suffering, but inevitably extends the area and incidence of sickness, while tying up healthy man-power or woman-power (relatives, etc.) away from the tasks of production in order to look after the chronic sick, aged, infirm or tuberculosis patients denied institutional care. Here also the development of adequate health and medical provision, on the basis of a unified

public health and medical service embracing the entire population, would be a measure of war economy which could be achieved even within the existing limitations and restrictions, and which would amply repay itself equally in the interests of the efficiency of the population for the war effort and in the interests of the future of Britain.

Finally, to achieve conscious collaboration of the entire people in the war effort, bureaucratic anti-democratic methods should give place to full popular democratic participation and expression. The maintenance of the fullest freedom of popular democratic anti-fascist expression, press, assembly and organisation; the upholding of the rights of public elected bodies; the extension of democratic-political propaganda and education to reach all sections of the people; and the drawing in of the widest participation and sharing of the mass popular organisations in the tasks of administration: these become essential responsibilities of war leadership. Such encouragement of many-sided democratic participation is wholly compatible with the strictest war discipline. In a war which represents the will and the interests of the people, repressive measures are in fact only needed against the enemies of the people, the wealthy speculators, saboteurs and defeatists, the friends of reaction and secret fifth-column supporters of Fascism ("There is no evidence in Norway, Holland, France or Belgium that any part of the working class, whatever their political party might have been, operated as Fifth Columnists: the Fifth Columnists came from higher up"—Mr. Bevin, speech in London on July 10, 1940).

France is the classic warning of the consequences of the repudiation of this policy. In France the main energies of the Government of Daladier and Bonnet in 1939-40 were directed, not against the foreign enemy, but against the people at home; a crippling censorship was imposed on the press; the entire repressive machinery of the administration was directed against the left, against the Communists, the trade unions, elected municipal bodies and parliamentary representatives, the foremost representatives of whom were thrown into prison in thousands, while the Fascists and friends of Hitler were left free, drawn into the Coalition Government, and given free play in the military command.

"While claiming that this was a struggle for freedom, the French Government from the outset demonstrated that they had no real sympathy with liberty. Fighting against systems which had completely suppressed all liberties of expression within their own territories, the French Government emulated the example of

the despots by practically forbidding all liberty of expression and criticism in the press of their own country."

D. Lloyd George, in the *Sunday Pictorial*, June 30, 1940).

"Those who imposed the censorship on France took an appalling responsibility. . . . When the blow came the French people were completely taken by surprise. The effect of this on the troops was incalculable."

(Alexander Werth in the *New Statesman and Nation*, June 29, 1940).

To the last, as Blum's speech at the Bournemouth Labour Party Conference in May, 1940, revealed, those who from within the ranks of the working class and democratic movement assisted in imposing this fatal policy, saw Communism and the Left as the enemy, and remained blind to the real danger from the Right.* The outcome was the collapse of France, with the final imprisonment also of those representatives who had assisted to forge the chains. The experience of German Social Democracy was thus repeated.

Here in Britain it is in the power of the working class and democratic organisations to prevent such a fatal policy and to fight for and maintain that freedom of popular expression and organisation which can ensure the greatest strength of the war effort and is the best guarantee against reactionary policy or fifth-column defeatism in high places. We cannot afford to be blind to the dangerous signs of reactionary anti-democratic tendencies, such as the general supersession of local democratic elected authorities by emergency forms and commissioner rule;** the banning of the *Daily Worker* and maintenance of this ban in the face of very strong public demand; the extension of this attack on press freedom by threats of suppression to other organs expressing sharp political criticism; the utilisation of anti-spy regulations in the factories to restrict anti-fascist propaganda or the sale of anti-fascist literature; and the simul-

* It was a Socialist Party Minister of Justice, Albert Sérol, who imposed the Death Decree against Communists, which preceded the fall of French democracy, just as it was the majority of Socialist deputies who had previously accepted Munich (of the 75 votes against Munich 73 were Communist votes) and subsequently voted the Vichy Constitution imposing the Pétain fascist régime.

** "The Regional Commissioner was a typical British institution, for he was not subject to rules and regulations. As one Commissioner observed to him: 'The glory of being a Regional Commissioner with no defined powers at all is that you can jolly well do as you like.' That was true, because the Regional Commissioners acted with the authority of the Government behind them."

(Herbert Morrison, in the House of Commons, June 10, 1941).

taneous considerable latitude and indulgence to pro-fascist, near-fascist, anti-democratic and anti-semitic propaganda or to the Mosley Fascists detained under very benevolent conditions under governmental protection from either popular anger or public trial.*

A reversal of these dangerous tendencies of policy is essential. If the Government pursue a policy of uncompromising hostility to Fascism, solidarity with the Soviet Union and the other nations in the alliance, and full energetic mobilisation and action for victory over Fascism, they need have no fear of failing to carry with them the complete confidence and enthusiastic support of the people in all measures, however drastic, which they require to undertake.

* "Sir Oswald Mosley is a Fascist, and we are fighting Fascism. For this reason he is a prisoner in Holloway Gaol. By affording him special privileges and comforts the authorities imply that they think he is not such a bad fellow after all. To those of us who are in the fighting services, this attitude is wholly incomprehensible and infuriating to the last degree. To us Mosley and his like are utterly contemptible. The Prime Minister has promised us 'blood, tears and sweat' before this war can be won. These conditions we can as a nation accept. But for the leader of the Fascists in this country there is to be comfort and comparative safety. He has it both ways, win or lose. That we cannot and must not accept."

(Letter from Flying Officer, R.A.F., *News Chronicle*, December 24, 1941).

This followed the press announcement that "Sir Oswald and Lady Mosley have been allocated one of the new domestic flatlets for married prisoners and wives detained under Regulation 18B. With this may be compared the treatment of the fascist internees' riot in the Isle of Man camp, when "for nearly three hours armed guards stood by, while Fascists at Peel internees' camp, Isle of Man, hurled bottles, stones and other missiles at them," but "under Home Office instructions the guard could not fire or do anything else to quell the trouble" (*Daily Telegraph*, September 22, 1941). In this case the Home Secretary decided that "the disorder cannot pass unnoticed" and that he would punish the violence of the fascist rioters (inside this country in the midst of an anti-fascist war) by depriving them of visits to the cinema for four weeks. The case of the newspaper *Truth* can be usefully pursued in the speech of Mr. Wedgwood in the House of Commons on October 15, 1941.

CHAPTER XII

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE WAR

THE speediest victory of Britain and Britain's allies over Hitler is not the special interest of one class or section of the nation, but the common interest of all classes and sections of the nation. This common aim unites widely differing classes and parties, however much they may be opposed on other issues, in a single common task, the organisation of the full strength of the nation for the defeat of Hitler. Just as the world alliance unites widely differing States and nations, so the counterpart of this unity of the world alliance is the unity of each nation composing the alliance. This national unity is indispensable for victory over Hitler. A divided nation opens the way to the victory of Hitler. A united nation ensures the maximum strength for the speediest defeat of Hitler.

This collaboration of all sections of the nation, of normally opposed classes, parties and organisations, constitutes the united national front for the defeat of Hitler. It finds expression in the united endeavour of the national war effort. In industry it finds expression in the co-operation of employers, management and workers for maximum war production. In the political field it finds expression in the co-operation of parties in parliament and in elections, and in the support of a Coalition Government of National Unity, based at present on the Conservative, Liberal and Labour Parties. The Government has received national support as the representative of national unity.

The weakness of the national front as at present developed is its formal character of a collaboration only of the official machines of the older parties; it makes no attempt to reach out to the vast web of organisations of the people, social, economic, sporting, religious or political, of youth or of women; it makes no attempt to draw in the practical participation of the masses of active men and women of all parties and of no party. Hence the tendencies of many men and women who are awakening to political life and interest in the conditions of the war and seeking new forms of political

expression, to be drawn in the wake of the various new "independent" groupings which crop up like mushrooms, often with very dubious antecedents, and which in fact, whatever their professions, cut across and break up national unity. This has been noticeable in recent by-elections, where the obsolete and unsatisfactory system of selection of candidates to represent national unity, not on the basis of the combined choice of all the democratic organisations in the constituency supporting national unity, but by the nomination of a caucus of whichever of the older party machines regards the constituency as its "property" on the basis of a seven year-old claim, has led in several cases to a revolt of the electors, the defeat of Government candidates representing national unity and the return of "independent" candidates, although this by no means reflects opposition of the majority of electors to national unity for victory over Hitler. These tendencies are a dangerous warning-signal. The disruption of national unity, even though beginning under the impetus of progressive desires and impatience of a section of the electors, would in fact play into the hands of the powerful reactionary forces which carried through the old policies of conciliation to Fascism, which are still heavily represented in the existing Conservative majority in parliament, and which, although not daring for the moment to proclaim their aims in the open, are on the look-out for any signs of the break-up of national unity to resume their intrigues and combinations for the pursuit of their old aims under new forms. All serious anti-fascists and supporters of decisive victory over Hitler need to recognise that the inadequacies of the existing united national front, and the legitimate criticisms which can be brought against its present working, demonstrate the necessity to strengthen it, and to strengthen the Government as the representative of the democratic anti-fascist will to victory of the people, and not to weaken it. The disruption of national unity only serves the interests of Hitler.

The transition, which is thus now imperative and urgent, from the present largely formal united national front, which in respect of organisation mainly exists on top, to the real living unity of the entire nation, drawing in the active democratic participation of the masses of men and women and of the mass organisations of the people, depends above all on the rôle of the working class movement. Only a strong, active and united working class, rallying and drawing into activity other sections of the people, can constitute the core of national

unity. Without this, national unity is distorted and crippled. This is the key to the problems of the present political situation in Britain.

The working class has no interests opposed to the interests of the united national front for victory over Hitler. The working class acts and fights as an integral part of the united national front. The strengthening of national unity is the vital concern of the working class, which has the most direct interest, for its very existence and the future of its aims, to secure the complete defeat of Fascism.

Within the broad unity of the national front for the defeat of Hitler, the organised workers, representing the most active and politically conscious sections of the democratic forces of the nation, have a distinctive rôle to play and a foremost responsibility to fulfil.

The working class constitutes the majority of the nation—and not merely the arithmetical majority, but that section which bears the decisive burden of the war effort alike in the field of production and in the fighting services. The rôle of the working class is decisive for the success of the war effort.

The working class is the rising class, which represents the future and which is least tied by the trammels of the past. The inevitable conflict between private property interests or monopolist restrictive policies and the maximum war effort means that the propertied sections of the nation, with the exception of a few individuals, are hampered from giving full and unqualified support to the maximum war effort by considerations for vested interests or fears of weakening the structure of property rights. The workers are not shackled by these limitations; they are by comparison free and unprejudiced in approach; they are ready to welcome what is new and progressive; they are less held back by fears of encroachment on vested interests; there is a wealth of creative energy in the working class which is still barely tapped in this country. It is not for nothing that that country where the working class has assumed power and the leadership of society has astonished the world by its limitless creative energy and resourcefulness, abundance of young and talented leading forces in every sphere, economic, political or military, its unshakable national unity, heroism, mass enthusiasm, capacity for self-sacrifice and dynamic achievement.

The working class is the most determined and inflexible anti-fascist section of the nation. Within the propertied classes there is division and conflict of interests and outlook

in relation to Fascism, because powerful sections see in Fascism the protection of their interests against the working class and socialism, and fear that a too decisive victory over Fascism would open the gates to the future victory of socialism. These calculations and fears among the propertied sections in all countries, which have been cunningly played on by Nazi propaganda, provide the basis of Munichism, the Quislings and the Fifth Column. The Fifth Column, as the War Cabinet Minister, Mr. Bevin, truly pointed out in July, 1940, has never come from the working class, but always "from higher up." Thus considerable sections of the propertied classes enter on the war against Fascism with a divided allegiance.

For the workers, on the other hand, the battle against Fascism is absolute and without compromise. Fascism, the representative of the most reactionary forces of the old dying social order, sets itself the aim to destroy the working class movement; to destroy the Socialist State in which the working people have already been able to win power and build that new social order which represents the aim of the working class movement in all countries; to destroy the democratic forms and national independence of all countries within the framework of which the working class movement has been able to grow up and build its organisation; and to destroy all aspirations to human progress and betterment. Between Fascism and the working class movement the battle is mortal, through whatever forms it must pass; one or the other must perish. The defeat of Fascism is the condition of survival of the working class movement and of the advance to Socialism. In this battle is being determined the fate of the working class movement and the future of the world.

Finally, the working class is the principal organised section of the nation and of democracy. The six million trade unionists, representing with their families the majority of the population; the two million members of the Labour Party; the nine million co-operators; the countless activity of the organised workers in the factories through their shop stewards and shop and works committees, and to-day also through the joint production committees; the Communist Party with an active membership and range of propaganda and campaigning exceeding that of any other political party or organisation; all these represent the forces of the organised working class. The workers are trained in discipline, solidarity, democratic initiative and organisation, self-sacrifice and tenacious struggle. They have learned the lessons of unity and collective action in place of

individualism and egoism. Through generations of struggle against heavy odds they have built up their organisation, won their rights, and fought in the forefront of every battle for democratic freedom, national liberty and human progress. Thus the organised workers have won and earned the rôle of the vanguard of the people, able and with the right, to the extent that they have achieved their own unity and leadership, to rally and draw with them in common action the masses of the people.

The tasks which the working class movement needs to fulfil within the common national front for the defeat of Hitler correspond to the character of the conflict and represent the highest level of responsibility in the long record of struggle of the working class.

First, the organised working class should be the strongest champion, organiser and defender of national unity for the defeat of Hitler. Against all hesitations and vacillations in other classes and sections of the nation; against all intrigues of adventurist and pro-fascist elements for the disruption of national unity; against all moods of passivity, half-heartedness, defeatism, war weariness, flinching from action and sacrifice, or leftist impatience, either in its own ranks or in the unorganised masses of the people, the strength, unity and leadership of the organised working class should be the most powerful bulwark and rallying-centre to lead, unite, inspire, hold firm and draw into active participation all sections of the people.

The workers know from twenty years of experience the necessity of unity against Fascism. Fascism has previously advanced, not by its superior strength, but by the division of its opponents. The unity of all opponents of Fascism is essential for victory. This lesson has been driven home equally by the experience of Germany, Austria or Italy, where the division of the working class and democratic forces permitted the victory of Fascism; and by the experience of France and Spain, where the unity of the working class and of the People's Front stemmed the advance of Fascism, until inner weakening or international disunity again broke the front; no less than by the example of China, where the national united front has for five years been able to hold at bay the armed power of Japan and prepare the conditions for future victory. The establishment of world unity against Hitler, on the basis of the world alliance and of the unity of each nation engaged in the common fight against the fascist enemy, has already brought within view the doom of the Nazi regime and of the Axis aims of world fascist domination. Only the disruption of this unity, division in action or hesitation to

bring into play the decisive combined strength of united action, could delay this doom. Therefore the maintenance and strengthening of this unity, both of the world alliance and of each nation fighting in the common cause, and unshakable opposition to every attempt to disrupt this unity or weaken united action, is the dearest interest of the working class in this historical moment. In this life-and-death struggle the working class can afford to lose no allies, however partial, hesitant or vacillating. The working class stands out and must stand out as the most determined upholder of national and international unity for the military defeat of German Fascism.

Second, the working class should not only be the most active upholder of the united national front for the defeat of Hitler, but should also be the most active driving force within the united national front. The working class has its positive contribution to make in the sphere of policy, programme and leadership. In every field of the struggle, in strategy, in political mobilisation in war production, in social and economic organisation, in colonial policy, in diplomatic policy, in propaganda, in the questions of war aims, the most active struggle needs to be conducted for the measures which are necessary in the interests of the world alliance for speediest victory over Fascism. The working class movement has the power and the responsibility to take the initiative in the fight to win support for these measures within the united national front and for their adoption by the Government.

Concretely, in the present situation this means that the organised working class movement should take the lead in the fight for a combined inter-allied strategy for maximum common action and full utilisation of existing forces in order to achieve the aim of victory in 1942, that is, specifically for the Second Front on the Continent of Europe; for the strengthening of the Government by the elimination of the remaining Munichite Ministers and the drawing in of the most resolute, energetic and capable democratic anti-fascist representatives; for the intensification and speeding up of war production by unified planning and effective public control of all war industry under a strong Ministry of Production, and ruthless over-riding of all sectional and vested interests which hamper maximum production; for the enforcement of a closer approach to equality of sacrifice in social and economic policy; for the protection and extension of democratic rights and press freedom for the purposes of anti-fascist mobilisation of the people, while operating more stringent measures against fascist and pro-fascist elements and propa-

ganda; for winning the co-operation of the Indian people by the recognition of the independence of India and the establishment of a representative Indian National Government capable of mobilising and organising the defence of the Indian people as an equal partner in the alliance of the United Nations; for the strengthening of political and diplomatic collaboration with the Soviet Union, both in the conditions of the war and in the settlement following the war; for the strengthening of democratic anti-fascist collaboration with the peoples of Europe enslaved by Nazi rule, and the repudiation of all aims and policies which hinder such collaboration; and for all similar measures which strengthen the anti-fascist alliance, protect its democratic anti-fascist aims and speed victory.

All these are measures which are urgently necessary for victory over Hitler, but in relation to which there is still hesitation, indifference or resistance within the united national front. It is essential to develop an informed public opinion in support of these measures within the united national front, to organise mass pressure in order to overcome reactionary resistance and strengthen the hands of the Government for carrying them out, and to secure their adoption by the Government as the representative of national unity. The working class movement has here a decisive rôle to play in voicing, leading and organising the fight for such measures.

Third, the organised working class movement has a special responsibility, in relation to the requirements of the war effort, to protect the standards, conditions and rights of the workers and of the masses of the people. In the interests of the major immediate aim of victory over Hitler, the workers have had to make many concessions, which under other conditions would have been stubbornly contested. It is the concern of the organised working class movement to see that these concessions are not exploited in the sectional interests of monopoly capital; that the compulsory powers, which have been freely used against the workers, are equally used, wherever the needs of the war dictate, against big capital, and that, within the limitations of war conditions, the standards and health of the working people take precedence as the first charge on all available means of consumption, in place of the present excess consumption expenditure of the upper incomes and propertied sections. For this purpose the working class movement needs to take special concern for the improvement of the pay, conditions and allowances of those serving in the armed forces and their dependants; the levelling up of old age pensions, widows' pensions and other

social service benefits; the improvement of women workers' wages and conditions with the aim to realise effective equality of pay, and the raising of the wages of low paid sections; the revision of taxation to take all excess incomes above a certain level, and raise the exemption limit for lower incomes; the extension of rationing and price control; the protection of the rights of the workers in the factories; the protection of working class and democratic rights of propaganda and organisation, etc. Similarly in the necessary changes in industry the working class organisations can alone judge the best ways and methods to combine the two objectives of maximum production with the safeguarding of the rights and interests and future claims of the workers. All these questions, while the initiative and guidance in solving them must come especially from the working class movement, are no separate interest of a section, but the vital interest of the united war effort, for the purposes of democratic anti-fascist war and for the protection of the future.

Fourth, the strength, unity and active leading rôle of the working class movement is the best guarantee, not only for the realisation of the present maximum war effort and united strategy for victory, but also for the future, for the character of the settlement which will follow the war, for the character of the organisation of the world after the war, and for the democratic and social advance which must follow victory over Fascism. The working class movement, as the representative of the working people and of the true interests of the nation, has the responsibility to see that the efforts and sacrifices of the people shall not be exploited for reactionary aims, throwing down a Hitler in order to set up some alternative form of reaction; that the settlement which follows the war shall correspond to the democratic anti-fascist aims of the people for the realisation of the freedom of nations and the organisation of a durable peace; that friendship and collaboration with the Soviet Union and with all the progressive forces of the world shall be maintained and carried forward; and that the economic and political concessions of the workers during the war, the concentration of monopoly capital and of executive powers necessitated by the requirements of the war, shall not become the basis of the intensified subjection and exploitation of the workers and enthronement of reaction after the war, but that, on the contrary, the advance shall be carried rapidly forward towards the aims of the working class movement, the aims of social liberation. No paper plan and no paper document can guarantee this. The hatching of elaborate plans of post-war reconstruction at

the present moment, before the premisses are present, can easily take on a reactionary hue, or become a diversion from present urgent tasks. Only the real relations of social and political forces at the conclusion of the war will determine the outcome. Only a powerful and united working class movement can ensure that the outcome shall correspond to the interests of the working people. But this depends on the present strengthening, achievement of unity and fulfilment of its present political rôle of the working class movement. The present determines the future.

In order to fulfil these tasks, the working-class movement needs to be strong and united, and with a policy and leadership capable of responding to present needs. The workers need to build up their organisation, trade union, political and cooperative; to achieve unity and overcome sectional barriers and divisions; to pursue actively a policy and programme corresponding to the urgent needs of the war; and to develop effective political leadership. The picture of the outstanding rôle which the working class movement can and should fulfil in the present situation is still far from the picture of what has so far been achieved. Within the framework of national unity there is not yet working class unity. This is a grave and dangerous contradiction which undermines national unity and shifts the balance in favour of reactionary forces. All the difficulties of the present political situation arise from the fact that there is not yet a strong and united working class movement fulfilling that active and leading rôle within the united national front which it can and should fulfil. Hence the manifold "independent" groupings are enabled to press their competing claims for the support of the people, and to confuse and weaken the popular forces for the ultimate benefit of reaction.

The experience of the critical years leading up to the present war already demonstrated the truth of this. Why was it possible for the policies of "non-intervention" in Spain, of Munich, of conciliation to Hitler, of refusal of the British-Soviet Pact and sabotage of collective security to be carried through by the Chamberlain Government, in spite of the overwhelming strength of popular opinion against them (87 per cent. poll for the British-Soviet Pact, eleven millions vote for the Peace Ballot for collective security, etc.) and the actual division of the ruling class, sown in the division of the Conservative Party? Only because the organised working class movement failed to fulfil its task of rallying and uniting the working class and democratic forces in a common front or People's Front, which would have

been capable—as opponents of the policy at the time recognised—of defeating Chamberlain and compelling a change of course. It is now widely recognised that if this policy, which was advocated at the time by the Communist Party, had been followed, we should be in a different situation to-day, and we should have probably been able to avoid the present war or, had it come, to have met it from the outset in a far more favourable situation.

To-day the representatives of the organised working class movement are participating in the Coalition Government for the defeat of Hitler. But this participation of individuals in a War Ministry, with little evidence of important influence on the major questions of policy, is far from equivalent to the active participation of a strong and united working class movement in the common national front, presenting its proposals and programme for the common cause, mobilising public opinion, and able in this way, both directly and through its representatives (whose voice would become strong as the voice of a mighty united movement with popular support), to exercise its due and powerful impress on the combined policy finally adopted by the Government. The weakness of the present situation, which is acutely felt by Labour supporters throughout the country, is not so much a question of the character of the individual representatives participating in the Coalition Ministry, as of the fact that this personal participation is regarded as a substitute for the participation of the working class movement in the national front, and is even made the occasion for closing down the political activity of the working class movement with consequent tendencies to decline of membership and stagnation of organisation, in this moment of most intense crisis, fateful issues and highest responsibility for the whole future of the movement.

In consequence, the criticism is sometimes expressed by some Labour supporters that the mistake lies in the participation in the Coalition Government, and that the solution is for Labour to come out of the Coalition. This, in the present situation, when Labour is in a minority in parliament, and there could be no question of Labour alone representing national unity, is equivalent to the denial of the necessity for national unity for the defeat of Hitler. Such a policy would play straight into the hands of reaction and the pro-Hitler forces. The maintenance of national unity, and of a Government representative of all political sections which stand for victory over Hitler, is essential for victory over Hitler, and is therefore the vital interest of the

working class movement. The fault does not lie in the participation in the Coalition, which is indispensable in the present relations of political forces, but in the policy pursued. The remedy does not lie in the disruption of national unity, and of the Coalition Government founded on its basis, but in the strengthening of the active rôle and positive leadership of the working class movement in the national front.

Similarly the criticism is sometimes heard that the labour movement is "dead," that there is stagnation, apathy and passivity in the localities, that organisation has fallen to pieces, and that the masses are turning elsewhere; and the conclusion is drawn that the future must be sought in some new "independent" "non-party" grouping or formation without roots in the organised workers or their mass organisations. This gloomy picture of the present situation of the organised working class movement is not a true picture. It is one-sided because it sees only what is going down and not what is rising; it sees a process of change and transition, which is the stirring of new life, as a process of decay and death. It is not the labour movement that is going down, but only old policies and methods which are discredited; new forces are rising to carry forward the movement and respond to present needs. Our task must be to assist this advance, and to clear away the obstacles which still stand in the path of further advance.

The workers are not quiescent. There is in fact abounding life and activity of the organised working class movement, even though still partial, and even though still held in by many limitations. The rise of trade union membership to over six millions represents the highest level for twenty years. Organisation and activity in the factories is more strongly developed than it has ever been, and is full of vitality, with plentiful evidence of keen enthusiasm and mass participation. Sales of working class literature have multiplied many times over during the war, and there is a new and serious reading public among the workers. The Communist Party has more than trebled its membership since the outbreak of war, and more than doubled it in the most recent period, reaching a total of fifty thousand active individual members, a new type of development in socialist organisation in this country. On the basis of its policy expressing the plain common interests of the workers and of the entire nation in the present struggle, it has been able to organise campaigns, meetings and demonstrations, with the participation of representatives of all sections of the working class and democratic movement, which have won striking mass support exceeding previous levels

of political campaigning and in certain cases exercising a perceptible influence in the political situation (campaigns for the removal of Margesson and Moore-Brabazon, for the Second Front, etc.).*

There is therefore no ground for deducing a decline in political interest of the organised workers from the recent decline in membership and local organisation of the Labour Party. This is only a reflection of the policies pursued during this period, the closing down of activities, and the harmful effects of the system of bans and exclusions. The removal of these causes could rapidly show a different picture.

The conclusion is evident. If the relatively small numbers of the most politically conscious workers organised in the Communist Party and the united movement have been already able to achieve a degree of mass response untouched by any other political party or organisation, how much more could be achieved if the entire organised working class movement were brought behind these demands and mobilised in united activity on a common immediate programme?

What is needed? The first necessity is to establish effective working class unity in action. The still continuing opposition of the Labour Party leadership to cooperation of the different sections of the working class movement in the present urgent common fight, and the imposition of the system of bans and exclusions within the political labour movement, with extension to the trade union sphere in respect of trades councils and in some unions, is less than ever defensible in the present situation. Despite the progressive step forward of the establishment of the British-Soviet Trade Union Committee, the policy of hostility to working class unity within Britain has even been intensified in certain respects since the establishment of British-Soviet unity. An extreme example of this policy has been shown in the attempted banning even of British-Soviet Unity Committees, broadly based on the cooperation of all parties

* The Trafalgar Square demonstration for the Second Front in March, 1942, organised by the Communist Party, exceeded any previous level of demonstrations in Trafalgar Square, according to the testimony of the veteran, Ben Tillett, ranging over the memories of sixty years since the great demonstrations of the eighties in the early days of the modern political working class movement. Thirty five thousand participated in this demonstration; in the succeeding Trafalgar Square demonstration of the Communist Party in May, 1942, accompanying the Communist Party National Conference, fifty thousand participated, and unanimously voted a resolution supporting the Communist programme for the Second Front and other measures directed to the aim of victory in 1942.

and organisations, political and non-political, under the leadership of the civic authorities, for the promotion of friendship and collaboration between Britain and the Soviet Union—on the grounds that cooperation between Labour Party members and Communists on a common committee and a common platform must not be permitted, even for the common aim of the fight against Hitler. This policy is neither in the interests of national unity for the defeat of Hitler, nor is it in the interests of the working class movement. Fortunately, the bans have not always been successful, and cooperation is extending in practice, in accordance with the healthy sense of the overwhelming majority of the working class movement; but it is still heavily impeded by the present disciplinary measures and the absence of cooperation on a national scale.

The aim of the policy of refusal of unity and disciplinary division of the working class movement is directed to place an artificial barrier between the vanguard of the working class and the main body, and thus seeks to prevent that interaction which is indispensable for the health and growth of the movement as a whole. The Communist Party has established its permanent place in the life of the working class movement as the representative of a growing body of politically conscious workers, and can make its distinctive contribution and fulfil an increasingly valuable rôle in the development of the working class movement as a whole. To attempt to prevent this by disciplinary regulations and threats is to attempt to stem the advancing tide of the working class movement. The refusal of unity and the system of division of the working class movement enabled Hitler to come to power in Germany. The same system serves the interests of Hitler in Britain to-day. It is necessary to make a serious attempt to overcome the present difficulties and find the way to establish united action and the free functioning of a united working class movement, by the cooperation of the Labour Party and the Communist Party, and the removal of those disciplinary bans on cooperation which paralyse the local working class movement or prevent the democratic election of representatives and expression of opinion within the working class movement. The establishment of such working class unity in action would enormously stimulate the growth, self-confidence, enthusiasm and revived activity of the entire working class movement.

Second, such working class unity in action needs to be based on a common immediate programme. It is necessary to adopt a common programme of action of the united working class.

movement corresponding to the present needs for the achievement of victory in 1942, and to be campaigned for within the framework of the united national front. The question of working class unity is not merely a question of organisation; it is a question of policy. At present there is dangerous disunity in practice, and the authority and responsibility of the working class movement is thereby weakened. Despite the formal participation in the coalition, there is lack of convinced understanding of the necessity of national unity within the local sections, as recent by-elections have shown. Adventurist elements from outside the working class movement are able to take advantage of this confusion to win support for their careerist aims or for groupings hostile to the interests of national unity against Hitler. Trends alien to the working class movement, whether chauvinist or pacifist, are able to take advantage of the passivity to penetrate and win support. When some representative leaders associate with the agitation of a Vansittart; when others are associated with pacifist groupings which are in fact pro-fascist in their policy; when Labour electors withhold support from candidates representing national unity and their leaders hesitate even to appear on a platform in a by-election to recommend national unity; then it is obvious that such demoralisation is weakening to the working class movement and prevents it from fulfilling the rôle which it should fulfil in the national front. The adoption of a common immediate programme and campaign of a united working class movement, expressing the urgent necessary measures for speediest victory over Hitler, would rally all sections of the workers in support, end the weaknesses and vacillations, and lead to the very great strengthening of the working class movement and its political rôle.

Third, the campaign of the united working class movement needs to be developed with the active cooperation of all sections on the basis of the common programme. For this purpose the extension of working class activity, and the protection, restoration or extension of the necessary democratic rights for anti-fascist propaganda and agitation is essential. In the forefront stands the question of the restoration of the *Daily Worker*. It is now admitted by the widest sections of opinion that the maintenance of the ban on the *Daily Worker* is indefensible. This question is vital for the strengthening of the working class movement, no less than for the cause of press freedom, democratic rights and national unity in the fight against Hitler. The opinion of

leading trade unions and democratic organisations has emphatically called for the lifting of the ban. The *Daily Worker* since its foundation in 1930 has stood in the forefront of the fight for the unity of the working people, for opposition to Fascism, and for cooperation with the Soviet Union. To-day it could fulfil a rôle which would mobilise, inspire and organise mass opinion and activity throughout the country for the united national fight against Hitler, for intensified war production, for the strengthening of the working class movement and for speedy victory. The attitude towards the ban on the *Daily Worker* is becoming more and more a touchstone of the whole attitude towards the war and the democratic anti-fascist aims of the war. It is imperative in the interests of the working class movement, no less than of the anti-fascist fight and of the cause of victory over Hitler that the *Daily Worker* should be immediately restored in order to fulfil the great rôle which it can play in the cause of the working class and of democracy.

Such a revival of working class activity, on the basis of the establishment of working class unity and a united campaign would not merely strengthen the working class movement and the fulfilment of its rôle in the national front, but would greatly strengthen the entire national war effort and the will to victory. The strength and the unity of the working class rallies wide sections around it. The common programme of the united working class, expressing the present needs of the struggle against Hitler, and embodying the necessary measures for victory, would win an enormous response from the entire nation. The establishment of working class unity on the basis of such a common immediate programme would basically change the political situation in Britain and open up a new perspective in the war. This path would lead to the most rapid achievement of a combined strategy, the opening up of the Second Front in Europe, and the accomplishment of those accompanying necessary measures which would help to make possible the realisation of the aim of victory in 1942.

More than this. A strong and united working class movement in this country would thus help to create the most favourable conditions for the speedy victorious ending of the war against Hitler. At the same time it would represent the most effective force on the side of the people for tackling the problems which would follow such a victory.

Great problems and great tasks lie before us. We need to defeat Fascism. We need to ensure that the world we shall create after the defeat of Fascism shall not permit the continued

domination of those reactionary forces which have produced Fascism and the present evils, but shall correspond to the aspirations of the people for freedom, for a durable peace and for better conditions of life. We can achieve these aims, provided that we fulfil our present tasks and build up our strength and unity of the working class and popular forces in the battles of to-day to be capable of controlling the issues of the future. The greatest responsibility here rests with the working class.

In proportion as we fulfil our present tasks, and build up the strength of the working class movement in so doing, we shall be strong also to face the future.

And Now . . .

You who have now completed reading R. Palme Dutt's **BRITAIN IN THE WORLD FRONT** must be concerned in the political work and thought which are involved in the winning of the various measures the book advocates as prerequisites to speedy victory over the Fascist Axis. Equally, as history unfolds in the epochal days ahead of us you will feel the need to study the further political steps necessary to correspond to new situations.

In **LABOUR MONTHLY**—which R. Palme Dutt has continuously edited since its foundation in 1921—these needs are amply met: through Dutt's own well-known regular contribution *Notes of the Month* and the contributed articles in each issue from various authoritative-writers. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that a close study each month of all that is written in **LABOUR MONTHLY** is an indispensable task for every serious-minded man and woman playing any part in the working-class and progressive movement.

The conceptions embodied in this book, and the preparation for their popularisation amongst the masses organised in political parties, trades unions and co-operatives, form the material for study in that new war-time development of **LABOUR MONTHLY**—its Discussion Groups, many hundreds of which are functioning now in all parts of the country.

LABOUR MONTHLY.

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